

CAQ

CovertAction Quarterly

FALL 1997

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MAD COW DISEASE

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"Operation Ghetto Storm": Paramilitary Policing

Free Radio vs. the Feds

Vaclev Havel's Warm and Fuzzy Image

Mercenary Armies & Mineral Wealth

The CIA at Fifty

From Bombs to Ballots: US Intervention in Cambodia

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The Long Secret Alliance: Uncle Sam and Pol Pot



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The Khmer Rouge diligently documented its victims such as these, who were presumably executed soon after they were photographed.

The Long Secret Alliance: Uncle Sam and Pol Pot

by John Pilger

The US not only helped create conditions that brought Cambodia's Khmer Rouge to power in 1975, but actively supported the genocidal force, politically and financially. By January 1980, the US was secretly funding Pol Pot's exiled forces on the Thai border. The extent of this support — \$85 million from 1980 to 1986 — was revealed six years later in correspondence between congressional lawyer Jonathan Winer, then counsel to Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. Winer said the information had come from the Congressional Research Service (CRS). When copies of his letter were circulated, the

John Pilger, based in London, has won numerous awards for his reporting from Indochina. His 1979 TV documentary, *Year Zero: The Silent Death of Cambodia*, is credited with alerting much of the world to the horrors of the Pol Pot regime and the US bombing that preceded it.


Reagan administration was furious. Then, without adequately explaining why, Winer repudiated the statistics, while not disputing that they had come from the CRS. In a second letter to Noam Chomsky, however, Winer repeated the original charge, which, he confirmed to me, was "absolutely correct."¹

Washington also backed the Khmer Rouge through the United Nations, which provided Pol Pot's vehicle of return. Although the Khmer Rouge government ceased to exist in January 1979, when the Vietnamese army drove it out, its representatives continued to occupy Cambodia's UN seat. Their right to do so was defended and promoted by Washington as an extension of the Cold War, as a mechanism for US revenge on Vietnam, and as part of its new alliance with China (Pol Pot's principal underwriter and Vietnam's ancient foe). In 1981, President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, said, "I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot." The US, he added, "winked publicly" as China sent arms to the Khmer Rouge through Thailand.²

With 50 CIA agents running Washington's Cambodia operation from Thailand, the dividing line between the international relief operation and the US war blurred.

As a cover for its secret war against Cambodia, Washington set up the Kampuchean Emergency Group (KEG) in the US embassy in Bangkok and on the Thai-Cambodian border. KEG's job was to "monitor" the distribution of Western humanitarian supplies sent to the refugee camps in Thai-

land and to ensure that Khmer Rouge bases were fed. Working through "Task Force 80" of the Thai Army, which had liaison officers with the Khmer Rouge, the Americans ensured a constant flow of UN supplies. Two US relief aid workers, Linda Mason and Roger Brown, later wrote, "The



Khmer Rouge instruments of torture found at Tuol Sleng school.

FROM TUOL SLENG MUSEUM, CAMBODIA

US Government insisted that the Khmer Rouge be fed ... the US preferred that the Khmer Rouge operation benefit from the credibility of an internationally known relief operation."³ In 1980, under US pressure, the World Food Program handed over food worth \$12 million to the Thai army to pass on to the Khmer Rouge. According to former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, "20,000 to 40,000 Pol Pot guerrillas benefited."⁴ This aid helped restore the Khmer Rouge to a fighting force, based in Thailand, from which it destabilized Cambodia for more than a decade.

Although ostensibly a State Department operation, KEG's principals were intelligence officers with long experience in Indochina. In the early 1980s it was run by Michael Eiland, whose career underscored the continuity of American intervention in Indochina. In 1969-70, he was operations

officer of a clandestine Special Forces group code-named "Daniel Boone," which was responsible for the reconnaissance of the US bombing of Cambodia.⁵ By 1980, Col. Eiland was running KEG out of the US embassy in Bangkok, where it was described as a "humanitarian" organization.

Responsible for interpreting satellite surveillance photos of Cambodia, Eiland became a valued source for some of Bangkok's resident Western press corps, who referred to him in their reports as a "Western analyst." Eiland's "humanitarian" duties led to his appointment as Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) chief in charge of the Southeast Asia Region, one of the most important positions in US espionage.

In November 1980, the just elected Reagan administration and the Khmer Rouge made direct contact when Dr. Ray Cline, a former deputy director of the CIA, secretly visited a Khmer Rouge operational headquarters inside Cambodia. Cline was then a foreign policy adviser on President-elect Reagan's transitional team. Within a year, according to Washington sources, 50 CIA agents were running Washington's Cambodia operation from Thailand. The dividing line between the international relief operation and the US war became more and more confused. For example, a Defense Intelligence Agency colonel was appointed "security liaison officer" between the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) and the Displaced Persons Protection Unit (DPPU). In Washington, sources revealed him as a link between the US government and the Khmer Rouge.⁶

The UN as a Base

By 1981, a number of governments, including US allies, became decidedly uneasy about the charade of continued UN recognition of Pol Pot as legitimate head of the country. This discomfort was dramatically demonstrated when a colleague of mine, Nicholas Claxton, entered a bar at the UN in New York with Thaoun Prasith, Pol Pot's representative. "Within minutes," said

1. Letters from Jonathan Winer to Larry Chartienes, Vietnam Veterans of America, citing Congressional Research Service, Oct. 22, 1986. Letter from Winer to Noam Chomsky, June 16, 1987. Telephone communication with author, August 1989.

2. Elizabeth Becker, *When the War Was Over* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 440.

3. Linda Mason and Roger Brown, *Rice, Rivalry and Politics: Managing Cambodian Relief* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 135, 159.

4. William Shawcross, *The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1984), pp. 289, 345, 395.

5. William Shawcross, *Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger and the Destruction of Cambodia* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979).

6. The colonel's role was "made plain" at a meeting with staff members of the Senate Intelligence Committee on Feb. 10, 1990, according to John Pedler, who was at the meeting.

Claxton, "the bar had emptied." Clearly, something had to be done. In 1982, the US and China, supported by Singapore, invented the Coalition of the Democratic Government of Kampuchea, which was, as Ben Kiernan pointed out, neither a coalition, nor democratic, nor a government, nor in Kampuchea.⁷ Rather, it was what the CIA calls "a master illusion." Cambodia's former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was appointed its head; otherwise little changed. The Khmer Rouge dominated the two "non-communist" members, the Sihanoukists and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). From his office at the UN, Pol Pot's ambassador, the urbane Thaoun Prasith, continued to speak for Cambodia. A close associate of Pol Pot, he had in 1975 called on Khmer expatriates to return home, whereupon many of them "disappeared."

The United Nations was now the instrument of Cambodia's punishment. In all its history, the world body has withheld development aid from only one Third World country: Cambodia. Not only did the UN — at US and Chinese insistence — deny the government in Phnom Penh a seat, but the major international financial institutions barred Cambodia from all international agreements on trade and communications. Even the World Health Organization refused to aid the country. At home, the US denied religious groups export licenses for books and toys for orphans. A law dating from the First World War, the Trading with the Enemy Act, was applied to Cambodia and, of course, Vietnam. Not even Cuba and the Soviet Union faced such a complete ban with no humanitarian or cultural exceptions.

By 1987, KEG had been reincarnated as the Kampuchea Working Group, run by the same Col. Eiland of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Working Group's brief was to provide battle plans, war materiel, and satellite intelligence to the so-called "non-communist" members of the "resistance forces." The non-communist fig leaf allowed Congress, spurred on by an anti-Vietnamese zealot, then-Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-NY), to approve both "overt" and

7. *Inside Asia*, Feb. and June 1985. Kiernan is now program director of Yale University's Cambodian Genocide Program.



PHOTO ARCHIVE GROUP

Khmer Rouge cadre in an undated photo.

"covert" aid estimated at \$24 million to the "resistance." Until 1990, Congress accepted Solarz' specious argument that US aid did not end up with or even help Pol Pot and that the mass murderer's US-supplied allies "are not even in close proximity with them [the Khmer Rouge]."⁸

The "trial" of Pol Pot was a wonderful Khmer Rouge theater-cum-media-event, but was otherwise worthless.

Military Links

While Washington paid the bills and the Thai army provided logistics support, Singapore, as middleman, was the main conduit for Western arms. Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was a major backer

8. *New York Times*, May 14, 1989.

of the US and Chinese position that the Khmer Rouge be part of a settlement in Cambodia. "It is journalists," he said, "who have made them into demons."⁹

Weapons from West Germany, the US, and Sweden were passed on directly by Singapore or made under license by Chartered Industries, which is owned by the Singapore government. These same weapons were captured from the Khmer Rouge. The Singapore connection allowed the Bush administration to continue its secret aid to the "resistance," even though this assistance broke a law passed by Congress in 1989 banning even indirect "lethal aid" to Pol

Pot.¹⁰ In August 1990, a former member of the US Special Forces disclosed that he had been ordered to destroy records that showed US munitions in Thailand going to the Khmer Rouge. The records, he said, implicated the National Security Council, the

9. BBC Shortwave Broadcast Summary, 1990.

10. *Cambodia: The Betrayal*, Central Television, 1990.

president's foreign policy advisory body.¹¹

In 1982, when the US, Chinese, and ASEAN governments contrived the "coalition" that enabled Pol Pot to retain Cambodia's UN seat, the US set about training and equipping the "non-communist" factions in the "resistance" army. These followers of Prince Sihanouk and his former minister, Son Sann, leader of the KPNLF, were mostly irregulars and bandits. This resistance was nothing without Pol Pot's 25,000 well-trained, armed, and motivated guerrillas, whose leadership was acknowledged by Prince Sihanouk's military commander, his son, Norodom Ranariddh. "The Khmer Rouge," he said, are the "major attacking forces" whose victories were "celebrated as our own."¹²

The guerrillas' tactic, like that of the

of that ruin, American power would again assert itself in Indochina.

The British — who have had special military forces in Southeast Asia since World War II — also played a key role in supporting Pol Pot's armed force. After the "Irangate" arms-for-hostages scandal broke in Washington in 1986, the Cambodian training became an exclusively British operation. "If Congress had found out that Americans were mixed up in clandestine training in Indochina, let alone with Pol Pot," a Ministry of Defense source told Simon O'Dwyer-Russell of the *London Sunday Telegraph*, "the balloon would have gone right up. It was one of those classic Thatcher-Reagan arrangements. It was put to her that the SAS should take over the Cambodia show, and she agreed."¹³

US has maintained a network of dictators with Hitlerian tendencies — from Suharto in Indonesia to Mobutu in Zaire and a variety of Latin American mobsters, many of them graduates of the US Army School of the Americas. But only one has been identified by the world community as a genuine "Adolf Hitler revisited," whose crimes are documented in a 1979 report of the UN Human Rights Commission as "the worst to have occurred anywhere in the world since Nazism."¹⁵ He is, of course, Pol Pot, who must surely wonder at his good fortune. Not only was he cosseted, his troops fed, supplied, and trained, his envoys afforded all diplomatic privileges, but — unlike Saddam Hussein — he was assured by his patrons that he would never be brought to justice for his crimes.

These assurances were given publicly in 1991 when the UN Human Rights Subcommission dropped from its agenda a draft resolution on Cambodia that referred to "the atrocities reaching the level of genocide committed in particular during the period of Khmer Rouge rule."¹⁶ No more, the UN body decided, should member governments seek to "detect, arrest, extradite or bring to trial those who have been responsible for crimes against humanity in Cambodia." No more are governments called upon to "prevent the return to government positions of those who were responsible for genocidal actions during the period 1975 to 1978."¹⁷

Such guarantees of impunity for the genocidists were also part of the UN "peace plan" drafted by the permanent members of the Security Council: that is, by the United States. To avoid offending Pol Pot's principal backers, the Chinese, the plan dropped all mention of "genocide," replacing it with the euphemism: "policies and practices of the recent past."¹⁸ On this, Henry Kissinger, who played a leading part in the mass bombing of Cambodia in the early 1970s, was an important influence.¹⁹

Western propaganda prior to the UN "peace process" in Cambodia concentrated



LEAH MELNICK/IMPACT VISUALS

Some of Cambodia's refugees at a UN-run camp controlled by the KPNLF.

Contras in Nicaragua, was to terrorize the countryside by setting up ambushes and seeding minefields. In this way, the government in Phnom Penh would be destabilized and the Vietnamese trapped in an untenable war: its own "Vietnam." For the Americans in Bangkok and Washington, the fate of Cambodia was tied to a war they had technically lost seven years earlier. "Bleeding the Vietnamese white on the battlefields of Cambodia" was an expression popular with the US policy-making establishment. Destroying the crippled Vietnamese economy and, if necessary, overturning the government in Hanoi, was the ultimate goal. Out

11. *San Francisco Examiner*, Aug. 12 and 15, 1990.

12. In 1990 Ranariddh said that, in a proposed attack on

Pol Pot's Washington Impunity

Shortly after the start of the Gulf War in January 1991, President Bush described Saddam Hussein as "Adolf Hitler revisited."¹⁴ Bush's call for "another Nuremberg" to try Saddam under the Genocide Convention was echoed in Congress and across the Atlantic in London.

It was an ironic distraction. Since the original Fuhrer expired in his bunker, the

Siem Reap, "The Khmer Rouge will be the major attacking forces," *Associated Press*, Oct. 11, 1990; *Indochina Digest*, Oct. 6, 1990. His separate statement that Sihanoukists celebrated Khmer Rouge victories as their own was reported in the *Sunday Correspondent* (London), Nov. 5, 1989.

13. As told to O'Dwyer-Russell by a Defense Ministry source, and relayed to the author.

14. *The Guardian* (London), Oct. 16, 1991.

15. Cited by Penny Edwards, *The Guardian*, Nov. 4, 1989.

16. Agence France Presse report from Geneva, Aug. 30, 1990.

17. Ben Kiernan, *The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses*, p. 28.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

19. On June 5, 1990, *The Times* (London) reported Kissinger as saying, "I would not be surprised if 10 years from now, China, even following its present course, will appear like a freer country than Russia and a more prosperous one." In July 1989, Kissinger, who has strong business interests in China, had urged Bush to give the Beijing regime "most favored nation" trading status, despite the bloody events in Tiananmen Square only weeks earlier. He regards the Chinese leadership as a moderating influence in Southeast Asia and supports China's "present course."



STEVE GRAW/IMPACT VISUALS

A display near Phnom Penh shows the remains of some 20,000 genocide victims from more than 200 burial sites.

on the strength of the Khmer Rouge, so as to justify their inclusion. UN officials and American and Australian diplomats talked about 35-40,000 Khmer Rouge. "You will understand," they would say, "we can't leave a force as powerful as that outside the tent." As soon as the Khmer Rouge had been welcomed back to Phnom Penh and, in effect, given a quarter to a third of the countryside, they refused to take part in the elections. The tune then changed. They were now "finished," chorused Western diplomats. They were "weakened beyond hope."

In the meantime, the Khmer Rouge was establishing itself as the richest terrorist group in history by selling off tracts of Cambodia's forests, as well as its precious stones, to the Thai, whose government was a signatory to the "peace accords." No one stopped them. They established four large new bases inside Thailand, complete with a field hospital. Thai soldiers guarded the road that led to them. The "they are finished" line remains in vogue to this day. Undoubtedly, they have been numerically diminished by defections and attrition, but their number was always a false measure of their true strength. It seems the State Department believes they are far from finished. On July 10

this year, the spokesperson Nicholas Burns let slip that Khmer Rouge strength ran into "thousands."²⁰

The real threat from the Khmer Rouge comes from their enduring skill at deception and infiltration. Before they seized power in

truth is that no one on the outside can really say what these are, and that alone is a measure of the organization's strength and resilience. The Cambodian leader Hun Sen, for one, clearly retains a respect for the veracity and menace of their ambitions.

The media relish Pol Pot as a unique monster. That is too easy and too dangerous. It is his Faustian partners in Washington, Beijing, London, Bangkok, Singapore, and elsewhere who deserve proper recognition. The Khmer Rouge have been useful to all their converging aims in the region.

Eric Falt, the UN's senior

spokesperson in Phnom Penh at the time of that manipulated organization's "triumph" in Cambodia, told me with a fixed smile, "The peace process was aimed at allowing [the Khmer Rouge] to gain respectability."²¹ Unfortunately, many ordinary Cambodian people share his cynicism. They deserve better. ■

Pol Pot's patrons not only cosseted him, fed, supplied, and trained his troops, but also guaranteed him impunity.

1975, they had honeycombed Phnom Penh. This process is almost certainly under way again. As one resident of Phnom Penh said recently, "They're everywhere."

The "trial" of Pol Pot this year was a wonderful piece of Khmer Rouge theater-cum-media-event, but was otherwise worthless as an indication of the organization's strength and immediate aims. The

20. State Department Briefing transcript, US State Department, July 10, 1997.

21. Interviewed by the author on film for *Return to Year Zero*, Central Television, London, broadcast March 1992.

US Intervention in Cambodia: From Bombs to Ballots



IAN GUEST/UNHCR

by David Roberts

There was little room for irony in Washington this summer as Congress puffed itself up with outrage over possible foreign influence in the US electoral process. "The American people have the right to know" intoned Sen. Pete Domenici (R-NM), "and we have the highest duty to determine whether there was a concerted plan by foreign governments to infiltrate our electoral process."¹ Applied to the US, the rhetoric is melodramatic and hypocritical; used to describe the US role in Cambodia, it is glaringly inadequate. The legacy of US interference is written in blood and misery across the map of Cambodia. Although the bombing has stopped, and the world has a "new order," the US is still interfering in the domestic affairs of this small nation. And elections are only one part of the strategy.

David Roberts, Ph.D., is senior lecturer in Defense Studies, King's College, London, England.

Photo: The war continues for the tens of thousands of Cambodians disabled by landmines. The country has the highest per capita incidence in the world.

1. Congressional campaign finance hearings, July 1, 1997.

"In order to do what we want to do in Cambodia, we can do without Prince Sihanouk. We can do without [Hun Sen's] CPP. We have \$90 million to keep the officials and soldiers of [Cambodia] and to buy the CPP deputies necessary to get the two-thirds [majority] and then put in place the coalition of our choice." — US State Department representative, June 1993, Phnom Penh

On the surface, the recent ouster of Norodom Ranariddh, the leader of the FUNCINPEC (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia) royalists, by his coalition partner Hun Sen, head of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), seems a straightforward enough violation of democratic practice; it also appears to have little relationship to Washington. But the surface in Cambodia is shallow indeed and the roots of this coup lie deep and entangled with a history of US interference spanning almost three decades.

Although the US weapons of choice are now dollars and ballots, in the 1970s, they were bombs and troops. Then, as the war in Vietnam spilled across its borders, the US under Nixon and Kissinger launched "secret" and murderous air attacks on Cambodia's eastern border in its effort to wipe out Vietnamese communists. When revelations of this violation of a neutral country reached the anti-war movement and sparked public protest, the US temporarily halted the bombings and deployed a covert army of ground troops. But as soon as the political heat died, the bombers flew again

and rained down the equivalent of five Hiroshimas on a country which had no quarrel with the US.

Apart from killing innumerable Cambodians² and returning parts of Cambodia to the Stone Age, Washington's military and political intervention had other, long-lasting consequences. In March 1970, just after US ground troops invaded, a CIA-backed coup deposed King Norodom Sihanouk. His pro-Washington replacement, Lon Nol, who ruled from 1970 to 1975, was a weak, corrupt despot rejected by much of the nation. Antagonism to his regime, outrage over US bombing, and the starvation and destruction which flowed from Washington's policies in Southeast Asia breathed new life into Cambodia's Khmer Rouge. From the jungle where it had been banished by Sihanouk in the 1960s, the movement rapidly built popular support.

Out of the inferno of civil war and foreign invasion, the Khmer Rouge and its leader, Pol Pot, gained strength and in April 1975 took power. Declaring "Year Zero,"



15- One of the stiff-necked was slain by having his throat cut

Corrupt and corrupting, they were executed by the thousands. The second group, the "old," were rural peasants whose lives were romantically seen as hard but honest and who were to be more trusted because they were uncorrupted by modern city life and Western influences. To prevent their contamination, Pol Pot ordered the abolition of memory. Money and medicine were abolished. The national bank was blown up. The library, repository of much of Cambodia's precious history, was turned into a pig-sty. The Catholic cathedral was razed to the ground, and Cambodia's ancient religion of Buddhism was outlawed.

Then came the genocide. Under the pretext of US bombings, the Khmer Rouge emptied the capital, Phnom Penh, which was swollen with refugees. Leaving behind homes and possessions, up to 1.5 million people were expelled to a countryside devastated by "secret" bombing, invasion, and five years of civil war between the troops of Lon Nol and Pol Pot. One journalist at the time described the evacuation as "the greatest caravan of human misery the world has ever seen."³

In the three years and eight months that followed, Cambodia entered the darkest period of its history and experienced a

tences. Of the 20,000 who entered Tuol Sleng, seven survived. One, an artist, Heng Nath, whose work appears on this page, painted recollections of cruelty that beggar belief. The images haunt the tragic, dilapidated school: Scorpions are coaxed from a box next to a woman as her nipples are pinched with pliers; a man suspended upside down in water is electrocuted; prisoners are forced to eat their own excrement. The reign of terror, slavery, overwork and starvation that spread throughout the country claimed between one and two million lives.⁴

Helping Pol Pot

With the regime enjoying tacit economic, political and military support from China,

4. Ben Kiernan (ed.), *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993); David P. Chandler, "The Tragedy of Cambodian History Revisited," *SAIS Review*, v. 14, n. 2, 1994, pp. 79-90.



13- A female victim with hands and feet shackled on the torture bed- Pol Pot men pinched her nipples with red pliers and then made scorpions and scolopendras sting her.

they closed down Cambodia and began dragging the country back to a pre-industrial era devoid of the foreign influence they blamed for the country's woes. In the process, Pol Pot split Cambodian society in two. His "new" people were those the regime distrusted: educated professionals who had lived cozy lives in Phnom Penh and members of the former government.

2. In one incident in which more than 100 died when the small ferry town of Neak Loeung was hit by the full force of a B-52 bomber, US Ambassador Emory Swank responded by handing out \$100 bills to the grieving families. Cited in John Pilger, *Distant Voices* (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 406.

3. Jon Swain, "Diary of Events in Phnom Penh," *The Sunday Times* (London), May 11, 1975.



17- Several children, pulled out of their victim mothers, were to be exterminated.

it looked as if the horror would end only when there was no one left alive to blame. By 1977, even as Cambodia descended into chaos, some of Pol Pot's troops along the border with Vietnam had been sporadically murdering, looting, and raping Vietnamese villagers. Then, on Christmas Day 1978, Pol Pot's vast and grisly social experiment came to an abrupt end. The People's Army of Vietnam, in response to growing attacks by Khmer Rouge Eastern Zone cadre, entered Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge was by this stage in such disarray that the People's Army, despite being unprepared for such an operation, pushed Pol Pot's "army of genocide" to Thailand on Cambodia's western border, and deposed the brutal dictator.

With assistance from Vietnam, Pen Sovann and Heng Samrin became heads of Cambodia's de facto government until Hun Sen took over in 1985. At 35, he was the youngest prime minister in the world and was supported politically and economically by Hanoi. Vietnamese civil administrators quickly withdrew, but elements of the army remained to help defend the population from Pol Pot's forces. The People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK — later the CPP) inherited a country in ruin; the nation lacked the most basic infrastructure — money, health care and transportation networks had all but ceased to exist; most of the country's human resources, doctors, teachers, engineers had been slaughtered or died of malnutrition and overwork in the agrarian "experiment" gone grotesquely wrong.

But over the next decade, rather than provide desperately needed aid, the West and China, led by Washington, withheld assistance and instead pumped aid, money, and arms, often through Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conduits, to the Khmer Rouge and its newfound "allies" in the refugee camps in Thailand. Also withheld was formal recognition and a UN seat, without which Cambodia could not get the development aid so crucial to the mammoth task of rebuilding from the ruins of Year Zero. To this date, it retains the ignominious distinction of being the only country in the world to have been denied development aid by the UN. Instead, the world body surrendered to superpower *realpolitik* while thousands more Cambodians died in floods and famine.

Not satisfied with an aid embargo, Washington continued to demonize and punish both Cambodia and Vietnam. Humiliated by losing to a Third World peasant guerrilla army, Washington saw its chance to extend the war and elicit revenge

by isolating Vietnam and punishing poor Cambodia, whose only mistake, as award-winning British journalist John Pilger once wrote, was having liberators from the wrong side of the Cold War.⁵

US Intervention

For more than a decade, the Khmer Rouge, protected by Western and Chinese antagonism to the Hun Sen government, continued to wage guerrilla war from its bases on the Thai border. Then, with the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and Vietnam backed away from supporting Hun Sen. The Khmer Rouge, however, supplemented continuing international support from the US, China and Thailand with extensive logging and gem mining from its resource-rich control zones on its western

The politics of punishment that characterized US treatment of Cambodia in the 1980s also marked the UN peacekeeping operation.

border with Thailand. A tortuous peace process — originally blocked by secret US diplomacy because the deal didn't suit Washington's interests — resulted in the establishment of the most comprehensive, intrusive, and expensive UN peacekeeping operation to date. From November 1991, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) employed over 22,000 people including more than 6,000 civilians, and carried out staggeringly successful elections against enormous odds in a hostile, complex, and demanding environment. About a month before the elections, amid claims of UN partisanship, the Khmer Rouge withdrew its participation in the elections. Nonetheless, the polling took place from May 23 to 28, 1993, against a backdrop of intimidation and threats of violence by Pol Pot and his guerrillas.

The charge that elements of the UN were partisan was accurate, but the victim was not the Khmer Rouge. The October 1991 Paris Peace Accords that paved the way for the giant peacekeeping force had been skewed from the beginning. Washington, along with Beijing, had consistently

influenced the Accords to marginalize Hun Sen's CPP, which (in various guises) had controlled Phnom Penh since 1979. Both China and the US also insisted on including the Khmer Rouge in any peace plan. Thus, allegations that the UN and US were trying to exclude the Khmer Rouge neither follows precedent, nor explains the covert political machinations that characterized aspects of the peacekeeping operation.

US intervention in the electoral process itself was multifaceted, although not necessarily coordinated. It was guided by Washington's desire to extend the Cold War demonization of Vietnam and Cambodia into the post-Cold War order. Since Vietnam — after ousting the genocidal Pol Pot — had helped install the predecessors of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP),

Washington extended its animus to Hun Sen. While around the world, far worse rulers basked in US warmth, Cambodia became a special target. Again, its involvement was an accident of geography, as it had been in the late 1960s and early 1970s when US bombers illegally flattened its eastern border in pursuit of Vietnamese communists.

The politics of punishment that characterized the 1980s

also marked part of the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. Unfortunately, the few official government sources corroborating this agenda do so with tantalizing slips of intention, rather than direct admissions. However, information assembled from a wide variety of non-governmental sources, from researchers and aid workers, and from documents leaked from UNTAC show where, how, and by whom US influence over the Cambodian election process was exerted.

The UN's First Intelligence Unit

Of the seven components of UNTAC tasked with implementing the Paris Peace Accords' mandate, only one — the Information and Education Division — enjoyed unrestricted access to Yasushi Akashi, head of the UN operation. Info-Ed was unique in another way. Both of its senior staff were US citizens, in contrast to the more neutral multinational leadership of the other components. This well-connected division soon became "essential to the efforts of virtually all other offices."⁶ Its main power lay in its ability to control and shape the

5. David Munro and John Pilger, *Year Zero: The Silent Death of Cambodia*, ATV-TV (London, 1979).

6. Janet P. Heininger, *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia*, Twentieth Century Fund Report, New York, 1994, p. 41.

flow of information. Among its publicly stated objectives was running Radio UNTAC, through which the UN communicated with the Cambodian people. A less well-known, but nonetheless overt task, was providing information analysis for UNTAC's internal use. With a staff of fluent Khmer speakers who had studied in the West, Info-Ed became "the UN's first intelligence unit."⁷

Although it cultivated an image of neutrality, Info-Ed was, according to Professor Michael Vickery, a scholar of Cambodia, "Washington's base within UNTAC." Some of its members had disturbing connections with the past and the US war in Cambodia in the 1980s. Its anti-Phnom Penh policy led to a reinstatement of the Khmer Rouge to international legitimacy in the early 1980s. It was, said Vickery, "dominated by anti-Vietnam vendetta types ..."⁸

Timothy Carney, Info-Ed's senior representative, was a "member of the executive branch of the US government [and] an American Cambodia expert who, since 1980 had [been] a professional enemy of the PRK/SOC [now CPP]."⁹ In the 1970s, as "a senior US official based in the US Embassy in Phnom Penh, [he] had supported the Lon Nol regime and, after 1979, was engaged to implement the US policy at the Thai-Cambodian border."¹⁰ Dr. Craig Etcheson, of the Cambodia Genocide Center, questioned Carney's position within UNTAC: "[I]t does make you wonder exactly to whom he reports ... [There is a] widely rumored assertion that he is actually a CIA officer ... he sure does get around: ... South Africa during the collapse of Apartheid, Cambodia during the UN intervention, Somalia during the US incursions and now in the Sudan as that place is identified among US intelligence agencies as one of

7. Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate*, International Peace Academy (Occasional Paper Series, 1995), p. 55. For biographies of those involved, see Stephen Heder and Judie Ledgerwood (eds.), *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: ME Sharpe, 1996).

8. Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: A Political Survey, Regime Change and Regime Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific*, n. 14, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1994), p. 16.

9. Letter from Michael Vickery to *Z Magazine*, Massachusetts, May 9, 1994. Carney's name was well known in Cambodia, especially by the older generation of journalists gathered in Phnom Penh just before the campaign period in April 1993. Several had covered the war in Vietnam and knew Carney from there. Carney and other representatives of the State Department worked closely with the Kampuchea Emergency Group (KEG) there, which participated in the funneling of international aid originally destined for Cambodian refugees languishing in the border camps where they had sought sanctuary as Pol Pot's forces fled the incoming Vietnamese army.

10. Raoul Jennar, "UNTAC: 'International Triumph' in Cambodia?" *Security Dialogue*, v. 25, n. 2, 1994, p. 154. See also Michael Vickery, *Cambodia: A Political Survey ...*, op. cit., p. 47.



IAN GUEST/UNHCR

Evidence indicates that the UN, under US sway, undermined Hun Sen.

the world's main bases for Islamic terrorist organisations."¹¹

Another key member of Info-Ed was Stephen Heder, an academic who had worked on the Thai border in the early 1980s when the CIA was repatriating the Khmer Rouge in exile. An UNTAC district electoral supervisor described Heder as an anti-CPP "wild card who wanted to prove his point,"¹² and John Pilger called him an "arch-propagandist committed to his own agenda."¹³ By recruiting such people, one critic charged, "the UN ruined its credibility and neutrality"¹⁴ and undermined the premise of absolute impartiality on which peacekeeping is based.

That charge has much support. No one doubted that Info-Ed was "hardly ill-dis-

posed to seeing the CPP defeated."¹⁵ Even disinterested scholars such as Stephen Randall, who contributed to the discussion on UNTAC in academic journals, stated that "the United States ... would have preferred the total elimination of the pro-Vietnamese faction [CPP] from the new government."¹⁶ Many senior members of the Cambodian Assembly, members of UNTAC, and Western scholars went further, charging that elements of Info-Ed actively tried to undermine the position of the former Communist Cambodian People's Party (CPP). The division was "leading a campaign hostile to the state of Cambodia and the CPP,"¹⁷ and "was di-

15. Interview with Marcella Gange, Nov. 23, 1995.

16. Stephen J. Randall, "Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era: The UN and the Cambodian Elections of 1993," *Contemporary Security Policy*, v. 16, n. 2, 1995, p. 187.

17. Raoul M. Jennar, *Cambodian Chronicles VI: Samdech Preah Upaywaraj Norodom Sihanouk*, EFERC [European Far Eastern Research Centre], Jodoigne, Belgium, June 29, 1993, p. 7.

11. Personal correspondence with author, May 14, 1997.

12. Interview with Marcella Gange, UN District Electoral Supervisor (DES), Kompong Speu Province, Nov. 23, 1995.

13. Private communication between the author and John Pilger, June 5, 1997.

14. Jennar, *UNTAC*, op. cit., p. 154.



LEAH MELNICK/IMPACT VISUALS

With so many men killed by war and genocide, women are in the majority at UN displaced person camps like this one controlled by Siha-nouk's faction.



recting propaganda to the Cambodian people to malign the CPP."¹⁸ Said one recognized scholar, "no more ardent enemies [of the CPP] outside of the Khmer Rouge leadership could be imagined" than Info-Ed.¹⁹ And as a corollary, there were no more loyal friends of "an arrangement that suited the US" than Info-Ed.²⁰ That arrangement included backing FUNCINPEC (the Royalist party led by Norodom Ranariddh, son of Norodom Sihanouk) and KPNLF (the Buddhist-linked Khmer People's National Liberation Front), while undermining and dividing the CPP.

Nor was Info-Ed's bias a secret from the CPP. Hun Sen referred to Carney and Heder as "people who fought against us ... people who helped the Khmers Rouges ... people who don't want us to win."²¹ Referring to Info-Ed, CPP Minister of Information Khieu Kanharith said: "I don't want to accuse the United Nations as a whole, but I think that in this operation a lot of action was dictated by some influential group or influential people within UNTAC itself."²² He was referring directly to Info-Ed. With the UN's cover of neutral peacekeeping blown, Khieu Kanharith warned that "in any future UN elections, they [the UN] must be more careful about the personnel of this component."²³

Discrediting the CPP

The deck had been stacked against the CPP from the beginning. As the Cold War drew

to a close, the key sponsors of the "peace process," China and the US, set about ensuring that the outcome would not legitimize their enemies. Accordingly, Washington selected an electoral system for Cambodia that would generate a fragmented government and hurt the CPP's electoral prospects.²⁴ By encouraging the entry of many parties, the CPP vote would be diluted; by choosing a "slate" system that used party rather than candidate name, the more well-known CPP candidates would be further disadvantaged. After Washington had earlier added strong doses of political bullying and economic blackmail²⁵ to undercut any workable alternatives, the marginalization of the CPP was inevitable.

As the May elections neared, Info-Ed continued pushing the US agenda with a multi-pronged campaign against the CPP designed to erode political support for the party's base. Despite its mandate to facilitate peacekeeping and promote democratization, Radio UNTAC disseminated information that was used to compromise the CPP in general and Hun Sen in particular.²⁶ Starting on the first day of the six-day elections, for example, the station selectively reported violations of the UN Electoral Law.²⁷ The CPP rightly complained that only its transgressions were cited "while countless flagrant violations committed by the FUNCINPEC Party [were] ignored ..."²⁸ No opportunity to discredit the CPP was too petty. At a press briefing at UNTAC headquarters in Wat Phnom, UN Press Officer Eric Falt publicly ridiculed the CPP governor of Kompong Som for paying his fine for election violations in small bills.²⁹ Not long after, when Hun Sen met with UNTAC head, Yasushi Akashi, in the same building, Radio UNTAC reported that the CPP leader had tried to slip out a back

24. Raoul Jennar, *Cambodian Chronicles V: The Lost Gamble*, November 15, 1992, EFERC, Jodoigne, Belgium, p. 18.

25. The US has little time for regionally brokered solutions. In 1983, George Shultz threatened Bill Hayden with political repercussions if the latter proceeded with a local initiative. Later, as Thailand attempted to broker a deal which would have excluded the Khmer Rouge, Washington warned the Thai government that any benefit that might accrue to Bangkok in terms of new economic relations with Cambodia would be far outstripped by US punishment of trade ties between Thailand and the US.

26. As the station broadcast mainly in the Khmer language, and Info-Ed had a virtual monopoly on bilingual Khmer-Western language speakers in Cambodia, few people could monitor the broadcasts. Nor, apparently, are transcripts available. Asked about the tapes and where they were stored, Pierre Lizée, a scholar researching at York University, Toronto, warned me I was "playing with dynamite." Fax, June 24, 1995.

27. *Cambodia Times* (Phnom Penh), May 3-9, 1993, p. 24.

28. Letter from CPP spokesman and CPP Chief of Cabinet Sok An, to Reginald Austin, Chief Electoral Officer, May 26, 1993.

29. Field notes from UNTAC Press Conference, Phnom Penh, May 1993.

door.³⁰ The implication was that Hun Sen, who has never been media-shy, had something to hide and was trying to escape press scrutiny.

CPP Minister of Information Kanharith and others charged that UNTAC was “conducting psychological warfare through its control of media.” And it was ignoring its own regulations to do so. During the campaign, UNTAC required airtime for all parties in order to keep CPP from taking advantage of its incumbency and control of official media. But in the key period right before the election, when *all* broadcast campaigning was banned, CPP was kept off the air while opposition TV was allowed to show Ranariddh and the Voice of America broadcast political programs produced by Radio UNTAC.³¹ The UN authority also abused electoral law when it failed to prosecute Ranariddh’s party for illegally distributing and displaying posters and T-shirts bearing images of Cambodia’s revered god-king, Norodom Sihanouk. No party was supposed to claim this icon. Sihanouk is viewed as an earthly descendant of Cambodia’s Angkorean god-kings. His rule in the 1950s and 1960s is held in romantic memory as the halcyonic days of peace.

As the election approached, UNTAC’s propaganda machine swung into high gear. Info-Ed head Carney had noted in an article he co-wrote that Cambodians “can think one thing one day, then change their view or belief the next day or even that same night, depending on what they hear has happened in between.”³² Info-Ed vigorously used Radio UNTAC to make sure that any change disadvantaged CPP; it also attempted to reinforce expectations of defeat by manipulating how electoral results were released. According to UNTAC electoral law, results for each province would not be announced until the counting there was completed. Despite this injunction, the day after the election, when 20 percent of the electorate had not yet cast ballots, Radio UNTAC “made a point of influencing this number ... to vote against the CPP,” said Kanharith. The station announced that FUNCINPEC was ahead in the four *partially* counted provinces.³³ At the same time,

there were no reports on provinces where CPP led. Smelling a rat, the CPP demanded that UNTAC stop releasing partial results that could create “the impression that the CPP had suffered a heavy defeat.” Info-Ed’s “lack of neutrality,” independent analyst Raoul Jennar charged, “was designed to create and make a CPP victory all the more unbelievable.”³⁴ It was not until days later that the complete tally was compiled.

With the benefit of three years hindsight, CPP Minister of Information Kanharith realized the extent of that manipulation.

[We] didn’t pay enough attention to the Info-Ed component, because we thought that the UN must be neutral, not [with] any political bias. But you look at ... every [other] component of

“[We] didn’t pay enough attention to the Info-Ed component, because we thought that the UN must be neutral. ... We were deliberately deceived by Radio UNTAC.”

UNTAC, the director and the vice-director never have the same nationality. But at the Info-Ed component, you had the director and the vice-director both American. I used to have to work with Radio UNTAC; I followed very closely what it had done. Radio UNTAC was very anti-[CPP] ... We were deliberately deceived by Radio UNTAC.³⁵

Self-Fulfilling Prophecies

The demonization of the Cambodian government and its Vietnamese allies was a key element in Info-Ed strategy and was consistent with CIA-led strategies that marked the 1980s. The “communists’” shortcomings were regularly “proven” by the Western media and by innumerable reports — mainly untrue — of miscon-

duct by both Hun Sen’s government and the Vietnamese “occupation.”³⁶ As the election approached, Info-Ed propaganda focused on making the CPP look untrustworthy and implying that the party would fare badly at the polls and then be had losers.

While independent polls, experts, and journalists all anticipated a close race and even Prince Sihanouk was “convinced the CPP would win,”³⁷ Info-Ed alone resolutely predicted that the ruling party had “no chance against the FUNCINPEC.”³⁸ One classified Info-Ed document seemed aimed at convincing the head of the UN operation that — because of “well-known shortcomings of this party during its many years in power”³⁹ — CPP would poll “a maximum of

9 percent of the total support base.”⁴⁰ Raoul Jennar described the report as little more than “hypothetical scenarios about the possibility of excluding the CPP from a future government coalition.”⁴¹ If Info-Ed could establish that CPP — despite the advantages of incumbency and control over state apparatus — had no chance of winning fairly, it would be a win-win situation. If

the royalists won, well and good. If, however CPP won or made a strong showing, “They can say [it] cheated, ... [and] create the basis for a policy of non-cooperation.”⁴² “This was deliberate policy,” charged Kanharith, who as a CPP minister was familiar with the members of Info-Ed and their possible agendas, “to make sure CPP loses” — one way or another.⁴³ In any case, applying Info-Ed’s internal logic, it would be impossible for CPP to win truly democratic elections. Kanharith

36. The range of propaganda was broad, but focused on the same goal: prolongation of the Cambodian conflict to the cost of Hun Sen and the Vietnamese. See Haas (1989), part 2; John Pilger, *Heroes* (London: Pan, 1989), pp. 31-32; and William S. Turley, “The Khmer War: Cambodia after Paris,” *Survival*, v. 32, n. 5, 1990. See also Michael Vickery, *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Pinter, 1986), chap. 4.

37. Heder (1996), p. 427. A Feb. 17, 1993 *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Japanese daily) poll gave CPP 35% (Jennar, *Cambodian Chronicles VI*, op. cit., p. 5), with other polls estimating a minimum of 25%; also see Vickery, *Cambodia: A Political Survey*, op. cit., p. 15.

38. UNTAC Analysis of Parties and their Prospects, Jan. 1993.

39. *Ibid.*

40. *Ibid.*

41. Jennar, *Cambodian Chronicles VI*, op. cit., p. 1.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

43. Interview with Khieu Kanharith.

30. Interview with Khieu Kanharith.

31. Khieu Kanharith in *NGO Resource Project — Cambodia: Daily Report*, June 1, 1993, Phnom Penh. CPP also broke the rules, showing “The Killing Fields” on State TV after the campaign period.

32. Timothy Carney and TL Choo, *Whither Cambodia? Beyond the Election*, (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993), p. 19.

33. In Pursat, the CPP had 1,054 votes; FUNCINPEC 1,346. In Sihanoukville, the CPP had 5,276; FUNCINPEC 7,473. In Kratie, the CPP had 3,291 votes; FUNCINPEC 9,314. In Phnom Penh, CPP had 4,346 votes; FUNCINPEC 7,518. See

NGO Resource Project — Cambodia: Daily Report, May 29-30, 1993, Phnom Penh, p. 7. The details of numbers were not announced; but the party name was. See also *NGO Resource Project — Cambodia: Daily Report*, June 1, 1993, Phnom Penh, p. 1.

34. Jennar, *Cambodian Chronicles VI*, op. cit., p. 7. See also David Roberts, “Democratic Kampuchea?,” *Pacific Review*, v. 7, n. 1, 1994; and John Pilger and David Munro, *Return To “Year Zero,”* Carlton TV (London), May 1993.

35. Interview with Khieu Kanharith.

explained: "For the Westerner, a Communist Party cannot enjoy popularity, cannot get the support of the people." So if Cambodia is a "democratic country, CPP must lose."⁴⁴ It follows then, that if the inherently unpopular communist CPP did win, the election could not have been free and fair. And, given the "predictions," the reasons must be CPP fraud, intimidation, and harassment.

It was a pretty neat scenario, but in the end, the extent of the report's inaccuracies and Info-Ed's biases became, in themselves, strong evidence of a disinformation campaign. Info-Ed had tried to gain "credibility" and "avoid public exposure of the degree of US influence in UNTAC ..." by using a "well-known ... politically neutral" Cambodian as the source for its assessment of CPP chances. In fact, it quickly emerged that the analysis had been "prepared by people who were extremely partisan"⁴⁵ and that "the source" had served alongside the Thais and the US on the Cambodian border during the 1980s. Nor did US machinations escape those on the ground. An UNTAC district electoral supervisor commented that US operations "became a case of 'spot the CIA agent' in the provinces."⁴⁶

Power Politics

The US was clearly satisfied with the election results: a four-party coalition with only two effective contenders. Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC got more votes than the second place CPP, but not enough for a majority. Had this result stood, CPP influence would have been undercut in the assembly, and an alignment of FUNCINPEC with the other parties would probably have made it impossible for Hun Sen to muster the 66 percent majority needed to pass resolutions. Thus, CPP would be cut out of the elite decision-making loop. Instead, CPP cried foul and balked, blaming electoral irregularities and demanding a recount in some provinces. Its threat was clear: Cede more power to Hun Sen or the CPP would use its control of most of the police and military to launch a civil war. Recognizing the danger and drawing on his prestige as impartial elder statesman, Prince Sihanouk intervened and declared a 50-50 settlement, where both Ranariddh and Hun Sen would share power equally, and where all the ministries would also have two heads of department.

44. *Ibid*

45. Michael Vickery, "A Background and Analysis of the Paris Agreement," Presentation at the Cambodia Coordinating Centre, Phnom Penh, June 3, 1993, p. 11.

46. Interview with a UN district electoral supervisor, Nov. 1995, England.

Unwieldy as it sounds, it was still appropriate, because the alternative was the undoing of the peace operation and a possible return to civil war.⁴⁷ One US representative, echoing Washington's feelings more broadly, dismally complained that the proposal was "not quite what we had in mind ... it doesn't work for us."⁴⁸

To prevent such an arrangement — which would have legitimized Washington's arch enemy in Cambodia — the US mission quickly circulated an unofficial "non-paper" condemning Prince Sihanouk's

All for One and UNO for All

The US strategy in Cambodia of influencing elections through aid, propaganda, dirty tricks, and worse was used more successfully in several other elections in the developing world. The most blatant and well-documented example is in Nicaragua, where the US, failing to defeat the Sandinistas with a surrogate army of Contras on the battlefield, attacked the elected leftist government with dollars and propaganda. Eventually the US-backed UNO party beat the Sandinistas at the polls. Vickery points out the parallel in Cambodia where the UN elections were "an element of the Nicaragua Strategy which the US had worked on that country — political isolation, economic blockade, support for contras just across the border, resulting in economic disintegration, declining standards of human rights, and political disaffection within the target country, until, in an election, the targeted party loses." *

* Vickery, *Cambodia ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 6; see Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies* (London: Pluto, 1989).

"constitutional coup."⁴⁹ Sihanouk's interim government of reconciliation lasted only hours. The following day, the *Bangkok Post* and the *Cambodia Times* claimed that the non-paper had been a major cause of the collapse of the 50-50 deal. US intervention, however, had an unexpected consequence, rich in irony. The loss of the position the CPP had negotiated with Sihanouk backed the party against the

47. See *Phnom Penh Post*, v. 2, n. 12, June 6-12, 1993, p. 1. For a discussion of the advantages of this, see Raoul M. Jennar, *Open Letter* (circulated), Phnom Penh, May 27, 1993.

48. Interview between Helen Long, a researcher working for the Indochina Project, and Minister of Information Khieu Kanharith, Provisional National Govt. of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Sept. 3, 1993.

49. Michael Vickery, "Resignation of CPP Candidates and Their Replacements: A Counter Analysis to 'CPP Secessionism, Resignations from the Assembly and Intimidation of UNTAC: Background and Theories,' by Stephen Heder," Phnom Penh, June 24, 1993.

wall. The only solution for it was escalation: An armed secession began in several provinces east of the Mekong River along the Vietnamese border. At this point, Heder again joined the fray, declaring in an internal document that the secessionists and some who resigned in protest at the elections were plotting to work outside the National Assembly on a clandestine "illegal" destabilization of the political environment and the CPP's opposition.⁵⁰

Although Heder's analysis was meticulously detailed and apparently well-informed, it was easily debunked as "partisan propaganda designed to mislead UNTAC about the intentions of the CPP."⁵¹ The US charge that the CPP had used intimidation and made an unscrupulous power grab was far closer to the truth. But accurate though that assessment was, the CPP's heavy-handed tactics threatening violence were not the real reason why the US Mission intervened. Its prime argument was that the CPP were "puppets" of Washington's principal enemy, Vietnam, and would be hostile to US interests in Cambodia. Hun Sen's view was that the US "consider us pro-Vietnamese and they don't like Vietnam," said Hun Sen. "They hate that we are Communist and so found every way so [CPP] would

not win the elections."⁵²

Kanharith agreed: "If Sihanouk did take control, the US government, US interests, would not be able to influence the National Assembly because they cannot control Sihanouk after the interim government. The non-paper was to prevent this situation, so the US would have control."⁵³ Some critics of US intervention went further. They saw the "non-paper" as an attempt not only to set up a "friendly government," but also to take "revenge on

50. Stephen Heder, *CPP Secessionism, Resignations from the Assembly and Intimidation of UNTAC: Background and Theories*, Phnom Penh, June 1993.

51. Michael Vickery, "Resignation of CPP Candidates ...," *op. cit.*

52. *Phnom Penh Post*, v. 4, n. 24, December 1-14, 1995, p. 7. Hun Sen echoed these sentiments during the January 1, 1994 interview.

53. Interview with Khieu Kanharith.

Prince Sihanouk and on those put in power by the Vietnamese [in 1979].⁵⁴ After it was apparent that the scheme to define an emerging coalition had failed, a senior US representative warned that Washington was not about to roll over: "In order to do what we want to do in Cambodia, we can do without Prince Sihanouk. We can do without the CPP. We have \$90 million to keep the officials and soldiers of [Cambodia] and to buy the CPP deputies necessary to get the two-thirds [majority] and then put in place the coalition of our choice."⁵⁵

Aid as a Political Weapon

Info-Ed was not the only actor trying to marginalize the CPP. The US Agency for International Development (AID), well-documented as a tool of US foreign policy, was also active in Cambodia.⁵⁶ At the inception of the peacekeeping operation in 1991, it had been enlisted to target development assistance to those non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and projects likely to strengthen opposition to the CPP. By summer 1992, with the horror of the Khmer Rouge reign undeniable, Congress declared that aid to Cambodia should be broad-based, nation-wide, and should not benefit Pol Pot's minions.

But a careful reading of "Invitation for Applications," distributed to aid agencies in Cambodia in early 1993 reveals a telling distinction. Each program area "must include" the KPNLF/FUNCINPEC zones, "but [must] not necessarily be limited to [those zones]."⁵⁷ (Emphasis added.) Thus, while AID was required to fund regions organized or managed by the Buddhist KPNLF and the royalist FUNCINPEC (Khmer Rouge allies in the 1980s), assistance to the 80



PHOTO ARCHIVE GROUP

Chinese advisers with the Khmer Rouge at Angkor Wat, undated.

percent of the country controlled by the CPP was optional. The distinction appears subtle, but the aid community is well schooled in licking the hand that feeds it. Project designers understood that proposals for KPNLF and FUNCINPEC zones would likely be approved, while projects for CPP zones would, as one aid worker explained, "obviously jeopardize their chances of getting funding ... [F]ew agencies would dare outline projects which would benefit CPP areas for fear of outright rejection ... There was no doubt that AID was not being neutral, despite offering that appearance. The policy [was] probably a continuity of previous practices on the Thai border" throughout the 1980s when USAID funded CPP opposition. One NGO delegate called this policy "a crude form of vote buying and control ... obviously intended to strengthen the hand of the opposition to the CPP; ... [the US] Embassy and AID are tight."⁵⁸

Another researcher believed that during the electoral period, the US wanted to establish "a sphere of influence for the FUNCINPEC and KPNLF."⁵⁹ With NGOs unlikely to apply for — or get — grants in areas controlled by the CPP, the opposition could easily win or buy hearts, minds, and votes by distributing largesse and positioning projects.

An internal report by the General Accounting Office inadvertently acknowledged Washington's partisan interest and intent. The \$3 million aid program, it declared, had "achieved its goal ... [to] support the non-Communists in their effort to reunify and lead Cambodia after the peace settlements, as evidenced by the results of the May 1993 election."⁶⁰

To this end, AID backed a variety of projects in Cambodia, some ostensibly designed to "promote democracy." During the electoral period, it worked to influence the outcome through its funding of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Since its founding during the Reagan years, NED has been a tool of US anticommunist foreign policy. With the end of the Cold War, it has served as a policy wedge for inserting free market "reforms" under the guise of democratization. It is used when the "US ha[s] in mind the usual form of democracy committed to the preferential option for the rich, particularly US investors";⁶¹ it is "financed by Congress to support foreign organizations sympathetic to US foreign policy objectives." NED's *modus operandi* is "to do somewhat overtly what the CIA has been doing co-

54. Jenner, *Cambodian Chronicles VI*, op. cit., p. 18.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 17. See also Roberts (1994), op. cit., and *NGO Resource Project — Cambodia Daily Report*, June 9, 1993, Phnom Penh.

56. *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, v. XVII; Steven B. Tisch & Michael B. Wallace, *Dilemmas of Development Assistance: The What, Why, and Who of Foreign Aid* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994); Noam Chomsky, *Necessary Illusions ...*, op. cit.; William Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History* (London: Zed, 1986); John Pilger, *Heroes* (London: Pan, 1989), pp. 426-27.

57. "Invitation for Applications," United States Agency for International Development, Phnom Penh, Jan. 27, 1993.

58. Interview with David Appleton, Head of Delegation, Cambodia Trust (NGO), Phnom Penh, April 25, 1993.

59. For a further discussion, see Roberts (1994).

60. *Review of US Assistance to Cambodia*, June 1993: Job Code 711012, US General Accounting Office. This was the draft version, criticized for being "too harsh" in its assessment, and of being insufficiently subtle. In other words, it explained US foreign policy intentions clearly.

61. Noam Chomsky, *Year 501: The Conquest Continues* (New York: Verso, 1993), p. 210. See also *The NED*

vertly for decades — manipulate the political process in a target country by financing political parties, labor unions, book publishers, newspapers, etc.”⁶²

One of NED's components, the International Republican Institute (IRI) played a key role in Cambodia. (IRI is sponsored by the Republican Party, while the Democratic Party administers its counterpart, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs). IRI's official mission there was “to develop and foster the notion of democracy and peace in the Cambodian electorate.” Its representatives proclaimed that “IRI is an entirely neutral organization with ... no agenda and ... no ideology.” The statement is pure fantasy. In November 1992, for example, when IRI organized a human rights conference, “all the representatives of the Western [CPP]-bashing organizations — Lawyers Committee, Amnesty, AsiaWatch — [were invited] ... while specialist students of Cambodia ... with sympathy for Phnom Penh were not only not invited, but two of them ... were denied permission [even] to sit in as observers.”⁶³ That two of the world's leading experts on Cambodia, Michael Vickery and Ben Kiernan, were excluded, was clear evidence of NED's partisan agenda. In Cambodia, as elsewhere, NED did what it was created to do: serve Washington's interests — in this case “to undermine the ... object of US hatred, the Phnom Penh side,”⁶⁴ and to weaken CPP prospects at the polls. NED's 1997 programs in Cambodia come to \$1.24 million, channeled through IRI, NDI, and six other organizations.

The War On Vietnam Prolonged

That mission was an extension of more than two decades of US foreign policy in the region using both covert operations and overt pressure. In the 1980s when all foreign aid to Cambodia was embargoed, the US tried to isolate Phnom Penh and Hanoi, to eliminate the CPP and its political predecessors, and to continue punishing Hanoi.⁶⁵ The goal, noted journalist

John Pilger, was to sweep “away the last vestiges of Vietnam's humiliation of the US, with the aim of overseeing a pro-American anti-Vietnamese, IMF-indebted regime in Phnom Penh.”⁶⁶

But even more destructive than undermining reconstruction efforts in this war-ravaged country were efforts by Washington — with Western complicity and extensive Chinese military and diplomatic aid — to restore the Khmer Rouge to diplomatic credibility and military prowess. US and

tives who would later join the Info-Ed division in the UN peacekeeping operation, this clandestine operation worked to shore up Pol Pot's forces.

By consistently supporting Pol Pot and torpedoing regional deals that might have ended the conflict and condemned the Khmer Rouge to isolation and ineffectiveness, the US guaranteed continuing conflict and instability.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, CIA-led disinformation campaigns ensured that Phnom Penh would remain in near virtual

diplomatic, political, and economic isolation for over a decade. And when the end of the Cold War appeared inevitable and the tepid support for the US and China's onerous intervention in Cambodia began to wane, Washington, along with its more powerful allies in Beijing, sought to control any peace deal. “The reason for the inventing of the ‘Peace Process,’” Vickery reminds us, “was not to marginalize the Khmer Rouge, nor to end a war, but to forestall the danger of a [CPP] victory, or its recognition ...”⁶⁹ The peace deal removed the last of Vietnam's troops — which had been defending Cambodians from the marauding Khmer Rouge — and ensured that the CPP lost more weapons than the

guerrillas. While a 70 percent cut across all parties seemed fair in principle, in practice, the Khmer Rouge could conceal its weapons in remote mountain and jungle hideaways while the government had to surrender its arms stored in garri-sons. Even Sihanouk took umbrage, advising Hun Sen to “surrender your worst weapons and give your ill-trained, poorly-motivated troops to UNTAC for demobili-

Death Squad Amigos

One of IRI's consorts in Cambodia was Raul Garcia Prieto, former vice president of El Salvador's ARENA Party and protégé of death squad leader Roberto D'Aubuisson. Given its accountability regulations, AID must have been aware of his background when it funded recruiting this international thug to work for IRI to oversee the democratic transition in Cambodia. While David Miller, of the US Embassy in Phnom Penh, charged that IRI acted independently of AID, the head of the “democracy” section of AID in Phnom Penh declined to be interviewed when informed of the subject. According to Michael Vickery, the issue provoked “not the slightest peep of objection ... from any UN agency, let alone the Human Rights Component”; nor was it reported by any of the hundreds of journalists in Cambodia.

Chinese vetoes in the UN Security Council ensured that the Khmer Rouge, and not the de facto regime in Phnom Penh, held Cambodia's UN seat. Washington also established the Kampuchea Emergency Group and its successor the Kampuchea Working Group which established links with the Khmer Rouge and other groups, and helped funnel information, aid, cash, and weapons.⁶⁷ Facilitated by representa-

International Affairs, v. 44, n. 2, Mar. 1991, p. 497; *Time*, April 30, 1990, p. 17; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 11, 1990; *New Statesman and Society*, March 22, 1991; *New Statesman and Society*, July 9, 1993; and Chandler (1993), p. 231. For an early article identifying the punishment of Vietnam by the US as a key foreign policy initiative, see John Pilger and Anthony Barnett, “Revenge on Vietnam,” *New Statesman*, July 20, 1979, p. 81.

66. John Pilger, “The West's Lethal Illusion in Cambodia,” *New Statesman and Society*, July 9, 1993, p. 15.

67. Stephen Heder, “Kampuchea 1980: Anatomy of a Crisis,” *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, n. 77, Feb. 1981, p. 3; John Pilger, “An Organized Forgetting,” *New Statesman and Society*, Nov. 1, 1991, p. 10. This view is shared by authors such as Roger Brown and Linda Mason, *Rice, Rivalry and Politics: Managing Cambodian Relief* (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1983); Eva Mysliwiec, *Pun-*

ishing the Poor: The International Isolation of Kampuchea (London: Oxfam, 1988); and Michael Haas, *Cambodia, Pol Pot and the United States: The Faustian Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1989).

68. The complexities of the diplomacy of this period are well reviewed in Acharya, Lizée and Peou (eds.): *Cambodia — The 1989 Paris Peace Conference: Background Analysis and Documents*, Center for International and Strategic Studies, York University, Toronto, 1991; Michael Haas, “The Paris Conference on Cambodia, 1989,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, v. 23, n. 2, April-June 1991; and Georges Hervouet, “The Cambodian Conflict: The Difficulties of Intervention and Compromise,” *International Journal*, v. XLV, Spring 1990.

69. Vickery, *Cambodia: A Political Survey* ... , op. cit., p. 6. See also Chomsky (1989).

Backgrounder, Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center (Albuquerque), April 1992.

62. William Blum, *Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II* (London: Zed, 1995), pp. 280 and 303. See also *National Endowment for Democracy, Annual Report 1996*, Washington, DC, Dec. 1996, pp. 16-17.

63. Letter from Michael Vickery to *Z Magazine*, May 9, 1994.

64. *Ibid.*

65. However absurd this notion appears, there is a wealth of evidence to support the argument that this was a primary tenet of US foreign policy until very recently. See, amongst many others, George C. Herring, “America and Viet Nam: The Unending War,” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991/1992; Tricia Thomas, “Into the Unknown: Can the United Nations Bring Peace to Cambodia?” *Journal of*



LEAH MELNICK/IMPACT VISUALS

Display at a Cambodian museum memorializes some of the Khmer Rouge's million-plus victims.

zation because otherwise there will be no balance between you and the Khmer Rouge ... [and] there has to be balance before there can be peace."⁷⁰

Ultimately the plan to destroy the CPP failed, but not for want of trying. The 1993 Cambodian elections suggested strongly that Washington, in pursuit of its foreign policy goals, sabotaged free and fair elections, even when run by the United Nations. Having weakened Phnom Penh's position, and compromised Vietnam's support for its former allies with promises of "normalization" in return for cooperation, the final stages of the operation to punish both Vietnam and Cambodia were little more than war by other means.

If the hypocrisy was not so appalling, Cambodians might be cheered to hear the halls of the US Congress ring with condemnation of foreign interference in an electoral process. But while the scandal in the US surrounding campaign contributions is mainly a melodrama of political posturing,

in Cambodia the result of interference in the electoral process is a tragedy of horrific proportion. The unstable coalition the US and

While the US scandal around campaign contributions is mainly a melodrama of political posturing, in Cambodia the result of interference in the electoral process is a tragedy of horrific proportion.

others forced on Cambodia has promoted infighting and crushed development.

Again, the Cambodian people are the losers, victims of policies created thousands of miles away by comfortable bureaucrats who have turned a blind eye to

consequences of three decades of devastating interference. In the 1970s, the US anti-war movement helped stop the bombing that was surely not a secret from those on whom destruction rained. In mid-1990, Americans who penetrated the mist of media propaganda demanded that President Bush stop aid to the monsters of Pol Pot's creation. But while many Americans joined cause with the Cambodian people, Washington embraced the demon of revenge. US cynicism toward Cambodia and its own people ironically

parallels that of the Khmer Rouge during the Pol Pot regime to the Khmer innocents: "Preserve them, no profit. Kill them, no loss."⁷¹ ■

70. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 4, 1993, p. 22.

71. John Pilger, *Heroes*, op. cit., p. 178.

"OPERATION GHETTO STORM"

The Rise in Paramilitary Policing



by Peter Cassidy

The multi-jurisdictional SWAT team members came from 13 separate police agencies including the federal Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Tobacco, Alcohol and Firearms, the Washington Air National Guard, the Washington State Patrol, three county sheriff's SWAT teams, and four small city police departments.

A massive, essentially military operation, the raid netted a few arrests for possession and 54 marijuana plants. It also terrorized eight children asleep in their beds when hooded figures burst in, guns ready. One officer put a gun to the head of a three-year old, according to witnesses, and ordered him down on the floor. Because the police were masked, had no badge numbers, and represented so many different agencies, the victims decided to settle out of court.¹

1. Thurston County, Washington Superior County Search Warrant File No. 668 (Affidavit Filed July 12, 1994, Warrants Executed July 14, 1994) and Claims for Damages filed in 1996.

That same July, on the other side of the country, another SWAT team ran amok. As Cleave Atwater tended his customers at his club and pool room in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, the door suddenly splintered open and a mob of men in ninja hoods and fatigues waving automatic rifles rushed in and shouted for people to get down onto the floor. Terrified, Atwater slipped out while his bar assistant sprawled face down in a pool of his own terror-provoked urine. On reaching the street, Atwater entered a surreal landscape in which paramilitary-style police taking part in "Operation Redi-Rock" were selectively stopping and searching black people.

Atwater, proprietor of the Village Connection, had called the police months before to complain about drug trafficking near his Graham Street business. But when the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation's Special Response Team (SRT) and the local police that held the warrant for the block-wide raid² finally arrived

2. Complaint, *Barnett v Karpinos*, filed in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Aug. 15, 1995.

At 4:30 a.m., the first wave of SWAT teams — clothed in battle dress uniforms (BDUs) with black hoods and wielding submachine guns — swarmed into nine homes in a rural community in Washington state. Some 150 officers executed search warrants in 1994, alleging that the residents were running a massive international drug cooperative and harvesting marijuana in underground farms.

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in full battle dress, they brought little comfort or remedy.³

The victims of North Carolina's Operation Rendi-Rock raids survived their ordeals. In another incident, in Oak City, about 70 miles north of Chapel Hill, Jean Wiggins, a cleaning woman, was less fortunate. The same SRT team that went into Graham Street put seven rounds through her body as she ran from a bank where she had been held hostage for 15 hours after a robbery attempt. In less than two years, a single paramilitary police team destroyed a lot of public trust and claimed the life of a woman who should have had every reason to expect she would be safer with the police than with her captors.⁴

Occupied Territories USA

Atwater, Wiggins and the Washingtonians were witnesses to a fundamental shift in policing: the militarization of local law enforcement. This transformation is largely a consequence of a drug war that has incrementally evolved into a real domestic offensive with all the accouterments and ordnance of war.

Increasingly, America's neighborhoods, especially within minority communities, are being treated like occupied territories. In the past 25 years, police agencies have organized paramilitary units (PPUs) variously called SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) or SRT (Special Response Team), outfits that go to work in battle dress uniforms with automatic assault rifles, percussion flash-bang grenades, CS gas — and even armored personnel carriers. The number of these units and the situations in which they are deployed have been rapidly expanding. With predictable results: "civilian" casualties; police killed by friendly fire; and a growing, uneasy antagonism between the "peace-keepers" and the kept.⁵ Within the police, the elite, highly militarized units have fueled a culture of violence and racial antagonism.

A landmark study by Professors Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler at Eastern Kentucky University's School of Police Studies revealed the depth of saturation that these paramilitary units have achieved in US communities.⁶ For one thing, they

are no longer confined to big cities. In 1982, 59 percent of police departments had an active paramilitary police unit. Fifteen years later, in a huge increase, nearly 90 percent of the 548 responding departments funded such units.

More troubling, however, Kraska and Kappeler found that police paramilitary units are now called in to perform relatively mundane police work — such as patrolling city streets and serving warrants. Indeed, with the mainstreaming of police paramilitary units, cities including Fresno, California, and Indianapolis, Indiana, send police to patrol non-emergency situations in full battle dress — giving these communities all the ambience of the West Bank. Of 487 departments answering questions about deployment scenarios, more than 20 percent said that their tactical teams were used for community patrols. Ironically, the rise in the



Within the police, these elite, highly militarized units have fueled a culture of violence and racial antagonism.

number of PPU is occurring at the same time as the concept of "community policing" is gaining in popularity.

One commander of a paramilitary unit in a midwestern town of 75,000 described how his team patrols in BDU, cruising the streets in an armored personnel carrier. "We stop anything that moves. We'll sometimes even surround suspicious homes and bring out the MP5s (an automatic weapon manufactured by gun manufacturer Heckler and Koch and favored by military special forces teams). We usually don't have any problems with crack-heads cooperating."⁷

Just 15 years ago, city departments called out their tactical units little more than once a month on average, usually for those rarest of situations — hostage situations, terrorist events, or barricaded suspects. The mean number of call-outs for these units rose precipitously to 83

events — or about 7 a month — in 1995. Of that sample, more than 75 percent were for thrilling, no-knock drug raids like Operation Rendi-Rock.

Lt. Tom Gabor of the Culver City, California Police Department contends that PPU call-outs have "less to do with officer or citizen safety issues than with justifying the costs of maintaining units. ...There exist literally thousands of unnecessary units." Moreover, he claims that regular police officers could have handled 99 percent of the cases in which SWAT units were utilized.⁸

Targeting Blacks

One of the greatest costs of this militarization of local law enforcement, says Joseph McNamara, a research fellow in the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, has been in the loss of public trust in police institutions, alienating communities from those resources. According to

McNamara, a rotation onto these units is often given as a reward. "When you have police in military uniforms with military weapons — sometimes with tanks and armored personnel carriers, this reinforces the idea that the police are an occupation army as opposed to partners in the community," said McNamara. "People often feel these raids do not take place in white middle class

neighborhoods and, by and large, that is accurate."⁹

Nowhere has that alienation been more profound than in African American communities. In "Operation Rendi-Rock" an entire block of an African-American neighborhood was raided and nearly 100 people were detained and searched. After Operation Rendi-Rock, plaintiffs in a successful lawsuit claimed that all those arrested were black — whites were allowed to leave the area. No prosecutions resulted from the raid.¹⁰ The survey by Kraska and Kappeler substantiated that black urban communities in the US are bearing the brunt of paramilitary police activity. In some 126 follow-up telephone interviews in his survey, Kraska found, "First and foremost most of the paramilitary activity we found was fo-



3. Interview, May 1997. Affidavit of Donnie Carol Webb, Oct. 2, 1992, in the subsequent lawsuit, *Barnett v. Karpinos, et al.*

4. Associated Press, "NAACP President Calls for Civilian Review in Hostage Shooting," Oct. 16, 1992.

5. Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units," *Social Problems*, v. 44, n.1, February 1997.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, April 1993.

9. Interview, May 1997.

10. Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing ...," *op. cit.*, p. 8.

SELLING SWAT

by Lynne Wilson

Intense competition by arms manufacturers to sell high-tech equipment is helping fuel the explosion in the number of police special tactical units. Increasingly, these SWAT teams, decked out in full battle dress uniforms (BDUs), are enforcing the "War on Drugs" and raising questions of police excess. Weapons manufacturers such as Heckler & Koch and Smith & Wesson hawk their wares to local departments through such tactics as SWAT training "camps" and competitions. With an eye toward sales, the manufacturers pepper low-cost, week-long tactical training sessions for officers with sales pitches to their bosses to stock up. Submachine guns are a favorite at \$1,200 or so apiece. Surrealistic ads pushing weaponry and BDUs look and sound like Sylvester Stallone movie promos: "In the risky business of forced entries, you need all the leverage you can get," warns an ad by Safariland, Ltd., manufacturer of tactical body armor.

The largest seller of submachine weaponry to local police tactical units is Heckler & Koch [H&K], a German weapons manufacturer now based in Virginia. Its MP-5 (MP is German for "machine-pistole") is now the weapon-of-choice for the British SAS, the German military, the US Navy SEALs, and the Los Angeles Police Department SWAT unit.¹ In fact, 80 percent of local and state police SWAT teams use some version of H&K's "MP-5" submachine gun with almost all of those departments arming more than a dozen officers each with the high-powered weapons.²

H&K operates six mobile training teams that provide convenient SWAT training for every local police department in the country in addition to its main training headquarters in Loudoun County, Virginia. At its training seminars, H&K — which already dominates the market for SWAT weapons — pushes ammunition sales. One officer who attended a week-long session in "low light" and "concealed carry" techniques, described how the course book told participants "to expect to burn up to 1,000 rounds of ammunition" in daily workouts that lasted ten or more hours. When many of the students ran through their rounds by the fourth night, H&K pulled through with a "stash to take care of this emergency."³

Competition among weapons manufacturers has been growing fierce. One way Smith & Wesson (S&W), a Springfield, Mass.-based weapons manufacturer, goes after H&K's market share is by offering tactical training seminars at well below the \$2,000-plus cost of attending a privately run paramilitary training camp.

S&W's curriculum includes specific tactical advice on hostage situations, barricaded suspects, and executing drug search warrants, the last of these making up by far the major portion of SWAT work. Since most local police departments cannot afford to send their entire unit to attend and SWAT

such training, the commander will typically then pass on the training to the rest of the team. The climax of the intense week-long session is a hardball pitch for the S&W version of the MP-5, delivered with an intensity rivaled only by those for life-long time-share condos in Florida.

SWAT training programs as well as SWAT team competitions for local police are conducted not only by arms manufacturers, but also by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the FBI, whose tactical units


brought us some of the worst law enforcement disasters of the last 20 years (Waco, and Ruby Ridge). In addition, the "National Tactical Officers Association" (NTOA), an ostensibly non-profit outfit boasting 10,000 members, also conducts pricey SWAT training and competitions.

With weapons manufacturers conducting training, sales hype is transformed into an unnecessarily dangerous, often deadly, reality. Small wonder that local SWAT teams now execute most drug search warrants with essentially the same firepower, military zeal, and black-clad storm trooper tactics that British Special Air Service [SAS] used in its 1981 raid on dissidents at the Iranian Embassy, or that military commandos recently deployed to storm the Japanese ambassador's residence in Peru.

What appears to be missing from this alliance of sales and training are clear standards and guidelines as to how tactical units with their high-tech weapons and military-style approach should be used. To date, according to Dr. Peter Kraska of Eastern Kentucky University, no standardized SWAT policies or procedures exist, although NTOA is making an effort. "Departments are pretty much on their own" says Kraska, as to what weapons and equipment they use and how they use them. ■

Lynne Wilson is an attorney in Seattle, Washington, and a member of the steering committee of the National Coalition on Police Accountability.

1. Chuck Taylor, "Up Close & Personal with the H&K MP-5," *Guns & Weapons for Law Enforcement*, Sept. 1997, pp. 12, 68.
2. Interview, Dr. Peter Kraska of Eastern Kentucky University, Aug. 7, 1997.
3. Walt Rauch, "Concealed Carry & Low Light Operations," *Guns and Weapons for Law Enforcement*, Nov. 1997, pp. 34, 36, 37.



SHARPSHOOTER

UP CLOSE & PERSONAL WITH THE H&K MP-5

**All about this SMG—how it works,
available options, combat techniques!**

German criteria perfectly. In contrast to the MP5 meets all but one of the classic criteria for SMGs. Technically, in a departure from traditional SMGs, the MP5 fires from a closed, locked bolt instead of the unlocked, open-bolt of most SMGs. Thus, the MP5 is a sort of "machine car."

By Chuck Taylor

First appearing way back in the middle 1970s with the commercial designator "HK54," Heckler & Koch's famous 9mm SMG has indeed come a long way. Subsequently adopted by the German military and police establishment as the "Maschinenpistole 5" (MP5), it's since seen widespread adoption and resulting worldwide proliferation. Its rapid increase in notoriety was further boosted by the British Special Air Service (SAS), who used it in their famous Iranian Embassy raid. It was an event widely captured on film, showing black-clad MP5-armed SAS troopers storming the embassy building. As a

has shown this hazard to be far less formidable than at first anticipated. From W.H.B. Smith's SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD (Stackpole Books, PO Box 1831, Harrisburg, PA 17109). "The HK54 is the submachine gun updated and edited by Edward Ezzi." "The HK54 is the submachine gun that delayed blowback operated submachine guns have less vibration and less than blowback operated submachine guns. On the other hand, they are more. Regardless of weather, the MP-5 SMG system offers excellent accuracy and ruggedness. Whether the mission requires close-range or distant work, it can "get the job done."

From Guns & Weapons for Law Enforcement



The drug war, which serves as justification for calling out SWAT teams, disproportionately targets people of color. Here a grandmother caught with a small quantity of drugs at a New York housing project faces serious jail time.

cused on a very small part of the black community — gangs and drug dealers.”

Kraska also found racism within the ranks of one of these paramilitary units, apparently amplified by its culture and experiences. In response to Kraska and Kappeler’s survey, a PPU commander wrote of his patrols: “When the soldiers ride in, you should see those blacks scatter.”¹¹ At one “training” session, the researcher observed members of three police agencies — including the state police — from a large industrial “heartland” state as they were developing a multi-jurisdictional paramilitary unit. (Officers shot automatic weapons at “head-sized” jugs of water.) One of the officers there was casually — and, apparently, unremarkably — attired in a T-shirt embossed with a drawing of a burning city; the caption read: “Operation Ghetto Storm.”

In terms of public policy, the arrival of police ninja corps was preceded by a number of factors that initially had little relation to one another. Paramilitary police units in the US were established in two

11. *Ibid.*, p.10.

separate waves. The first modern urban police paramilitary team was put together by then-Los Angeles Police Commissioner Daryl Gates when he founded the country’s first local SWAT team in the mid-

“When the soldiers ride in, you should see those blacks scatter.”

1960s.¹² Los Angeles and the other big cities that followed its example created paramilitary units in response to civil disturbances of the 1960s and 1970s. At first, these teams were eyed with suspicion and used sparingly.

12. An early example of this collaboration occurred under J. Edgar Hoover. He made a deal with the Army’s Military Intelligence Service to trade access to FBI files on US citizens for military training of FBI agents in strategy and tactics of riot control. Since no funds changed hands, the arrangement escaped congressional oversight. On the evolution of federal swar forces, see “Gardenplot & Swar: U.S. Police as New Action Army,” *CounterSpy*, v. 2, n. 4, Winter 1976.

The War at Home

Then came the “War on Drugs” in the 1980s. Suddenly, there was a new rationale for aggressive use of state-sponsored violence since — any teenage moviegoer knows by now — drug dealers are wanton, diabolically violent characters, armed to the teeth, eager to fight to the death, and stereotypically non-white. From 1985 to 1995, the survey found, a second wave of paramilitary units was established — most in the smaller, less populous jurisdictions —

to fight the drug war.

Starting in the 1970s, the military had been only casually involved in drug interdiction activities. Its participation sparked court cases charging violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, which was passed to end the state of martial law that existed in occupied southern states after the Civil War. During that period of repression, in which internal passports, arbitrary search and arrest, public beatings and lynchings were the norm, the line between military and



JEFFREY D. SCOTT/IMPACT VISUALS

Albuquerque SWAT officers arrest a man at his home on drug and burglary charges.

policing functions was routinely blurred.¹³ The Posse Comitatus Act became a guiding tenet of American democratic governance: the military is designed to engage in war, and the civilian police are charged with enforcing the law.¹⁴

Then two changes in the law, first in 1983 and then in 1989, brought the military and police institutions side by side — formally and legally — at exactly the same time that the post-Cold War military was looking for a new mission. After those amendments to Posse Comitatus, the military could provide intelligence, materiel, transport services and training, as well as participate in drug interdiction efforts in almost every way short of direct search, seizure and arrest.¹⁵

Subsequently, through programs including Joint Task Force Six at Ft. Bliss in El Paso, Texas, local police began receiving some of the same kind of military train-

ing as the Special Forces units. More than 20 of the respondents in Kraska and Kappeler's survey reported their paramilitary teams were trained by Army Rangers or Navy SEALs, military units that specialize in commando tactics. One commander told Kraska in a follow-up interview: "We've had teams of Navy SEALs and

The SWAT and SEAL units used a tow truck to tear the door off and shot a suspect with two joints.

Army Rangers come here and teach us everything. We just have to use our own judgment and exclude the information like: 'at this point we bring in the mortars and blow the place up.'"¹⁶

The similarities between police and military operations have raised serious questions about civil liberties. In May 1997, Marines conducting a border control

"anti-drug" training mission shot dead a goat herder tending his flock in Texas at the Mexico border. The four soldiers, dressed in camouflage, claimed that the herder — armed with a World War II era single-shot rifle, as is usual when protecting livestock in rattlesnake and coyote territory — had fired on them. But where police would be required by law to announce their presence and fire only when their lives were in danger, the soldiers remained hidden and unannounced as they stalked high school student Ezequiel Hernandez for several hours.¹⁷

As the army assumes civilian police functions, the police are acting — and looking — more like soldiers. McNamara, who served as a police chief in San Jose and Kansas City after 15 years in the New York City police department, partially blamed the militarization of police forces on the proliferation of assault weapons: "I predicted a long time ago, the failure to control mili-

13. David Adams, "Internal Military Intervention in the United States," *Journal of Peace Research*, v. 32, n. 2, 1995, pp. 197-211.

14. Peter B. Kraska, "Militarization of the Drug War: A Sign of the Times," in *Altered States of Mind: Critical Observations of the Drug War*, ed. Peter B. Kraska (New York: Garland, 1993), pp. 159-206.

15. Timothy Dunn, *The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992* (Austin, TX: CMAS Books, 1996).

16. Kraska and Kappeler, *op. cit.*; and interviews with JTF-6 and Operation Alliance spokespersons.

17. "Marine Kills High School Student in Texas Border Operation," Associated Press, May 22, 1997.

tary-style weapons into the general population would lead to further militarization of police."¹⁸ The drive toward high-tech weaponry was facilitated soon after the end of the Cold War when military spending reductions brought cheap war-surplus materiel into the market. (St. Petersburg, Florida, just bought its first armored personnel carrier this Spring — for \$1,000 — from the US military.) Gun companies, perceiving a profitable trend, began aggressively marketing automatic weapons to local police departments, holding seminars, and sending out color brochures redolent with ninja-style imagery.¹⁹

This confluence of experiences with martial-style ordnance, immersion in military culture, and popular media imagery quickly conspired to create a new hybrid agent of state-sponsored force that behaves much more like a war-making soldier than a constable on patrol. Almost immediately after this type of "elite" training and ordnance became available to local police, fellow officers, bystanders and suspects alike started dying under bizarre circumstances surrounded by heavily armed, cinematically attired cops in paramilitary drag.

When police SWAT and Navy SEAL units teamed up in Albuquerque in 1990, they used a tow truck to tear the door off an apartment building, fire twice and kill the suspect, who had all of two marijuana joints on the premises.²⁰ A 1994 SWAT raid at the wrong address precipitated the death of Accelyne Williams, a 75-year-old retired minister in Boston who was chased to his death in his own apartment and died handcuffed, face down, his heart palpitating to its last.²¹ A March 1996 tactical raid in Oxnard, California, ended in the "friendly fire" death of a tactical team member in the confusion following the explosion of a flash-bang grenade. Last year, a Reno SWAT team member died in a parachute jump from a Navy helicopter.²² Every month it seems, another overzealous paramilitary gang kills another cop, a bystander or suspect — or settles a subsequent suit with the survivors.

Martialing Resources

How long this trend in policing continues is contingent on America's tolerance of

police-sponsored violence in the name of crime prevention — and on how long the public will continue misreading crime rates. Politicians eager for votes, police hoping to expand their budgets and turf, military planners seeking post-Cold War missions, and arms and training companies looking for profits, all have an interest in exaggerating the threat to the public posed by street crime.

Thus, while crime rates in most areas are falling, public fear that crime is spiraling out of control is increasing — as are demands to remedy the threat by extraordinary, even martial, measures. Neither

ment of PPU's is temporary because these units must always maintain pressure on the communities. The greatest concern is that these paramilitary forces will eventually be seen and perceived as an occupying army.²³ How long can a community be, in effect, garrisoned? Tension kept this high, Kraska predicts, could lead to a flashpoint. "All it takes is one kid taken out by a submachine gun."²⁴

Philosophically, America has arrived at this threshold through its own militarism, its pathological puritanism, and its unshakable racism. After a decades-long national addiction to waging war on



BRIAN PALMER/IMPACT VISUALS

Police used unrest such as that following the Rodney King trial to justify deploying high-tech weaponry and special paramilitary units.

the police nor the public is well-served by these misconceptions which promote empty, cinematically inspired displays of force over the unglamorous, long-term community policing schemes that put officers face to face with the people they are charged to serve. Such community-based law enforcement helps to build the unspoken covenant of trust that is the basis of effective, humane policing.

Kraska is not optimistic about which approach will triumph. He sees martial force being answered by greater force by law-breakers and fears a Cold War-style escalation of armaments in the streets of America. For besieged communities — often underserved by routine policing — the paramilitary teams are often seen as bringing relief.

Joseph McNamara believes that crime reduction associated with the deploy-

ments — framed largely as a war against "unruly minority ethnics" — the deployment of cops dressed like extras in a Stallone movie waving automatic weapons around poor neighborhoods seems almost inevitable. And after 50 years of living as a nation in a peacetime state of emergency managed by the military, the sight of cops cruising the streets in war-surplus armored personnel carriers to remedy social, cultural, and economic problems shouldn't be such a shock. ■



²³ Steve Macko, "Is It Being Used Too Much?" ENN emergency services reports, EmergencyNet News Service (Internet), July 15, 1997, v. 1-196.

²⁴ Interview, May 1997.

18. Interview, May 1997.

19. "Sheriff's SWAT Team Gets Serious Set of Wheels," *St. Petersburg Times*, Oct. 6, 1997.

20. Interview with library staff, *Albuquerque Journal*, May 1997.

21. "Boston to Give Victim's Widow \$1 Million in Wrongful Death Suit" *New York Times*, April 25, 1996.

22. *Los Angeles Times* (Ventura County Edition), Nov. 21, 1996.

ANNOUNCING A NEW BOOK

Mad Cow U.S.A.


Could the Nightmare Happen Here?

by Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber

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In England, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) has already become a household word because of its association with that country's epidemic of mad cow disease. In 1996, the news that young people were dying from eating infected beef shook England and all of Europe.

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Mercenary Armies & Mineral Wealth

ANDREW LICHTENSTEIN/IMPACT VISUALS

by Pratap Chatterjee

The two British men might have been mistaken for businessmen as they walked through the Peninsula hotel just outside Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea (PNG) this past February. Few in that South Pacific country noticed them and no one would have guessed that the heavy suitcases they carried were filled not with business papers but with cash. Nor could one blame bystanders, halfway across the world at the small airport in Yopal in the Andean foothills of eastern Colombia, for overlooking two black boxes carried by another pair of Brits.

Like their colleagues in PNG, these men were not your average businessmen or tourists. All were former members of the Special Air Services (SAS), an elite British

Pratap Chatterjee is an environmental writer researching gold mining companies for Project Underground, a Berkeley, CA-based human rights and environmental group.
Photo: South African gold miner.

fighting force. Several had participated in covert assassination operations against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1980s.

These men are part of a growing number of slick new corporate security operations around the world linking former intelligence officers, standing armies, and death squad veterans. In unholy alliance, they go into battle for new bosses: the mineral industries, which range from multinational corporations to small oil and mining entrepreneurs. Elizabeth Rubin, a contributing editor of *Harper's* magazine, recently summed up this new phenomenon of armies for hire: "It's not just a military machine. Behind it is the old colonial structure, only now it's dressed up in a sort of multinational corporation, with suits and Sat phones instead of Jeeps and parasols."¹

1. Elizabeth Rubin, interviewed on *Weekend All Things Considered*, National Public Radio. Feb. 9, 1997.

This militarization of the mineral industries is really a result of three phenomena. The advent of new technologies such as computer-aided satellite mapping and the use of cyanide to extract gold have turned formerly marginal operations into potential moneymakers. The collapse of the Soviet empire and the signing of the global free trade agreements have opened up countries like Angola that were previously off-limits to Western multinationals. And, lastly, the availability of capital and the mitigation of risk have been ensured by the new push from the international financial institutions, such as bilateral and multilateral agencies including the World Bank and the US Export-Import Bank. They are eager to provide cash and political risk insurance for private resource extraction projects pretty much anywhere in the world.

Tim Spicer, one of the two former SAS men in the South Pacific, was soon to regret his quiet discussion at the Peninsula Hotel. He had met with two senior government officials about buying a copper mine owned by Rio Tinto, the Anglo-Australian mining titan, on the island of Bougainville. Less than a month later, dressed in crumpled jeans, Spicer was led into a Papua New Guinea court. His suitcase, bulging with \$400,000 in cash, was produced as evidence of his contract with the disgraced government to provide a mercenary force to take over the copper mine. His mission had been to defeat a small group of separatists who had shut down the copper mine for almost a decade. When news of Spicer's contract became public, ordinary citizens and local army officers took the law into their own hands. The rioting closed shops, banks and schools and sealed off major roads until truckloads of police armed with automatic rifles eventually dispersed the enraged populace with tear gas and rubber bullets.²

The two unnamed former SAS officers in Colombia fared better. Their black boxes — full of guns and ammunition — were waved through the checkpoint run by a

colleague, Bill Nixon, a former British intelligence officer, whose new job is providing security at the private airport owned by British Petroleum (BP). All three mercenaries were on contract to BP to help train the Colombian police — notorious for their human rights abuses — to protect the Dele-B oil rig. The oil company interpreted security concerns broadly: According to a recently surfaced report commissioned by the Colombian government, BP collaborated with local soldiers involved in kidnappings, torture, and murder. The unpublished document alleges that the oil company compiled intelligence — including photos and videotapes of local people protesting oil activities, and passed the information on to the Colombian military, which then arrested or kidnapped demonstrators as “subversives.”³

Most of the men running the mercenary-for-hire operations tend to operate behind the lines, preferring to employ other men — local or imported hired guns — to carry out on-the-ground operations. Both the Colombian and Papua New Guinean contracts were handled out of London offices run by yet more former SAS officers. Spicer's boss was ex-SAS officer


Anthony Buckingham, the second man at the Peninsula Hotel meeting in February. Buckingham is one of the shadier operators in the security business, who runs a mini-conglomerate of mercenary, oil, and mining companies out of discreet offices at Plaza 107, 535 King's Road in the up-market south London neighborhood of Chelsea.

The Colombian deal was assigned to another security firm, Defense Systems Limited (DSL), a slightly more upscale operation with offices overlooking Buckingham Palace. DSL has a contract with British Petroleum's security division, which in turn is run by more former military types — Mark Heathcote, a former British intelligence officer, and Tony Ling, a former SAS commander. Heathcote, Ling, and Nixon all worked undercover in Northern Ireland, where the SAS specialized in assassinating Irish Republican Army guerrillas.⁴

Today, men like these provide “security” services to companies and governments in Colombia, Guyana, and Venezuela in South America; to Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone in West Africa; to Angola and Namibia in Southern Africa; to former Zaire in Central Africa; to Sudan and Uganda in East Africa; to Papua New Guinea and Indonesia in the Pacific; and to Kazakhstan in Central Asia. Many of these recruits are veterans of South Africa's 32 Battalion and

2. Richard Savill, “Papua troops attempt to quell riots in capital,” *Daily Telegraph* (London), Mar. 21, 1997.

3. Michael Gillard and Fiona Macleod, “Secret soldiers paid for by BP,” *Scotland on Sunday* (Edinburgh), June 29, 1997.



The June 9, 1997 *Oil & Gas Journal* ran a feature on “Energy Company Security.” This map showed guerrilla activity affecting security concerns on the Colombia-Venezuela border.

Civil Cooperation Bureau, which were the most notorious units of the old apartheid forces until elections brought a multi-racial government to power a few years ago.⁵

Recolonization

There is little evidence (other than slick public relations material) that these men are any different from soldiers of fortune like “Mad Mike” Hoare, “Black Jacques” Schramme, and Bob Denard, mercenaries who drank hard, womanized, and wreaked havoc throughout Africa in the wars that followed independence from colonial rule. In the 1950s, for example, Harry Oppenheimer, the South African chair of De Beers, defeated his competitors in Sierra Leone

4. *Ibid.*

5. Elizabeth Rubin, “An army of one's own: in Africa, nations hire a corporation to wage war,” *Harper's*, Feb. 1997.

by enlisting Sir Percy Sillitoe, one of Britain's top counterespionage agents during World War II. Sillitoe hired soldiers and launched an all-out diamond war. The mercenaries laid booby traps, mined border crossings, and ambushed diamond traders until finally they were persuaded to sell their wares to the De Beers buyers.⁶

Military action, private or public, to support mineral extraction permeates the history of the Americas. From the devastation of the Inca in Peru by Pizarro in his search for gold in the 1530s to the US Army massacres of the Sioux in South Dakota in the 1870s as prospectors swarmed into the region; to the forced march of the Navajo from Arizona to New Mexico at the same time; to the 1960s when the Peruvian military bombed the Matsigenka indigenous peoples in the Amazon on behalf of Mobil, the pattern remains consistent. Jeff Moag, from the Washington-based National Security News Service, says that the financing of the mercenaries by the mineral industries amounts to nothing less than "a new colonialism."⁷ And the men who enforce it, like their predecessors, are the prostitutes of war who sell themselves to any company, faction, or government with ready cash to pay.

In fact, Martin Van Creveld, a war theorist, believes that future armed conflicts around the world will resemble the old ones. He argues that conventional nation-states are disappearing and that future "war-making entities" will look much as they did in the feudal past — tribes, city-states, religious associations, private mercenary bands, and commercial organizations such as the East India Company in the time of the British empire. "As used to be the case until at least 1648, military and economic functions will be reunited," Van Creveld writes. In such times, he predicts, "much of the day-to-day burden of defending society against the threat of low-intensity conflict will be transferred to the booming security business, and indeed the time may come when the organizations that comprise that business will, like the *condottieri* of old, take over the state."⁸

6. *Ibid.*

7. Interview, July 1997.

8. Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991).



J. CRISP/UNHCR

When one medical worker in Sierra Leone who worked in a clinic like this one saw the Executive Outcomes helicopters, she rushed to prepare for an influx of wounded.

Privatizing Militarism: New Super Pinkertons

The most infamous mercenary army contracted by the new colonialists is Executive Outcomes (EO), which provided Buckingham and Spicer with soldiers-for-hire in Papua New Guinea (see box). But EO's most famous campaign was in Sierra Leone in May 1996 by Sierra Rutile, an Ohio-based titanium company, and Branch Energy, one of Buckingham's many companies.

The EO mercenaries arrived in Sierra Leone better equipped than most armies in Africa, with Russian helicopter gunships, a radio intercept system, two Boeing 727s to transport troops and supplies, an Andover casualty-evacuation aircraft, and fuel-air explosives. Used with devastating results by the US in the Gulf War, fuel-air explosives — one step below nuclear weapons in power — suck out all available oxygen upon detonation, killing all life within a one-mile radius.

The pilots, according to Martha Carey, an American who worked for Doctors Without Borders, "were racist killers with no interest in the country." Carey reported that during the early days of the mercenary presence in Freetown, she had only to see the EO helicopters flying over her house to know that it was time to rush to the hospital and prepare for an influx of wounded. The real mission of the mercenaries, she charged, was to gain control of Sierra Leone's substantial diamond wealth. And

indeed, the operation left EO with a lucrative security contract financed by the profits earned by the diamond mines.⁹

The G.O.D.s of Greed: Gold, Oil, and Diamonds

Violent scenes like the ones that horrified Carey accompany the mercenaries wherever they go. But to understand the forces behind these operations, it may be better to travel back a quarter century to visit three distinctly different men, whose lives have been shaped by their single-minded pursuit of three minerals — gold, oil, and diamonds.

The first man, a quiet, urbane, Cambridge graduate, left Britain to study business at Stanford in the late 1960s. John Browne grew up in Iran and other countries where his father worked for BP. "It was a colonial existence more than anything else. People lived in these strange expatriate camps, and everyone was connected with the oil business in some way," he later said, recalling that he loved the excitement of the foreign travel.¹⁰ Over the last two decades, Browne slowly but surely worked his way up in BP, based first in Alaska and then the North Sea. In 1989, he became head of exploration for BP, steering the company to successful oil strikes in the Caspian Sea.

9. Rubin, "An army..." *op. cit.*

10. Matthew Lynn, "Browne stays in the BP family," *Sunday Times* (London), June 22, 1997.

The second, Robert Friedland, a charismatic young student from Chicago, got an early start in dubious trafficking at Bowdoin College in Maine in the late 1960s, where he ran an LSD smuggling business out of a college dormitory until he was busted by local undercover cops. He later moved to a hippie commune in Oregon where he found an abandoned mine. "I crawled in and I was scared because it was wet and cold, and here and there the walls had caved in, and all I had was this funky old flashlight. But I *grokked* it immediately — Gold!"¹¹ he once told a reporter, describing his first infatuation with the yellow metal. Two decades later, another of Friedland's mines in Colorado was the site of the most expensive clean-up in this country's mining history as the cyanide-laced waste from one of his mines killed all life in a 17-mile stretch of the Alamosa river.¹²

The third man was a Mauritian-born diamond buyer, Jean-Raymond Boulle, who was working for De Beers, the South African multinational, in Sierra Leone and the Congo at the end of the 1960s. The Congo, which had just been renamed Zaire (and had since taken the name the Democratic Republic of Congo), was being run by the iron hand of Mobutu Sese Seko. The US-backed dictator had taken over the country in 1965, after a bitter war fought by South African mercenaries recruited and paid for by the CIA.

While Browne climbed the corporate ladder, the other two men led more colorful lives. Friedland spent time in India, Switzerland, Canada, Singapore, and finally Australia, while Boulle lived in Belgium, Texas, Minnesota, Arkansas, Belize and eventually Monaco. In the course of his travels, Friedland befriended the families of the rich and powerful. In Indonesia, he established joint ventures with the sons of Indonesian dictator Suharto; in Burma, he linked up with Reggie Tun Maung — the vice president of his holding companies — who just happens to be married to the daughter of Maung Maung Khin, deputy prime minister of the current military junta; and in China, Friedland donated a tenth of the assets of his joint venture to a disabled people's organization run by Deng Pufang, the son of Deng Xiaoping, the late Chinese premier.¹³

11. Adrian du Plessis, "Faster than you can say Jim Bob Hodge," Aug. 5, 1996; and see <http://www.imagen.net/howenow>.

12. Roger Moody, "The Ugly Canadian: Robert Friedland and the Poisoning of the Americas," *Multinational Monitor*, November 1994; and Nazim Baksh, "The Guyana Gold Mining Disaster: Poison in the Lifeline," *CAQ*, n. 56, Spring 1996, p. 28.

For his part, Boulle also courted power. During his stay in Arkansas, when he was beginning to explore in the Crater of Diamonds State Park, he met with the governor. "I spent a little time with Gov. Clinton explaining to him that this could be important to his state and to the nation," he says.¹⁴

Boulle and Friedland met through a common interest in prospecting for diamonds off the Atlantic coast of Namibia. They struck it big time in January 1994 when they staked out what they originally thought was a major diamond property in Labrador. A year and a half later, Friedland and Boulle sold this property — which turned out to have a huge nickel deposit — to Inco, the world's largest nickel producer, for \$4.3 billion Canadian. In the next 12 months, the two parted ways but by then, each was the richer by several

Money from the US Overseas Private Investment Corp. and the Export-Import Bank helped pay for Executive Outcomes' Sierra Leone job.

hundred million dollars. Meanwhile, in April 1996, Browne was appointed chief executive of British Petroleum under chairman Peter Sutherland, the former Irish head of the World Trade Organization.

As they gained wealth, the three mineral barons had more to protect. At about the same time, they all started hiring men like Buckingham, Spicer, and Nixon to put down local protests that might interfere with their exploitation of gold, oil, and diamonds.

On April 30, 1996, BP finalized a deal with DSL to dispatch trainers to Colombia to help the local police "defend" the company oil installations and beef up BP's existing contracts. The oil company's contracts with the army for protection eventually became a minor political sensation in Britain.¹⁵

Meanwhile, in the US, Boulle put up \$10 million in early April 1996 for Sierra Rutile, an Ohio-based company that was struggling to re-open the world's largest

rutile mine in Sierra Leone. The West African facility, a major source of titanium dioxide, had been shut down by rebels in January 1995. The company used this cash, plus money it had borrowed earlier from the World Bank, the London-based Commonwealth Development Corporation, and two US federal agencies — the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank — to pay EO to quell the troubles.¹⁶

The other major backer of EO in Sierra Leone was Branch Energy, headed by Anthony Buckingham. Already an old Africa hand, the Brit had spent the previous ten years helping the Canadian company, Ranger, run oil exploration operations in Angola.¹⁷

Michael Grunberg, Buckingham's financial adviser, introduced his boss to Friedland just before Friedland began to withdraw from active partnership with Boulle. In September 1996, Buckingham and Friedland announced their setup of DiamondWorks (see p. 34). That collaboration set the stage for the new mineral extraction colonies in places as far-flung as Angola in Southern Africa and Sierra Leone in West Africa, the Venezuelan Amazon and Southern China.

Some of the stories of the many military campaigns currently being waged around the world on behalf of these three men and the industries they lead are told in the country studies below. But they are by no means the only major players. There are at least a few dozen others in the mineral industries, men like "Jim Bob" Moffett, the maverick ex-college football player from Texas, who runs the biggest gold mine in the world, and Brian Anderson, the outgoing chief of Shell Nigeria, who are responsible for some of the worst environmental and human rights abuses committed in the world today. Indeed, Millius Palawiya of the London-based NGO (non-governmental organization) International Alert, says that mercenaries today cast themselves in the respectable mold of free market businessmen championed by ex-British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. "They use the Thatcherite language of pri-

16. Michael Ashworth, "Africa's new enforcers: What is a mercenary?" *The Independent* (London), Sept. 16, 1996; also see World Wide Web news summary for *Mining Journal* (London), Apr. 19, 1996, at <http://www.mining-journal.com/mj/index.htm>.

17. Keith Dovkants, "The decline and fall of Tumbledown Tim," *Evening Standard* (London), March 25, 1997.

vate enterprise, efficiency and investment," he says.¹⁸

And now the governments of the new free market-driven world have even begun to court them. No less a luminary than Kofi Annan, the United Nations secretary general, has consulted DSL on how to protect the refugees on the border between Zaire and Rwanda, while the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Pentagon's spy arm, invited Tony Spicer and other EO figures to a major conference about private armies on June 24.¹⁹

Many activists, however, have taken an opposite stance. In June, the London-based Africa Research and Information Bureau (ARIB) launched a campaign against new mercenary operations in Angola, Sierra Leone and Sudan. "Mercenaries are a serious threat to stability in Africa. We must get rid of the mercenaries from the face of Africa," says Kayode Fayemi of ARIB.²⁰ Indeed, if history is anything to go by, inviting private armies into Africa will only serve the interests of those who hire them: the extraction of resources for profit by any means necessary, and with little regard for the human or environmental consequences.

Other activists say that those concerned by cultural, economic, and environmental devastation wrought by the mineral industries' need to become more aware not only of those exploiting the planet's wealth, but of those consuming it. Danny Kennedy, an activist with the Berkeley-based environmental and human rights group, Project Underground, says: "As people in consumer countries drive more and buy more oil, or wear more gold and diamonds, indigenous peoples will continue to be killed and pristine places will be destroyed. Only by building a movement of affected communities and educating these consumers can we hope to reverse this terrifying phenomenon."²¹

18. Moyiga Nduru, "Leaders urged to stop recruiting mercenaries," *Inter Press Service*, June 18, 1997.

19. Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War: How affairs of state are outsourced to corporations beyond public control," *The Nation*, July 28-Aug. 4, 1997.

20. Darius Bazargan, "Mercenaries Go Where Blue Berets Fear To Tread," *Inter Press Service*, June 11, 1997.

21. Interview, July 1997.

The task is enormous not only because of the wealth and power of the mineral industries, but also because the privatization of their security functions on the international scene is only one part of a much larger phenomenon. Here in the United States, prisons, policing, and even welfare are being turned over to corporations. Wealthy people around the world are hiring private security firms which use



While the US has hired mercenary companies, when the Angolan government paid EO to rout former US ally, UNITA, Clinton forced a cancellation of the contract.

everything from brute force to sophisticated electronic surveillance systems to keep the unemployed and the poor away from their enclaves. Meanwhile, ivory tower economists argue about the merits and demerits of free trade, forgetting that the debate cannot simply be restricted to cheaper minerals, food or clothes — it is also about the trade in everything from guns to death itself. Increasingly and openly, governments and corporations are joining together to pillage public resources. When both are armed to the teeth and obsessed by profit, war, inequality and environmental devastation become inevitable. ■

COUNTRY REPORTS

Angola

In the 1960s, this former Portuguese colony in Southern Africa became a major battleground between superpowers which financed rival factions, each seeking to oust its Portuguese master. The war between the Cuban/Soviet-backed MPLA and the US/South Africa-backed UNITA and FNLA was fueled by covert financial assistance and continued even after independence in 1975. By the time the US finally recognized the Angolan government in 1993 — more than two decades after the rest of the world — much of the country lay in ruin and the infrastructure had been eroded.

In September 1994, the Angolan government hired EO for an initial contract of \$40 million. Branch Energy put up some of the money to protect the diamond mining town of Lunda Norte and the coastal oil fields of Soyo where Heritage Oil and Gas has concessions. Heritage, like Branch Energy, is controlled by Buckingham. The EO mercenaries launched a series of attacks on the UNITA rebels in the north-eastern part of the country. With the advantage of having fought alongside UNITA under the South African government, they easily routed the rebels.²²

Last year, apparently at the urging of military advisers to the Clinton administration, Angola was convinced to publicly cancel the mercenary contract. Branch Energy and EO, however, immediately circumvented the government. EO simply set up new shell companies and signed new security contracts with individual members of the Angolan ministry of defense. The company put in additional strategic infrastructure, bought an Ilyushin 76 aircraft, and installed a powerful telecommunications system in the diamond regions linked to the Johannesburg telephone exchange.²³

(continued on p. 35)

22. Rubin, "An Army..." *op. cit.*

23. "De Beers loses diamond contract to Executive Outcomes," *Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), May 13, 1997.

NATIONAL ARMIES FOR SALE TO

The phenomenon of hiring private armies is only one of the strategies used by corporations and governments to protect their assets. National armies that were once set up to defend a country from pillage by foreign interests are today working directly for almost the opposite cause: foreign expropriation of domestic minerals. In at least three countries — Nigeria, Indonesia and India — multinationals have paid directly for services from the local army to harass anybody who protests against the environmental impact of mineral exploitation operations.

In Nigeria, which is now run by brutal military dictator Sani Abacha, the Anglo-Dutch multinational Shell has caused major pollution in the Niger delta during its 38 years of drilling for oil. Ogoni people and other indigenous communities have endured hundreds of oil spills annually, as well as massive flaring from the extraction operations. The typical village in this former British colony still lacks working roads, electricity, running water, schools, and medical facilities. Meanwhile, thousands of the indigenous peoples of the Niger delta have been massacred by the army and police throughout this oil drilling region.¹

After London's *Observer* newspaper published copies of the transaction documents, Shell admitted supplying the Nigerian military government with arms. In a May 12, 1994 internal memo, Major Paul Okuntimo of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, a special military agency, wrote: "Shell operations are impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence."²

Ten days later, Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa was arrested; less than six months later he and eight others who had protested government policies were executed.

In December 1995, Humanitex Nigeria Limited, an arms dealer, sued Shell for \$1.2 million for breach of contract to upgrade weapons for the Nigerian military, whereupon Shell admitted to having purchased 107 Beretta pistols on behalf of the military 15 years previously.³

In April 1997, four former Shell staff members anonymously provided Steve Kretzmann of Project Underground with information about the existence of three

Shell armories at Bonny, Warri, and Port Harcourt, "located within the police stations or offices attached to the relevant Shell premises" that contained Beretta pistols, "pump action shotguns, automatic rifles and revolvers."⁴

Shell admits that the company directly employs an elite detachment of Nigerian police personnel known as Shell police. Former members of this force told Kretzmann about the existence of a special "strike force" to intimidate and harass peaceful protestors with tear gas and gunshots.⁵

Indonesia

In Indonesia, a US company, Freeport McMoRan of New Orleans, was the first major foreign investor in that country after the current dictator Suharto came to power in the mid-1960s. Currently, according to the company, Freeport has "contracts of work" with the Indonesian government to protect a copper and gold mine in Irian Jaya. Corporate documents confirm that its operations dump more than 110,000 tons of mining

"Shell operations are impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence." — Nigerian military agency


waste into local rivers every day. The pollution and heavy sedimentation caused by the dumping of this waste have destroyed local forests along the river banks. When the populace protests the devastation and lack of compensation, Indonesian troops in the region around the mine routinely move in to crack down on the troublemakers. The latest incident occurred in August 1997⁶ despite Indonesian tribunals early last year that found local army personnel

guilty of killing several local people and sentenced them to prison. Human rights groups estimate that the army has killed some 2,000 people in the region in the two decades that the company has mined for copper and gold there.⁷


According to a report prepared by the local Catholic bishop, people from three churches in the villages of Arwanop, Banti, and Waa held a peaceful demonstration on Christmas Day 1994, protesting the mine in Waa. After a prayer ceremony, a group of 15 people left to go to Tembagapura (the Freeport company town) but was arrested by a group of soldiers from a local battalion who accused them of being GPK (security disturbing gang) rebels.

One of the 15 told the bishop that they were all beaten and locked in a Freeport shipping container on Christmas morning. For four hours, "the 15 of us were beaten with sticks and rifle butts and were kicked with boots by the troops.... They stripped us stark naked and took our belongings such as beads and money," said the eyewitness.

The group was released from the container and escorted by soldiers onto a Freeport company bus heading to the low-



THE HIGHEST CORPORATE BIDDER



TEUN VORTEN/IMPACT VISUALS

In Colombia (above), and an increasing number of nations, energy corporations are cutting deals to train and deploy national soldiers to protect private assets.

land town of Timika. One of the group — Wendi Tabuni, a 23-year-old man from Timika — “tried to jump out of the window but one soldier quickly jumped up and stabbed him in the belly with his bayonet ... [but he] still jumped out of the window and ran away,” said the eyewitness. “The bus stopped at once and a number of soldiers jumped down and without warning shot Wendi in the head. The soldiers took his body and threw it in a ravine near Mile 66,” he added.

The other 14 were taken to the Freeport workshop in Koperakopa at about two o'clock in the afternoon where “we were beaten and tortured one by one by the soldiers.” With their eyes taped shut, three people — Yoel Kogoya, 27, Peregamus Waker, 28, and Elias Jikwa, also 28 — “were tortured by being beaten with sticks on the neck from behind, left, right and from the front, till their necks were broken and they died,” says a survivor.

The following day, Yunus Omabak, a 33-year-old Amungme tribal chief from Waa, was summoned to a military post in Tembagapura, together with three other elders from his tribe, to report on the religious service. Omabak says he was put in

Freeport bus number 404 and taken to a Freeport “security cell.” There, soldiers accused them of raising an Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement) flag at the Christmas day protest and supplying the rebels with rice and cigarettes. “[T]hey hit me over the head with a big stone till blood streamed over my body. They put an iron bar in the hollow of my knees and forced me to squat and lean against a chest for hours. I was screaming in pain,” he said.⁸

Burma and India

In Burma, the military forces local people into unpaid service for Unocal and Total, two oil companies from California and France respectively. These companies set up a joint venture with Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which is controlled by the State Law

and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the military government of Burma. Unocal, Total and MOGE are working together to build a \$1.2 billion 40-mile-long pipeline that will deliver natural gas from the Yandana gas field in the Andaman Sea to an electric power plant in Thailand. Officials from the government-in-exile say that the Burmese army has rounded up villagers to build the railway, roads, airports, and other facilities. No official figures exist, but some observers estimate that 500,000 people provide unpaid, forced labor on any given day. The situation is arguably worse than in Nigeria and Indonesia because not only does the army provide protection for the mineral multinationals, but additionally, it can force the local community to provide dirt-cheap or slave labor.

That's not all. “People in the region where that gas pipeline will be constructed have been relocated to areas where they have no means of earning a living. Villages that have existed for decades have been burned and destroyed,” says Sein Win, the leader of the government-in-exile.⁹

In India, a far more democratic country than Burma, Nigeria, or Indonesia, armies have recently become available to multina-

tional corporations for a pittance. This January, following a series of major protests, Enron, a natural gas multinational from Texas, reportedly paid policemen about \$3.50 a day for a battalion to guard a power plant currently under construction. Since then, Amnesty International has recorded several incidents of police violence.¹⁰

The Cold War kept national armies throughout the Third World well supplied with weapons as the superpowers vied for control of almost every country on the planet. With the new international configuration comes a new — or perhaps only more overt — function and source of funding for the world's militaries: to protect multinational mineral industries from the wrath of the local people. ■



BILL BURKE/IMPACT VISUALS

Nigerian pro-democracy groups protest outside Shell's DC headquarters.

1. Steve Kretzmann & Shannon Wright, “Shell Independent Annual Report,” Project Underground & Rainforest Action Network, May 1997.
2. Paul Okuntimo, “Law and Order in Ogoni etc,” memo from the chair of Internal Security, May 12, 1994.
3. Cameron Duodu, “Shell Admits Importing Guns For Nigerian Police,” *Observer* (London), Jan. 28, 1996.
4. Kretzmann, *op. cit.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. “Irian tribal clash in Indonesia leaves two dead,” Reuters, Aug. 22, 1997.
7. “Freeport in Indonesia,” Project Underground Factsheet, April 1997.
8. “Trouble at Freeport,” Australian Council for Overseas Aid, April 1995.
9. Interview, October 1996.
10. Charubala Annuncio, “Excess Power: Amnesty indicts Maharashtra for rights violations at Dabhol,” *Outlook* (New Delhi), August 6, 1997.

Mercenary Portraits

Executive Outcomes

EO head Eben Barlow recently told a South African reporter that "War and anarchy will reign in Africa because it has been exploited by people making promises. The Cold War left a huge vacuum and I identified a niche in the market — we are selling the business of surviving."¹ Barlow is a former commander of the notorious 32 Buffalo Battalion of the South African special forces under the apartheid regime. This espionage unit, formed by South African military intelligence, specialized in disinformation and assassination. It targeted enemies of the apartheid state and was deployed alongside the UNITA rebels to fight the Marxist MPLA Angolan government. Barlow was also a member of the South Africa Directorate of Covert Collection and the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB), for which he ran pro-apartheid operations in England in 1988, according to Jeff Moag of the National Security News Service. The CCB sent Barlow to Western Europe, where he purportedly spread disinformation about Nelson Mandela's African National Congress and set up front companies to evade sanctions and sell South African weapons abroad.²

Barlow set up EO in 1989 in Pretoria but a recent spate of unfavorable publicity and parliamentary attention has apparently convinced him to move the nerve center of his operations to London. The company employs old Buffalo and CCB hands as well as Angolan, Namibian, and African National Congress veterans.

The company conducted its first known operation in Angola in 1993 where the mercenaries used their first-hand knowledge of UNITA to rout their former allies. Angola is possibly where Barlow met former SAS officer Buckingham, who is now believed to have ultimate control over EO and the complex web of some 80 companies involved in businesses ranging from landmine removal to water purification.

Some of its more notable affiliates are Sandline International, which ran the disastrous PNG operation, and Saracen International, which is partly owned by relatives of Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni. Saracen runs security for gold mines as well as operations against rebels in that country. Other affiliates like Shibata, Ltd. are believed to have operations in Mozambique, while Falconer Systems apparently does business with the United Nations.³

Buckingham's own businesses include Branch Energy, Branch Mining, and Heritage Oil and Gas — a group of mining and oil companies with concessions in Angola, Colombia, and Sierra Leone. Branch Energy, whose Sierra Leone operations are part-owned by EO, recently merged operations with Carson Gold. This mining company, established by Robert Friedland, then became DiamondWorks, based in Vancouver, Canada. DiamondWorks is now prospecting for minerals in China, the Philippines, and Venezuela. Company documents published on its Internet site show that two men from Branch Energy — Buckingham and Michael Grunberg — were appointed to the board of DiamondWorks when it set up offices last October. Also sitting on this board are Eric Friedland, Myron Goldstein, and Beverly Downing, the brother and two close associates of Robert Friedland.⁴

Defense Systems Limited

Set up in 1981 by Alastair Morrison, a former SAS officer, DSL now employs 4,000 people from 30 nations. Its most lucrative business is providing security for oil and mining companies including Broken Hill Proprietary Petroleum of Australia; BP, Shell, and British Gas of the United Kingdom; Amoco, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, and Texaco of the US; Cambior and Ranger of Canada; and De Beers of South Africa.

No stranger to counterinsurgency training, DSL has provided security forces in Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea, and Mozambique. It also contracts to embassies in countries torn by civil war such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), where DSL officers guarded the US, South African, and Swiss embassies; and in Angola, where the company guarded the British, Italian, South African, Swedish, and US embassies. Retired British army Maj. Gen. Stephen Carr-Smith says that DSL provides services in "about 30 or so different countries around the world. They are always the dodgy type of countries, the remote, and the hostile — Angola, Mozambique, Colombia, Algeria, the former Soviet Union. Those sorts of countries where life is a bit tough at this stage."⁵

Military Professional Resources Inc.

This Virginia-based company was founded in 1987 by retired Army Gen. Vernon Lewis. It is currently run by former high-ranking military figures, including Gen. Carl Vuono, US Army Chief of Staff during the invasion of Panama and the Gulf War, Gen. Ed Soyster, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Gen. Frederick Kroesen, former commander of the US Army in Europe. Describing itself as "the greatest corporate assemblage of military expertise in the world," it boasts a "business focus on military matters to include training, equipping, force design and management, professional development, concepts and doctrine, organizational and operational requirements, situational and war gaming operations, humanitarian assistance, quick reaction military contractual support, and democracy transition assistance programs for the military forces of emerging republics...[and] could be a fun and productive place to work."⁶

MPRI was hired in 1995 to train the Croatian army, which went on to launch a series of bloody offensives against Serbian forces. Most important was Operation Lightning Storm, the assault on the Krajina region during which Serbian villages were sacked and burned, hundreds of civilians were killed, and some 170,000 people were driven from their homes. In the weeks before the offensive, Gen. Vuono held at least ten meetings with officers involved in the campaign including Gen. Varimar Cervenka, the chief architect.⁷ MPRI has also worked for the Bosnian and Liberian governments and made a failed attempt to win US contracts in Zaire. ■

1. Angella Johnson, "Broker of war and death," *Mail & Guardian* (Johannesburg), Feb. 28, 1997.

2. Rubin, *op. cit.*

3. Moag, *op. cit.*

4. Canada NewsWire, "Carson Gold Completes Name Change to DiamondWorks," Oct. 21, 1996; and see also company website: <http://www.diamondworks.com>.

5. Bazargan, *op. cit.*; and see also company website: <http://www.defencesystems.com>.

6. MPRI website: <http://www.mpri.com>.

7. Silverstein, *op. cit.*

(continued from p. 31)

Meanwhile, the Upper Cuango diamond concession in UNITA-held territory has been awarded by the government to the Dutch-based International Defense and Security (IDAS), another mercenary army, which has turned over the exploration contracts to a company controlled by Jean-Raymond Boulle.²⁴

The government has also begun talks with UNITA to convince it to sign a combined peace and diamond trading agreement (the Angolan diamond trade is estimated to be worth \$1 billion a year). In mid-May, to convince the rebels to do business, the Angolan army launched a new offensive in Lunda Norte, capturing several towns and villages in UNITA-held territory. By July, some 8,000 people had been forced to flee their homes. Elisabeth Rasmusson of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Assistance, warns: "We have got to get some help to these people very soon or a lot of these people are going to start dying."²⁵


The decision of Angola to rely upon a mercenary army raises important questions for developing nations at the end of the cold war. Without Cuban and Soviet military support — and with the US unwilling to lend military assistance — how should a country such as Angola defeat an outlawed Cold War relic such as UNITA? Developing countries are faced with a dilemma. A conventional standing army diverts tremendous resources from civilian needs, hinders development, and increases the risk of coups by military officers. On the other hand, resorting to mercenary armies in time of crisis risks encountering a wealthier adversary who can bid for a larger force. The increasing cost of arms expenditures and the permanence of armies for hire are forcing such choices on already beleaguered nations.

Sierra Leone

This West African country was set up by former slaves from Nova Scotia in the 18th century and became part of the British empire until its independence in 1961. EO touts Sierra Leone as an example of success after an EO mercenary force stopped the civil war, forced out the military dictatorship, and installed a government that held elections. EO's claim crumbled earlier this year when the new government was ousted as soon as the mercenaries left.

24. Barnaby Phillips, "Unita pressed to cut deal on diamonds," *Financial Times* (London), June 12, 1997.

25. Lando Malonga, "Instability Drives Many from their Homes," *Inter Press Service*, July 23, 1997.



C. SATTLBERGER/UNHCR

Some of the 6,500 Zairian refugees sheltered in a former railway station. While US-backed dictator Mobutu and foreign corporations looted the country's mineral wealth, the population suffered war and extreme privation.

Until recently, one of Sierra Leone's biggest single sources of income — the titanium ore mine run by Ohio-based Sierra Rutile — was shut down by rebels in January 1995. The company responded by calling in the Gurkha Security Guards, a company led by Robert MacKenzie, son-in-law of the late CIA deputy director Ray Cline.²⁶ MacKenzie was killed in an ambush and the Gurkhas — abiding by the terms of their contract — refused to take offensive action.

26. Rubin, "An army..." *op. cit.*; and Moag, *op. cit.*

A few months later, in April, Sierra Rutile teamed up with Branch Energy to bring EO to the country with the blessing of Valentine Strasser, the military ruler of the country. In return, the mercenaries were guaranteed \$1.5 million a month in profits from diamond mines in Kono, the eastern part of the country, near the border with Guinea. Once in the country, EO employed traditional Sierra Leonian hunters as scouts and brought in two of apartheid-era South Africa's most highly decorated air force pilots. When the pilots told

the Sierra Leone military commander that they were having difficulty distinguishing between the rebels and civilians camped under the impenetrable canopy of vines and trees, the reply was, "Kill everybody." So they did.²⁷

By June 1995, the rebels and renegade soldiers had scattered into the hills and all that remained in Kono's towns were dogs and vultures feeding off the corpses strewn about the streets. In February and March 1996, less than a year after the mercenaries landed, Sierra Leone went to the polls for the first presidential elections in 28 years. The new government lasted a year until, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, it terminated the EO contract and was promptly overthrown in a coup. To make matters worse, a Nigerian peacekeeping force has started air strikes against the new military government.

The human rights situation continued to deteriorate, with reports of an increase in armed robberies and dozens of summary executions in July. Also, the World Food Program alleges that the army has started "systematic and violent looting of relief food."²⁸

Meanwhile, Sierra Rutile has raised \$10 million in new funds from Jean-Raymond Boulle and has applied for a new \$17 million loan from the World Bank, ostensibly to expand the mine. The loan proposal has been condemned by Friends of the Earth, which says that the company has violated Bank resettlement and environmental guidelines.²⁹ And in late July, Spicer flew to meet with investors in Vancouver, Canada, to discuss "strategy, logistics and training" to "convert 40,000 militia into an effective fighting force" in Sierra Leone.³⁰

Democratic Republic of Congo

This Central African country, a former Belgian colony, and then Zaire, was ruled by Mobutu Sese Seko, who took over the country in 1965 after the five years of bitter civil war that followed independence. Mobutu, one of the most brutal dictators of our time, was supported for decades by the CIA until his government fell to Laurent Kabila earlier this year.

Jean-Raymond Boulle pulled off one of the most spectacular mineral deals of the

year this March when his company — America Mineral Fields — signed a \$1 billion agreement with Kabila's rebel troops to develop a zinc mine at Kipushi, a cobalt extraction operation in Kolwezi, and cut a deal to sell diamonds in the mineral-rich eastern province of Shaba. As part of the agreement, he lent Kabila a leased jet.³¹

Within weeks, Kabila, apparently backed by Angolan, Rwandan, and Ugandan troops and support, routed Mobutu Sese Seko and ended his 32-year rule. Recent reports from South Africa show that Mobutu turned down two offers of help — from EO of South Africa and Military Professional Resources Incorporated — for lack of funds in the crucial last days of battle.³²

Boulle started his career as a diamond buyer for De Beers, the South African diamond moguls, in Zaire in the late 1960s, just after US-financed South African mercenaries helped defeat another mercenary-backed government led by Moïse Tshombe of Shaba, and installed Mobutu. Ironically, his new deal with Kabila, who also hails from Shaba, beat his old employer, De Beers, to the punch.

Although Kabila was hailed as a conquering hero, his past belies that image. He has been accused of running brothels, drug-trafficking and kidnapping.³³ The Babembe people Kabila ruled in the late 1960s accuse him of burning alive at the stake those he suspected of betraying him or of using witchcraft. Kabila also forced the Babembe to mine gold to fund his planned revolution. Today the UN is attempting to investigate allegations that Kabila's troops massacred 400,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the forests of eastern Zaire.

Papua New Guinea

The eastern half of the South Pacific island of New Guinea, Papua New Guinea (PNG), was a British and German colony and then an Australian protectorate until 1975. That year, both PNG and the outlying island of Bougainville, some 500 miles northeast of the capital, Port Moresby, declared independence. PNG quickly took over Bougainville, where an Australian company, CRA, had begun to mine copper in 1972.

In 1989, local landowners shut down the Panguna mine to protest the environmental destruction it caused and to demand independence. This February, the

PNG government — which had received about 44 percent of its revenue from the mine — paid Sandline International \$36 million to rout the Bougainvilleans. Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan allegedly tried to pay for the contract by illegally trading in the near-defunct Bougainville Copper Ltd. on the Australian Stock Exchange.

In early March, Chan sacked the military commander, Brigadier Gen. Jerry Singarok, for denouncing the contract with Sandline and arguing that the money would be better spent on his own troops, who were desperately underpaid and ill-equipped. Riots ensued after soldiers loyal to Singarok led protests and were joined by at least 2,000 civilians. The soldiers arrested and deported a number of the mercenaries, sparking a popular demand for Chan to resign — although he recently returned to power after a lengthy public inquiry. At the hearings that followed disclosure of the contract, Sandline operative Timothy Spicer revealed one aspect of the mercenaries' campaign. "Operation Oyster" was to wage a psychological campaign against the Bougainvilleans with the help of a light aircraft. "It has a tape recorder and a speaker system that is an incredibly powerful system and can broadcast from the aircraft to the ground," he said. Singarok testified that PNG's commitment to paying Sandline \$120 million a year would have caused the Panguna mine to be effectively mortgaged to the mercenaries until the army revolt scotched the whole operation.³⁴

Sudan and Uganda

Neither of these former British possessions — unlike Angola and Zaire — was targeted for more than routine US interference. Both of these East African countries have had significant internal problems. Sudan has only had 11 years of peace since independence in 1956 and is currently controlled by a fundamentalist Islamic dictatorship. Uganda has suffered two dictators and is now ruled by the autocratic Yoweri Museveni.

In the Sudan, Arakis, a small, new Canadian oil company, recently finalized a billion dollar agreement to exploit the Al-Muglad Rift Basin on the seam line between the Arab North and the black African South. In the last nine months, Arakis and the government have worked hand in hand in a relationship that "is self-evidently symbiotic," writes Martin Cohn, the *Toronto Star's* Middle East reporter, who

27. Rubin, "An army..." *op. cit.*

28. Melvis Dzisah, "Junta Interferes with Food Relief," *Inter Press Service*, July 29, 1997.

29. Kamara Sullay, "Mined Out," *Friends of the Earth England, Wales & Northern Ireland*, April 1997.

30. Allan Robinson, Karen Howlett, and Madeline Drohan, "Mercenaries eye Sierra Leone," *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), Aug. 1, 1997.

31. Marius Bosch, "Scramble on for riches in Kabila's Congo," *Reuters*, May 28, 1997.

32. Peta Thornycroft, "Mobutu couldn't afford SA mercenaries," *Mail & Guardian*, July 18, 1997.

33. Chris McGreal, "An ugly corner of Kabila's past," *Mail & Guardian*, May 22, 1997.

34. Paul Ruffini, "Mercenaries planned psychological action against PNG rebels," *Asia Pulse* (Singapore), April 7, 1997.

recently visited the drilling site. "The oil camp opens its doors to military men as well as nomads. Arakis services broken military trucks, provides electricity lines to their barracks and even pipes in water to army camps," he adds.³⁵

The Dinka and Nuer, the two major ethnic groups in the south, are refusing to cooperate with the project, as is the National Democratic Alliance. This coalition unites all the Northern and Southern military groups fighting the government that has ruled since 1989. Amnesty International has condemned the Khartoum military dictatorship for its massive human rights abuses, including the deliberate and arbitrary killings of villagers, the abduction of scores of children, and torture of suspected government opponents.³⁶

The situation has worsened in the last few months as fighting has increased. The rebels, led by John Garang, have advanced into the eastern provinces, through which Arakis' 940-mile-long pipeline to Port Sudan is due to be laid. The rebels allege that Arakis has hired white South African mercenaries to protect its new project.³⁷

The concession is expected to bring in annual revenues of \$1 billion, or a tenth of Sudan's present gross national product. Initially, Arakis' main potential partner in the venture was Occidental Petroleum. This California company won a special exemption from the Clinton administration to do business in Sudan, despite an economic embargo placed on the country for its sponsorship of terrorism. Although Khartoum vetoed Occidental's participation late last year, the US company's influence is still felt through its close association with Arakis. On July 30, James Taylor, then Occidental's executive vice president for international exploration, joined the Arakis board. The previous week, Arakis had appointed a new pipeline manager named David Hunter, who used to work for Occidental.

On the other side of the border in northern Uganda, General Kaleb Akandwanaho, better known as Salim Saleh, half-brother of autocratic ruler Yoweri Museveni, who has close economic ties to mercenary ventures. He owns shares in Buckingham's Branch Mining, which in turn has shares in a joint venture to explore

for gold in Kidepo national park. Saleh, who is currently in charge of the fight against Ugandan anti-government rebels in the north of the country, also controls 45 percent of Saracen Uganda, a subsidiary of EO. Saracen, which is based in South Africa, also employs Craig Williamson, a former spy who has admitted killing people in southern Angola with a parcel bomb.³⁸


Colombia

Colombia has spent the last few decades in a state of semi-civil war with leftist guerrilla groups. A major source of violence is the thriving cocaine trade, which forms a key component of the national economy and employs powerful paramilitary death squads.

British Petroleum and its partners last year signed a three-year, \$60 million agreement with Colombia's Ministry of Defense, under which the army agreed to supply a battalion of 150 officers and 500 soldiers, including an elite mobile unit, to monitor construction of a 550-mile-long pipeline to the Caribbean coast.

The Colombian army recently introduced a US-designed counterinsurgency strategy of dirty war, known locally as "quitarle agua al pez" or draining the fish tank. The phrase comes from the counterinsurgency strategy of draining the "sea" to kill the "fish." Instead of fighting the guerrillas, then, the army and pro-government paramilitary death squads target people they consider sympathizers. These same army officials are currently under investigation for human rights abuses and alleged involvement in the death of six peasant leaders who protested the oil giant.³⁹

In addition, last April BP signed a reported \$5 million contract with PONAL, the Colombian National Police, to create



CRISPIN HUGHES/IMPACT VISUALS

Sudanese refugee.

and dispatch a unit of police to protect company rigs. In 1996 alone, the Colombian ombudsman received 169 reports of police involvement in murder, disappearances, and threats. Wearing Colombian police uniforms, a BP team of DSL soldiers has been secretly training the national police at the rig sites. The course includes counter guerrilla tactics, such as lethal weapons handling, sniper fire, and close quarter combat. Amnesty International researcher Susan Lee charges that: "Given the well-documented role of the police in human rights abuses and the lack of accountability and controls on the Colombian armed forces — BP practices are extremely dangerous and certainly open to abuse."⁴⁰

The Amnesty report also details environmental damage caused by BP. The company's oil exploration has devastated a protected forest, polluted a river, and damaged several bridges and the only road local people can use to transport their products to market. ■

40. Gillard and Jones, *op. cit.*

35. Martin Regg Cohn, "Oiling the Wheels of Revolution," *Toronto Star*, April 20, 1997.

36. See Alex de Waal, "Hassan al Turabi's Muslim Brothers: Theocracy in Sudan," *CAQ*, n. 49, Summer 1994.

37. "Canadian Oil Company Employs Mercenaries In Sudan," *Drillbits & Twilings*, Project Underground, Berkeley, CA, Aug. 7, 1997.

38. "Mercenaries: A Kenyan Connection?" *The Economic Review*, Feb. 24, 1997; and Mungo Sogot, "Williamson shows 'contempt' for justice system," *Mail & Guardian*, Feb. 7, 1997.

39. Michael Gillard and Melissa Jones, "BP's secret military advisers," *The Guardian* (London), June 30, 1997.

Che Guevara and the CIA



Mexico, 1956. First photo of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara together, at the end of a prison term.

by Michael Steven Smith and Michael Ratner

When the international team of forensic scientists saw that one of the seven skeletons they had just unearthed had no hands, they knew they had finally found the grave of Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Thirty years before, a group of Bolivian soldiers and a CIA agent had executed the guerrilla leader and his comrades as they were trying to stir revolution in the Bolivian countryside. But before Che was buried near the edge of the

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military airstrip in Vallegrande, his hands were cut off and his prints sent to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. With Che confirmed dead, the agency closed "one of the thickest [files] in the CIA's global records."¹ Ever since, Bolivian authorities had kept the grave site a state secret and 28 years after his murder, when Bolivian Gen. Mario Salinas told journalist Jon Lee Anderson where the bodies were buried, the general was placed under house arrest. The Bolivians were trying to bury Che's legacy along with his body. It didn't work. Che was nowhere, but he was everywhere, still causing trouble and inspiring hope.

1. Peter Grosse, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1994).

Given Che's long history of revolution and Washington's anticommunism, it is not surprising that the US was not only interested in verifying Che's death, but had actively helped track him down. The embodiment of the Cuban revolution, Che had opposed US interventions around the world, from Guatemala to Vietnam to the Congo.

But Che's last campaign in Bolivia was ill-fated from the start. In February 1966, a month after he arrived, Che broke with the Bolivian Communist Party, noting in his diary that "the party is now taking up ideological arms against us."² A month later,

2. Ernesto Che Guevara, *The Bolivian Diary of Ernesto Che Guevara* (New York: Pathfinder, 1994).

even before the small band saw combat, two men defected and one sold the troop's location to the CIA. Immediately, the US sent counterinsurgency aid: Washington deployed aerial infrared photographic sensors — developed at the University of Michigan — to detect human body heat; the Pentagón set up a counterinsurgency camp in La Esperanza; and, while the CIA advised the Bolivian government on strategy, US Green Berets, fresh from Vietnam, trained a unit of Bolivian Rangers. Soon, Che's troops were identified, isolated, and increasingly depleted.

On October 8, 1967, less than a year after Che began work in Bolivia, those Rangers captured him and took him, wounded but alive, to a schoolroom in La Higuera near the Vallegrande military base. A day later, a Bolivian soldier executed Che on the orders of the military dictator Rene Barrientos "in the presence of a Cuban-American officer for the Central Intelligence Agency."³ All evidence points to a direct role in the murder by the CIA.

3. Jon Lee Anderson, *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: Grove Press, 1997).

One agent who boasts of taking part, Felix Rodríguez, served the CIA in Cuba (where he authorized an attack on a Spanish freighter, killing three people), Vietnam, Argentina, and El Salvador.⁴ During the Iran-Contra affair, he became a public figure where, as an aide to George Bush, he did his part to subvert the US Constitution. Rodríguez' home in Miami, where he retired on taxpayers' money, features a sort of museum displaying guns and rifles, a plaque from the US government thanking him for services rendered, and a bra in a glass case which he claims to have taken from Nidia Diaz, a comandante he captured in El Salvador. Another trophy is Che's watch, intended for the rebel's son.

4. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 611. In Felix Rodríguez' account, the Bolivian military ordered Che's execution, but he could have countermanded the order. He did not, Rodríguez (aka Max Gómez) told Anderson, because years before, Fidel Castro had been captured by Batista and not killed. This, Rodríguez thought, was a mistake. The account of investigative reporter Michele Ray, who traveled to Bolivia immediately after Che's death and interviewed key people, is both different and convincing. She contends that the CIA ordered the execution and asserts that Edward Gonzales, also a CIA officer, was present in La Higuera when Che was assassinated. ("In Cold Blood: How the CIA Executed Che Guevara," *Ramparts*, Feb. 1968.)

Rodríguez' eyewitness account, and a copy of Che's fingerprints — flown quickly to Washington by a Bolivian minister — confirmed the execution.⁵ The US government breathed a huge sigh of relief. Washington had been terrified that he would spread the Cuban example and ignite "one, two, three Vietnams" among the impoverished peoples of Latin America.

The Files

Convinced that Che's defeat was crucial to US political and economic control of the region, both the CIA and FBI extensively documented his activities.⁶ In the 1950s, when the files began in Guatemala, a *liet-motif* of the investigations was: "Is he a communist?" A few years later, when Che headed Column IV (there were actually only two columns), the CIA sent a spy — posing as a journalist — into Che's Sierra Maestra camp. He reported back that,

Despite "Che's" undoubted hostility to the US and despite his embracing of the Communist line concerning Guatemala and Hungary [deleted words] difficult to believe that he is a Communist in the sense of a dedicated Party member and revolutionary, and conspirator. One reason is that he does not talk consistently like an intellectually disciplined Communist. ... He does not have the jargon, the usual phrases, the pat and stock answers which characterize the real Communist. Furthermore "Che" is such an individualist and romantic that he doesn't sound like an "organization man" at all.

"Of course," the spy adds cautiously, "this could be nothing but camouflage."⁷

But when Che — an Argentine physician from an upper-class, somewhat bohemian family — arrived in Guatemala, his politics were relatively unformed. A brief stint as a merchant marine and his travels through South America by motorcycle, had made him painfully aware of the dismal conditions endured by most people on the continent. After visiting the copper mines in Chile and the tin mines in Bolivia, he commented with characteristically caustic wit that the Yankees had taken everything and left to the native people "only an ox."⁸

In 1954, 11 months after Che went to Guatemala, the CIA overthrew Jacobo



FREDDY ALBERTA

Bolivian army displays Che's body shortly after his assassination.

5. Perhaps, planning for the future, a Jan. 14, 1964 document from FBI headquarters had requested a more recent copy of Che's fingerprints. See Ratner and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 113, and Anderson, *op. cit.*

6. Ratner and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

7. Ratner and Smith, "CIA document, Feb. 13, 1958," *op. cit.*, p. 25.

8. Anderson, *op. cit.*

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/351,466
SUBJECT	Biographical Data on Ernesto GUEVARA Serna, Commander of Column No. 4 of the Fidel CASTRO Forces	DATE DISTR.	15 April 19
DATE OF INFO.	11 - 30 March 1958	NO. PAGES	3
DATE ACQ.		REQUIREMENT NO.	
		REFERENCES	
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.			
SOURCE:			

- Ernesto GUEVARA Serna ("Che") was born in Rosario, Province of Santa Fe, Argentina, on 6 June 1928. His parents still live in Rosario. He is Commander of Column No. 4 of the 26 of July Revolutionary Movement forces in the Sierra Maestra, the largest of the five columns under the command of Fidel CASTRO. GUEVARA studied medicine at the University of Buenos Aires. While at the University of Buenos Aires he expressed his opposition to Juan PERON, then dictator of Argentina, and later voted against him. In 1953, when GUEVARA was called for his compulsory military service, he refused to serve under PERON and for that reason left Argentina. He visited Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, and Cuba.
- GUEVARA specialized in allergies and for that reason has done a great deal of physiological research. When he graduated from medical school he did some work in this field with a doctor in Buenos Aires. Later in Mexico he apparently tried to resume this research. He never established a medical practice. In Mexico he married a Peruvian exile who was an Aprista and they have a two-year-old daughter. It is rumored that GUEVARA and his wife are separated. He has mentioned on occasion that she may have returned to Peru since the change of administration in that country.
- GUEVARA was in Guatemala during the last days of the regime of Jacobo Arbenz and defended the latter in the Guatemalan press. After the fall of Arbenz GUEVARA went to Mexico where he joined the 26 of July Revolutionary Movement of Fidel CASTRO. While in Mexico he received training in mountain warfare. GUEVARA was to serve the CASTRO Movement in the capacity of combat surgeon. He is one of the twelve survivors of the GRAMA expedition led by CASTRO which landed in Cuba on 2 December 1956. During the sixteen months in the Sierra Maestra with the forces of Fidel CASTRO, GUEVARA abandoned his post as combat surgeon to assume command of one of CASTRO's columns.

From the CIA's biographical file on Che Guevara.

Arbenz and doomed Guatemala to more than 40 years of murderous despotism. Arbenz' reformist administration had been stepping on corporate America's toes by nationalizing some of the vast land holdings of the United Fruit Company. Washington had recruited Castillo Armas, an ex-army colonel and furniture salesman, as Arbenz' replacement, and supplied him with arms and training in neighboring Nicaragua. When Armas' troops took over, Che, radicalized by the struggle to defeat the CIA coup, fled to Mexico.⁹

He brought with him three tenets and a new wife. After watching the failure of reform in Guatemala, he concluded that 1) monopoly land holdings had to be broken up and given to the peasants who work them, 2) the population had to be armed to defend its conquest, and 3) the old ruling

repressive apparatus had to be eliminated. His wife Hilda Gadea, a Peruvian radical more experienced and politically advanced than he, helped educate him. Their daughter, Hildita, was born soon after their escape to Mexico.

Che soon shared his hard-won tenets with "... a young man, intelligent, very sure of himself, and of extraordinary audacity. I think there is a mutual sympathy between us."¹⁰ Che's new comrade, to whom he was introduced by Cuban friends he met in Guatemala, was Fidel Castro. They went out for dinner and after talking for hours, Fidel invited Che to join his guerrilla movement. Che accepted on the spot. The only other member then was Raul Castro, Fidel's younger brother. Che described his decision:

The truth is that after the experiences of my wanderings across all of Latin America and, to top it off, in Guatemala, it didn't take much to incite me to join

GUEVARA claims emphatically that he is not now, nor has he ever been a Communist. He is a self-declared individualist, a non-conformist, and an ultra-nationalist in the Latin American sense. He resents accusations that he is a Communist and blames the United States and the United Press for such charges. GUEVARA claims that he defended the regime of Arbenz in Guatemala because he believed in the rise of an American republic which could defend itself against exploitation by foreign capital, for example, by the United Fruit Company. He refuses to believe that there was a Soviet penetration in Guatemala during the regime of Arbenz, and he said that all Latin Americans resented United States interference in the affairs of Guatemala.

GUEVARA said he became interested in Cuba during his university days when he read several books on Jose MARTI, the Cuban patriot. Later he met several Cuban exiles in Guatemala who were members of the 26 of July Revolutionary Movement. The aims and the ideals of the Movement appealed to GUEVARA, so he joined the organization.

GUEVARA is well-mannered, soft-spoken, and hesitant in conversation. He is extremely popular throughout the 26 of July Movement, both among the civilian and military components of the organization. In spite of his gentle nature he seems to have better military command than most of the leaders of the Movement. He is energetic, athletic, participates in any type of activity about the camp no matter whether it is softball, general recreation, or caring for pets. His men respect him because he is daring in combat and never passes up an opportunity for an encounter. He is the only commander in the Movement who has ever been observed to stand a man at attention and discipline him for inefficiency.

GUEVARA is about 5'11" tall, weighs about 170 lbs, and has a medium build. He is very tanned, but normally his complexion is very fair. He has crudely cut, dark brown hair, brown eyes, a rather high forehead, and a sparse brown beard. He generally wears olive-drab combat dungarees and a black turtle-neck wool sweater. His dungarees and vest pockets are used as files for messages, and are always stuffed with papers.

GUEVARA suffers from chronic asthma and must use his inhaler at night and during marches. Fidel CASTRO has ordered him to ride whenever possible during marches.

GUEVARA's sense of humor seemed to overcome his vexation when asked about Communism during a recent United Press interview. He answered that he was not a Communist, but that such questions from the press and indirectly from the United States Government were inducive to becoming a Communist. Later, when asked why he had abandoned his country, his profession, his wife and child for a distant ideological cause, he answered with mirth that this could have been a result of two factors: 1) that he read MARTI as a boy, or 2) because of the rubles he had hidden in his headquarters. In the same interview he was questioned concerning the duration and hardship of the struggle in the mountains and how long morale of the Movement would hold up. He answered that they have all the time in the world; that they are constantly growing; that only 12 men survived the landing 15 months previously but that there were now 1,200 men in the Sierra Maestra fighting forces.

GUEVARA spends most of this time on combat missions. During his absence from his headquarters Ramiro VALDES, his second-in-command, takes over. GUEVARA is in camp his typical day begins at 7 a.m. He has early coffee, plays with a dog or cat, and then wanders out for his morning tea. Messages and visitors begin to arrive about 8:30 a.m. Headquarters business may range from cases of military discipline to logistics, or to arbitration in cases of military transaction involving the property of farmers. Since his command is a base installation, the paper work is relatively heavy for a guerrilla movement. In the afternoon he may be needed at a civilian or military trial. Offenses involved may range from something as light as property liability to something as serious as treason. By evening he is ready to listen to news broadcasts or chat with camp visitors. He retires at 9 p.m., when he lights his corbide lamp, and a huge cigar, and brings out his book on Jose MARTI.

any revolution against a tyrant, but Fidel impressed me as an extraordinary man. He faced and overcame the most impossible things. He had an exceptional faith in that once he left for Cuba he would arrive. And that once he arrived, he would fight. And that fighting, he would win. I shared his optimism ... [it was time to] stop crying and fight.¹¹

In an alliance that lasted all his life, Che joined Castro and some 80 fighters on the yacht *Granma* as it traveled from Mexico to Cuba to begin the revolution. But Fulgencio Batista, forewarned of the invasion, ambushed the boat when it landed. As the 12 who survived death and capture scrambled to escape into the Sierra Maestra mountains, Che made a split-second decision: He grabbed a box of ammunition rather than a

9. "Sorting through the archives of the fallen Arbenz regime in Guatemala City a few weeks after the [1954] coup, [CIA official] David Atlee Phillips came across a single sheet of paper about a 25-year-old Argentine physician who had arrived in town the previous January to study medical care amid social revolution. 'Should we start a file on this one?' his assistant asked. The young doctor, it seemed, had tried to organize a last-ditch resistance by Arbenz loyalists; then he sought refuge in the Argentine Embassy, eventually moving on to Mexico. 'I guess we'd better have a file on him,' Phillips replied." (Peter Grosse, *op. cit.*, p. 283.)


10. From Che Guevara, *Diario de un Combatiente* (A Fighter's Diary), unpublished, cited in Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

11. Letter from Che to his parents, cited in Anderson, *op. cit.*

medical kit. After that, although he continued to serve as troop physician, he said, "I am a warrior, not a doctor."¹² And it was martial qualities he most valued, as when he praised a woman comrade with "unlimited boldness and a contempt for death."¹³

A year before the revolution, the spy who infiltrated Che's Sierra Maestra camp slept for a week in Che's tent. He reported that Castro's "henchman" has "no particular mannerisms with the possible exception of his exuberance and his readiness to laugh. He smiles readily and is extremely personable." He also smells and "is really outstandingly and spectacularly dirty." He smokes long cigars in the evening and regularly reads to his troops. That week he was reading Baudelaire. He also read them Charles Dickens, but not, according to the informer, Karl Marx and other Communist authors. "He is pretty intellectual for a Latino," the agent concluded.¹⁴

As the fighting continued, Che took on a complex and key role. He became Castro's chief confidant as well as his de facto military chief-of-staff. Che's father, brimming with admiration, told of a reporter who wrote how busy Che was: "(He)



rebel troops."¹⁵ And to develop a relationship with Aleida March, who fought alongside of him. They later married and had two sons and two daughters.

On January 1, 1959, the July 26th Movement achieved the near miraculous: Having grown to an army with tens of thousands of supporters, it overthrew the US-backed dictatorship Batista and his 50,000 US-supported troops. When the revolutionaries took Havana on January 8, 1959, Che was 30 years old and a hero. A special law granted him Cuban citizenship.

As head of the La Cabaña fortress where the Batista counterrevolutionaries and torturers were detained, Che organized their trials. Anderson describes him as scrupulous in keeping the proceedings objective. But he was also unbending in meting out revolutionary justice and some 600 Batista supporters were found guilty and executed.

Assessing Che

By 1961 the Cuban economy was in trouble; the US was waging economic — and then actual — warfare against its former neocolony. Washington's regret for not preventing the Cuban revolution from taking

power echoed that of Winston Churchill when he reflected that, "we should have strangled the Bolshevik baby in its crib."

Four months before the Punta del Este conference of the Organization of American States in August 1961, the US invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs had sharply increased tensions between Washington and Havana. In a major speech at the conference, Che, who led the Cuban delegation, condemned President John F. Kennedy's new Alliance for Progress. Cuba, Che declared, would not "export revolution," but "we do guarantee this conference ... that, if urgent measures of social prevention are not taken, the example of Cuba will take root in the people" of the Americas. US representative Richard N. Goodwin, after meeting with Che, reported that the Cuban had noted "an intrinsic contradiction in the *Alianza* — by encouraging the forces of change and the desires of the masses, we might set loose forces which were beyond our control ending in a Cuban style revolution."

In the three memos Goodwin wrote to President Kennedy after the meeting, it was clear that he liked and respected the Cuban. He described Che as "wearing green fatigues, and his usual overgrown scraggly beard. Behind his beard, his features were quite soft, almost feminine, and his manner intense. He has a good sense of humor and there was considerable joking back

The CIA spy who infiltrated the rebel camp posing as a journalist reported that Che "is pretty intellectual for a Latino."

had laid the bases for agrarian reform in the Sierra; built an arms factory; invented a bazooka rifle; inaugurated the first bread factory in the mountains; built and equipped a hospital ... created the first school and ... installed a radio transmitter called Radio Rebelde ... and he still had time left to found a small newspaper to inform the

12. Ratner and Smith, "CIA document, Feb. 13, 1958," *op. cit.*, p. 23.

13. Anderson, *op. cit.*

14. Ratner and Smith, "CIA document, Feb. 13, 1958," *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

15. Anderson, *op. cit.*



JAY MALLIN/IMPACT VISUALS

The guerrillas pose in the Bolivian jungle. Che is fourth from the right with "Tuma" who acted as his double on Che's left.

and forth during the meeting." Che, Goodwin reported, "wanted to thank us for the [Bay of Pigs] invasion — that it had been a great political victory for them — enabled them to consolidate — and transformed them from an aggrieved little country to an equal. ... He spoke calmly and in a straightforward manner, and with the appearance of detachment and objectivity. He left no doubt at any time that he felt completely free to speak for his government and rarely distinguished between his personal observations and the official position of the Cuban government."¹⁶

Rumors of a Split

The files on Che had continued to grow. With the Cuban revolution, the CIA and FBI had settled the question of whether Che was a communist, and moved on to a preoccupation with "What kind of a Communist is he?" Was he an internationalist looking to support the spread of anti-capitalist movements, or was he willing to go along with the privileged bureaucrats in the Soviet Union who had, since the 1930s, been willing to confine themselves to "socialism in one country"?

Che's role at the 1961 OAS meeting provided a partial answer and fueled rumors of tensions between Moscow and Havana. Goodwin wrote Kennedy "that Cuba is undergoing severe economic stress, that the Soviet Union is not prepared to undertake the large effort necessary to get them on their feet (a Brazilian told me, 'You don't feed the lamb in the mouth of the lion'), and that Cuba desires an understanding with the US."¹⁷

Although Che had approached Goodwin looking for a *modus vivendi* for better relations, the US representative suggested rejecting the overture and continuing the US policy of isolation, propaganda, and economic warfare. These 1961 documents articulate early on the essence of a US foreign policy toward Cuba that has remained constant for 36 years under both Republican and Democratic administrations: to reverse the Cuban revolution and restore the Caribbean to a US lake.

The island's relations with Moscow continued to worry Washington. On July 22, 1968, Goodwin, then working for President Lyndon Johnson, gave a policy briefing at the *New York Times* to update the editor, Ben Wells on the possibility of a "split" between

Moscow and Havana.¹⁸ (By then, Che was already dead.) According to a memo on the meeting written by one of Goodwin's aides, the revolutionary internationalism of the Cuban Communist Party was causing mounting "hostility between Castro and the Orthodox Communist world." The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, Latin America, and even factions of the Cuban Communist Party itself regarded Havana's "determination to continue to export the revolution" as "adventurism."¹⁹

Goodwin's aide points out that old-line members of the Communist Party of Cuba had opposed Castro's attack on the Moncada barracks, only to support him years later when victory was near. In 1967, the memo notes, there was "lukewarm support for the Che Guevara mission in Bolivia and expressions of satisfaction in the USSR and by Moscow-line leaders in Latin America when it failed."²⁰

18. The Goodwin memo lifts a corner of the curtain on one way public opinion is shaped. Background briefings are held with the "newspaper of record," the line is set, and then, once enunciated, is echoed across the country by the lesser papers. Since the front page of the *New York Times* is transmitted across country prior to other newspapers' deadlines, they have early guidance. For more information on this process, see Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, *Manufacturing Consent* (New York: Pantheon, 1988).

19. Anderson, *op. cit.*

20. Fidel Castro in introduction to Che Guevara, *Bolivian Diary* (New York: Pathfinder, 1994).

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 518-20.

17. Ratner and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

The memo writer compared the brand of internationalism espoused by Che and Fidel to "the early days of the USSR [... when] the regime had trouble with the same kind of people, and those were the Trotskyists." Goodwin emphasized to the *Times* editor: "How seriously things must be regarded in Moscow when they applied the name Trotsky in this situation."²¹

Solidarity Forever

If the US had any doubt about where Che stood on internationalism, his last speech as a public figure, given in Algiers at the Second Economic Seminar on Afro-Asian Solidarity in 1964, clarified his position. And, as the police and intelligence dossier documents reveal, it also fired up world-wide rumor-mongering not only about a Moscow-Havana split, but about one between Che and Fidel.

At the time, Cuba, dependent on Moscow for economic and military support, was in a difficult position. The US was committing more and more troops to its war on Vietnam. Che advocated extending revolution to protect Cuba's gains and to offer solidarity with the embattled Vietnamese. While he acknowledged Soviet military aid and a generous Soviet trade agreement on Cuba's sugar exports, he denounced the USSR as "an accomplice with imperialism" for insufficiently supporting the Vietnamese and taking competitive advantage of Third World countries. "Because there are no frontiers in the struggle to the death," he wrote to OSPAAAL (the Organization in Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America), "we cannot remain indifferent in the face of what occurs in any part of the world. A victory for any country against imperialism is our victory, just as any country's defeat is a defeat for us all. The practice of internationalism is not only a duty for the peoples who struggle for a better future, it is also an inescapable necessity."²²

In his detailed biography of Che, Anderson reports that the speech was "a slap in the face" for those in Moscow who practiced "peaceful coexistence," and the Soviets were "outraged." Feder Burlatsky, a former adviser to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, told

Anderson that the dominant group in the senior circles of the Soviet Central Committee "detested" Che who "was seen as dangerous, as against our own strategy. ... [But e]ven though Che was against our interest, there was still some sympathy for him ... there was a romantic aura around him; he reminded people of the Russian Revolution. ... Opinion was divided. ... Some compared him to Trotsky."²³

After the speech, Che resigned his official position and permanently dropped out of sight; for 30 years rumors have circulated, including in his FBI dossier, that Fidel had split with him or worse. There was, in fact, no split, merely a division of labor. After the Algiers speech and the Russian reaction, Fidel raised the idea that Che return to Africa to lead the Cuban guerrilla contingent already in training for the Congo mission. Anderson interviewed Manuel

an economic war on Cuba which continues to this day, barring even the sale of medicines and food.²⁵

From 1959 to 1965, Che directed Cuba's National Bank, traveled extensively, successfully concluded trade deals around the world, served as a spokesperson for Cuba, particularly at the UN, and headed Cuba's industrialization effort in order to get away from a dependent one-crop export economy. He also wrote a classic manual on guerrilla warfare and spoke widely across Cuba. Throughout, the CIA and the FBI diligently documented and analyzed his words. In one speech they recorded, Che — accepting an honorary degree at the University of Las Villas — told the gathered faculty and students that the days when education was a privilege of the white middle class had ended. "The university," he said, "must paint itself black, mulatto, worker and peasant."



Castro checks Che's false passport before Che (l.) leaves in disguise for Bolivia.

"Red Beard" Piñero, then head of Cuba's overseas revolutionary activities. "Che didn't need much convincing," said Piñero. "Che came back really enthused by his contacts with the Africans. So Fidel told him: 'Why don't you go to Africa?' He was really restless with the passing of time and his inability to fulfill what he saw as his historic mission."²⁴

After working for years within the halls of government, Che longed for action. He had prepared Cuba's agrarian reform law and designed the agency that would implement it. Compensation in the form of bonds was to be issued to repay the former US owners. The US deemed it inadequate and for this and many other reasons, waged

If it didn't, he warned, "the people would break down its doors ... and paint the University the colors they liked."²⁶

University of the World

But for Che, that university was the world. His real goal was human solidarity on a world-wide scale and a transformation of human consciousness. The war in the Congo that raged between the Western-

21. In 1927 the left opposition, led by Leon Trotsky, maintained, contrary to Stalin, that it was utopian to believe that socialism could be built in one country, particularly in an underdeveloped one like the Soviet Union. Given the superior economic development of the West, they argued, the world market would eventually restore capitalism to the USSR unless the Russian revolution broke out of its isolation and was extended abroad.

22. "Vietnam and the World Struggle for Freedom (Message to the Tricontinental)," *Tricontinental* (Cuba), April 16, 1967.

23. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 581.

24. *Ibid.*

25. According to a CIA information report "Views of Ernesto Che Guevara," dated July 28, 1959, seven months after the revolution: "It was not Cuba's intention to drive out U.S. business or force it to the wall, but Cuba did insist on controlling foreign business within its borders to prevent injustices of the past and interference in local politics." Ratner and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

26. In 1964, the CIA circulated an announcement notifying its staff that Che Guevara's new book *Guerra de Guerrillas: Un Metodo* was available in the CIA library. Ratner and Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

supported Mobutu regime and the Cuban-backed forces was an opportunity for Che to put his principles into action. In a history that was hidden until this year, Anderson details Che's guerrilla efforts as an extraordinary, heroic, but ultimately failed effort. Despite Cuba's support, the Congolese leadership, including Laurent Kabila, was disorganized and uncooperative.²⁷

Undeterred by defeat in the Congo, Che returned to Cuba convinced that "The objective conditions for [armed struggle] exist, and Cuba's example has shown the way ... Armed struggle was the only way to bring about social, economic, and political justice and that Cuba must lead the way."²⁸

"The example of our revolution," he had written earlier, "and the lessons it applies for Latin America have destroyed all coffee house theories; we have demonstrated that a small group of men supported by the people and without fear of dying can overcome a disciplined regular army and defeat it."²⁹

27. Anderson, *op. cit.* He draws much from the unpublished diary, Che Guevara, *Episodes of Guerrilla War: Congo*.

28. Ratner and Smith, FBIS transcript of an interview given to *Daily Worker* (New York), Nov. 1962, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

29. Anderson, *op. cit.*

Several months after returning from Africa, Che took the struggle to Bolivia. Traveling in disguise with a small group of Cuban *internacionalistas*, he evaded the CIA and FBI to arrive secretly in Bolivia in late 1966.

"The university must paint itself black, mulatto, worker and peasant [or] the people [...will] paint the university the colors they liked." — Che

But in revolution, timing is everything. When Che arrived in Bolivia, the movement was on the decline. Drawing literally on the Cuban experience, his critics, say, he mistakenly elevated guerrilla warfare from a tactic to a continental strategy and ignored the classic Leninist concept of building a revolutionary party. Instead, fired by passion, idealism, and self-confidence, he believed he could create guerrilla foci and spark revolution. This tack, however, was ill-suited to circumstances on the ground. In

Bolivia, there was no organic mass movement as there had been in Cuba. Nor was there a revolutionary organization; the mostly Indian Bolivian peasantry, unlike the Cubans, was suspicious of the rebels. And this time, the US was not caught off guard. It flew in heat-seeking devices to target the guerrillas and US Special Forces to train and supervise the Bolivian Rangers, who quickly encircled and exterminated the doomed band.³⁰

Viva Che

In the end, despite Che's hopes, the Andes were not the Sierra Maestras of South America and popular revolts did not shoot like electricity down their spine to light the continent with popular revolt. Today, there are 60 million more poor people in Latin America than when he died. Then, the gap separating the richest 20 percent from the poorest 20 percent was 60 to 1. In 1990, it was 150 to 1. These poor can only wonder what their lives would have been like under Che's vision of the "new man" living in a society of abundance in a world without exploitation.

Still, Che is remembered across the globe — even more so today than when he died three decades ago. The answer to his vast and enduring appeal could have been written by Victor Hugo. In describing why Jean Paul Marat, a leader of the French Revolution, and also a physician, remains a timeless symbol of social revolution, he wrote:

They guillotined Charlotte Corday and they said Marat is dead. No. Marat is not dead. Put him in the Pantheon or throw him in the sewer; it doesn't matter — he's back the next day. He's reborn in the man who has no job, in the woman who has no bread, in the girl who has to sell her body, in the child who hasn't learned to read; he's reborn in the unheated tenement, in the wretched mattress without blankets, in the unemployed, in the proletariat, in the brothel, in the jailhouse, in your laws that show no pity, in your schools that give no future, and he reappears in all that is ignorance and he recreates himself from all that is darkness. Oh, beware, human society: You cannot kill Marat until you have killed the misery of poverty.³¹ ■

30. Che's defenders say that given Castro's victory in Cuba with a small, depleted force, Che was right to take the chance in Bolivia. Piñero, who headed Cuba's overseas operations at the time, said in October that the cause of Che's defeat was the immediate detection of his base camp and his separation from half his troops. Che then spent key time searching for the strays in an area too thinly populated to support insurgency.

31. As quoted in Clifford D. Conner, *Jean Paul Marat: Scientist and Revolutionary* (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), p. 4.

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The CIA at Fifty:

A Letter from Philip Agee

Illustration by Matt Wuerker

This year the US national security state, as established by the National Security Act during the Truman Administration, has turned 50. Common wisdom questions the need for this expensive structure now that, as all seem to agree, the Cold War has ended. Most commentary centers on the present and future roles of the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community given the disappearance of the Soviet Union, always seen as the main threat.

Other commentary revolves around the dominant, and domineering, role of the US with no rival to challenge it at the turn of the century. In truth, the American Century looks likely to go on indefinitely, barring some unpredictable catastrophe. If, indeed, this "triumph" comes as a benefit, even partially, of the national security apparatus, why should anyone want to change it?

In fact, many proposals for changes in the intelligence community have come forward in the past year or two: from a Presidential Commission, both houses of Congress, the Council on Foreign Relations, and elsewhere. All seek to assess present and foresee future dangers: regional religious and ethnic conflicts, global economic competition, drugs and international crime, terrorism, and the usual list of "rogue states." And all seek to improve the performance of the intelligence community while containing its \$30 billion yearly cost.

Underlying this conventional approach, of course, is acceptance of the concept of national security as defined by those in power, which pretty much means continuation of the

state as servant and protector of private capital. Those who challenge this in ideas and actions are, and will be, the continuing "national security threats."

Absent from this commentary, as one would expect, is the notion that this same national security state has produced the myriad social afflictions besetting the US and the rest of the world. Making this connection is the basis for resistance to US domination, neo-liberal economics, and the worsening situation in which much of humanity finds itself.

During this last fifty years, the CIA and other agencies have served as instruments for imposing US national security policies on the rest of the world. The human

cost, especially in the Third World, is unspeakable. Yet, resistance goes on as


surely as the oppression and repression that create it.

One need look no further than Cuba to see a unified people in its 38th year of unbending resistance to every effort by the CIA to impose the US will, from attempts to assassinate the leadership, to sabotage and armed incursions,

to use of biological warfare.

Armed national liberation movements continue, as in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru, while political struggles in much of Central America also reflect resistance to US domination.

This 50th anniversary of the CIA and the national security state should be a time of national shame, given the moral bankruptcy of the policies that "won" the Cold War. But absent that, it can be a time of renewal for those who do resist, expose, denounce, and condemn the continuing dirty war against peoples seeking social justice, freedom from oppression and peace. ■



Philip Agee is the author of *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (1975) and *On the Run* (1987). He is a frequent lecturer at universities and civic events. He lives in Hamburg, Germany.



Vaclav Havel's Warm and Fuzzy Image

by Michael Parenti

No figure among the free market restorationists of Eastern Europe has won more adulation from US officials, academics, and journalists than Vaclav Havel. A playwright who was once jailed because of his opposition to the communist system, Havel later became the first president of post-communist Czechoslovakia and then president of the Czech Republic. Lionized whenever he visits the US, he was accorded the rare honor of appearing before a joint session of Congress in February 1990 where he received a standing ovation.

The corporate-owned US media could not get enough of him nor do enough for him, portraying him as a crusader for democracy, a lone dissenter who courageously prevailed against ruthless oppressors. Hardly immune to the very media influences they often criticize, many progressives, especially the academics, go absolutely gah over Vaclav, overlooking some unsettling things: his reactionary religious obscurantism, his undemocratic suppression of leftist opponents, and his unrestrained devotion to economic inequality.

Consider the political pronunciamientos Havel has issued from time to time. In a *New York Times* op-ed that caused an embarrassed silence among his US admirers, he denounced democracy's "cult of objectivity and statistical average," and the idea that rational, collective social efforts should be applied to solving the environmental

crisis. Sounding as goofy as his hero, novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Havel called for a new breed of political leader who would rely less on "rational, cognitive thinking," show "humility in the face of the mysterious order of Being," and "trust in his own subjectivity as his principal link with the subjectivity of the world." This empowered mystic, not unlike Plato's philosopher king, would be endowed with a "sense of transcendental responsibility" and "archetypal wisdom."¹ Havel never explained how such gifts would translate into actual policy decisions, for whose benefit, at whose expense.

On another occasion, Havel called for efforts to preserve the Christian family in the Christian nation. Presenting himself as a man of peace and vowing never to sell arms to oppressive regimes, he then sold arms to the Philippine generals and the fascist regime in Thailand. In June 1994, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, the man who butchered Chilean democracy, was reported to be weapons shopping in Czechoslovakia — with no audible objections from Havel.

Havel joined wholeheartedly in George Bush's Gulf War, an enterprise that killed more than 100,000 Iraqi civilians, with hundreds of thousands more perishing in the subsequent blockade. In 1991, along with other Eastern European pro-capitalist leaders, Havel voted with Washington to condemn human rights violations in Cuba. But he has never uttered a word on violations in El Salvador, Colombia, Indonesia, Turkey, or any other US client state.

Uncivil Liberties

In 1989, one of his first acts as president of Czechoslovakia was to grant amnesty to about two-thirds of the country's prison population, some 40,000 inmates. Havel assumed that most of those incarcerated under communism were victims of political repression and therefore deserved release. He and his associates were dismayed to discover that a good number of the "victims" were experienced criminals who

then lost no time resuming their unsavory pursuits.²

In 1992, President Havel, the great democrat, demanded that parliament be suspended and that he be allowed to rule by edict, so better to ram through his free-market "reforms." That same year, he signed a law that made the advocacy of communism a felony punishable by up to eight years imprisonment. He claimed, inaccurately, that the Czech constitution required him to sign the legislation. In fact, as he knew, the law violated the Charter of Human Rights which is incorporated into the Czech constitution. In 1995, he supported and signed another undemocratic law that barred communists and former communists from employment in public agencies.

The propagation of anticommunism has remained a top priority for Havel — even after the communist governments were overthrown. In 1995, he led what the *San Francisco Chronicle* described as "a frantic international campaign" to keep in operation two US-financed Cold War radio stations, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, so they could continue saturating Eastern Europe with their anticommunist message.³

Under Havel's government, a law was passed making it a crime to propagate national, religious, and class hatred. In effect, criticisms of big moneyed interests were now illegal, being unjustifiably lumped with ethnic and religious bigotry. Havel, the philosopher king, warned labor unions not to involve themselves in politics. Some militant unions had their property seized and handed over to more compliant company unions.

In 1995, Havel announced that the "revolution" against communism would not be complete until everything was privatized. His government even liquidated the properties of the Socialist Union of Youth — which included camp sites, recreation halls, and cultural and scientific facilities for children — putting them under the management of five joint stock

Michael Parenti's latest book is *Blackshirts and Reds: Rational Fascism and the Overthrow of Communism* (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1997).

1. Vaclav Havel, "The End of the Modern Era," *New York Times*, March 1, 1992.

2. "Street Crime Hits Prague Daily Life," *New York Times*, Dec. 18, 1991.

3. *San Francisco Chronicle*, Feb. 17, 1995.



SEAN SPRAGUE/IMPACT VISUALS

Since Havel has become president, anti-Gypsy violence has increased. Here, Romas in Prague protest lack of protections.

companies and leaving the youths to roam the streets.

Havel's "democratic reforms" have brought cuts in health care, public housing, and education; and reductions in rent and fuel subsidies to low income people. The condition of labor has drastically declined. Sick leave, maternity leave, paid vacations, and other job benefits once taken for granted under communism have been cut or abolished. Worker sanitariums, vacation resorts, health clinics, sports and cultural centers, daycare centers, and other features that made communist enterprises more than just workplaces, have nearly vanished. Hospitals, libraries, houses of culture, and public transport systems are closing or services have drastically declined. Rest homes formerly reserved for workers have been privatized and redone as casinos, night clubs, and restaurants for the *nouveaux riches*.

Real income has shrunk by as much as 30 percent under Havel's free market rule. More than one-third of citizens live in abject poverty and large numbers hold two or more jobs and work up to 14 hours a day. Those who have suffered the most are among the more vulnerable: women, children, the elderly, and ordinary workers and peasants.

There is an upsurge in official corruption and organized crime, as well as in street crime, murder, homelessness, drug addiction, mental and physical illness, and suicide. Women are being recruited in un-

precedented numbers for the booming sex industry that caters to foreign and domestic businessmen. Unable to find employment in their fields, many highly educated women go abroad to work as prostitutes. Children are also channeled into the sex market. "Prague and Budapest now rival Bangkok and Manila as hubs for the collection of children to serve visiting pedophiles."⁴

Oddly, the Prague police force today under Havel's free market "democracy" is many times larger than it was under the "communist police state," when "relatively few police were needed."⁵

Doing Well for Himself

Havel may be an intellectual and playwright but under his government, subsidies for the arts and literature have been severely reduced. Theaters have been closed and some symphony orchestras disbanded. Education, once free for qualified applicants even to the post-graduate level, is now available only to those who can afford the high tuition. In the name of "objective" social science, curricula have been "depoliticized," meaning that a critical left perspective has been replaced by a conservative viewpoint that is supportive, or at least uncritical of, imperialism and capitalism.

4. Christopher Dickey, "The Death of Innocents," *Newsweek*, Sept. 2, 1996.

5. "Street Crime ..." *op. cit.*


The inexpensive but high quality editions of classical and contemporary authors and poets, including ones from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, have been replaced by second-rate, mass-market publications from the West. And as the cost of books, periodicals, and newspapers has skyrocketed and education levels have declined, readership has shrunk almost to Third World levels.

Raised by governesses and driven by chauffeurs in a wealthy and fervently anticommunist family, Havel has remained true to his class interests. Under Czech privatization and "restitution" programs, factories, shops, estates, homes, and much of the public land was sold at bargain prices to foreign and domestic capitalists. In the Czech and Slovak republics, former aristocrats or their heirs were being given back all the estates and lands their families had held before 1918 under the Austro-Hungarian empire, dispossessing the previous occupants and sending many of them into destitution.

Havel himself took personal ownership of public properties that had belonged to his family 40 years before. He is once again a rich man. While presenting himself as dedicated to doing good for others, he has done quite well for himself, at the expense of many of his less renowned compatriots.

For all these reasons, some of us do not have a warm fuzzy feeling about Vaclav Havel. ■

The Battle for the Airwaves: Free Radio vs. The Feds



When police beat Dewayne Readus during a 1983 scuffle at the John Hay Homes housing project in Springfield, Illinois, they were no more aware that their actions would lead to a large-scale revolt than were the L.A. cops who beat Rodney King. Unlike the Los Angeles uprising, the one that started in Springfield was nonviolent, invisible, and international. It triggered the micro-radio revolt of unlicensed, low-power, low-tech, noncommercial stations that originate in, and broadcast to, local neighborhoods. Participants in the movement — unlike consumers of the “information revolution” marketed by Microsoft, IBM and other corporations — don’t need expensive computers or access to America On-Line. They don’t even need to be literate or have electricity in their homes. All they need is a \$10 transistor radio to receive the messages or a \$150 transmitter to send them.

Lawrence Soley is professor of communications at Marquette University in Milwaukee. His books on unlicensed broadcasting include *Pumpin’ Up the Volume* (forthcoming from South End Press, Boston), *Radio Warfare* (Praeger, New York), and with John S. Nichols, *Clandestine Radio Broadcasting* (Praeger, New York).

Roots of the Revolt

In 1983, Dewayne Readus, partially blinded as a child by glaucoma, was, like many young African-American men, unable to find a full-time or even a part-time job. To earn money, he worked as a disc jockey at parties in the project, spinning R&B. One of these events turned into a brawl and the police, who arrived swinging, beat Readus so badly he was completely blinded.¹

After a bout of depression and heavy drinking, Readus turned from parties and booze to social activism. He helped organize the Tenants Rights Association (TRA), which demanded that Hay Homes authorities and local police be accountable to project residents, rather than the other way around. To improve TRA’s outreach, Mike Townsend, a family friend and professor at Sangamon State University, suggested that Readus start a neighborhood newspaper. Readus, who has since changed his name to Mbanna Kantako (or “resisting warrior”), replied, “I’m blind, let’s do radio. I don’t get off on

print that much.”² At the next TRA meeting, members agreed. “We recognized that [since] a large percentage of our people can’t read,” said Kantako, radio was “the most effective way of getting our message to the people.”³

It was also illegal. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the government agency that regulates telecommunications, prohibits not only the operation of an FM station without a license, but also the purchase of a fully assembled FM transmitter. As Napoleon Williams, who runs an unlicensed FM station in nearby Decatur, puts it, “It’s amazing. You can buy an Uzi fully assembled, but it’s illegal to buy one of these [transmitters] fully assembled.”⁴

While FCC policies have purposefully kept community groups from getting licenses, they have handed them over to large corporations. “The FCC and its predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission,

2. Interview, July 1996.

3. Quoted in Sharon Albert-Honore, “Empowering Voices: KUCB and Black Liberation Radio,” *Mediated Messages and African-American Culture* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), p. 208.

4. David Burke, “I’m Still Saying, Can You Hear Me?” *Decatur Herald & Review*, Jan. 12, 1997, p. A4.

1. Interview, July 1996.

have turned over the [broadcasting] spectrum to commercial interests at no charge whatsoever," says Robert McChesney, a professor of journalism at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and author of *Telecommunications, Mass Media and Democracy*, a history of the FCC's corporate complicity. The FCC "serves the commercial broadcasting industry," he says. "It's a conspiracy of power politics, undiluted."⁵

And like many conspiracies, it operates in the open through a bureaucratic structure which, in this case, makes it easy for corporations, but difficult for community groups, to get licenses. For example, the FCC-developed rules require that broadcast applicants have the "financial qualifications" to operate the station in the red for an extended period of time. When well-heeled corporations and community groups are compared under this criterion, it is not surprising that for-profit corporations end up with 85 percent of US radio stations. Most of the others are owned by universities and state-wide broadcasting companies such as Minnesota Public Radio, Inc., not community groups.⁶

The reasons behind the FCC's pro-corporate bias are similarly unastounding. First, FCC commissioners usually come from the telecommunications industries — the very industries they are supposed to police. A House subcommittee study of FCC appointees noted that ten of the 19 commissioners appointed during a 16-year period had come from the industry or from law firms representing the industry. The next largest group of commissioners were political appointees who had been runners-up for more prestigious government posts, such as ambassadorships.⁷

Second, commissioners who prove to be loyal supporters of corporate interests are often rewarded with high-paying industry jobs after leaving the FCC. A study of the 33 FCC commissioners who served between 1945 and 1970 found that 21 went on to become employees of, lobbyists for, or lawyers representing the telecommunications industries; the other 12 were elderly and retired after their FCC posts.⁸ Consumer activists like Ralph Nader refer to this problem, which remains endemic, as "deferred bribery."

5. Interview, June 1997.

6. *Broadcasting and Cablecasting Yearbook 1995* (New Providence, NJ: R.R. Bowker, 1995), p. xxi.

7. Barry Cole and Mal Oettinger, *Reluctant Regulators: The FCC and the Broadcast Audience* (Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley, 1978), p. 5.

8. Roger Noll, Merton Peck and John McGowen, *Economic Aspects of Television Regulation* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 123-24.



KEN BURNETTE

Free radio activist Mbanna Kantako.

Third, commercial broadcasters, through trade associations such as the National Association of Broadcasters, maintain a constant presence in Washington, testifying at hearings and grooming personal contacts with politicians, commissioners, and other power brokers. As the book *Reluctant Regulators* observed, "Meetings with industry are nothing new to the FCC. Over the years, the full commission has held periodic, closed meetings with various industry groups. ... An FCC meeting with a citizens group, on the other hand, was a rare occurrence prior to 1970."⁹ Since then, the public has had limited input on such issues as violence on television, children's programming, and minority employment in the broadcast industry, but never on whether corporate-controlled broadcasting is in the public interest. The FCC openly admitted its pro-business agenda: "[T]o a major extent, ours is a commercially-based broadcast system and that this system renders a vital service to the Nation. Any policies adopted by [us]...should be consistent with the maintenance and growth of this system."¹⁰

Lastly, corporate broadcasters, through their political action committees and CEOs, influence policy through campaign contributions. In 1995-96, broadcasting interests were among the largest campaign contributors, handing out more than \$3.5 million to politicians. General Electric/

NBC, Walt Disney/ABC, News Corp./Fox and the National Association of Broadcasters each contributed over a half-million dollars to the national Democratic and Republican parties.¹¹

WTRA Signs On

With its chances for getting a broadcast license remote to none, the Springfield Tenants Rights Association decided to go on the air unlicensed. Using a grant from a Catholic Church Campaign for Human Development, TRA ordered \$600 worth of equipment out of a catalog and set up the WTRA studio in Kantako's living room. "We're not even concerned about the FCC regulations," says Kantako about the decision. "Clearly the [laws] were designed before blacks were allowed to hold their heads up. And, obviously, being designed at that period of time, there was no consideration of what we as people might want to do."¹²

At its inception, about a dozen people worked on the FM station, producing programs that aired two, then three, nights a week. Although many in the local black community listened, Springfield authorities and the FCC largely ignored the illegal broadcasts. Until 1989, that is, when Kantako interviewed Johnny Howell in the hospital where the middle-aged father was recuperating from a police beating. After

9. Cole and Oettinger, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

10. Federal Communications Commission, "Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensee," 63 *Radio Register* 2nd (P & F) 488.

11. Leslie Wayne, "Broadcast Lobby Excels at Washington Power Game," *New York Times*, May 5, 1997, p. D1.

12. Quoted in Steve LaBlanc, "Revolution Radio," *Version* 90, p. 21.

THE GREAT FCC GIVEAWAYS

During the 1960s and 1970s, unlicensed radio stations frequently broadcast between 1605 and 1620 kHz, a fallow area of the electromagnetic spectrum at the top end of the AM band. Listeners with old-style analog AM receivers could tune in these stations with little difficulty, and the broadcasts didn't interfere with licensed stations. Some of the early "pirate broadcasters" — as unlicensed broadcasters were then called — hoped that the FCC would make this area of the broadcasting spectrum available to them and others, who did not have licenses to broadcast legally.

These hopes were finally dashed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1993 when it opened the upper end of the AM band — 1605 to 1705 kHz — to broadcasting. Rather than opening this portion of the spectrum to new voices, the FCC reserved these frequencies for already-licensed AM broadcasters, who could petition to move their stations from lower to higher frequencies. The FCC claimed that the decision wasn't a gift to broadcasting companies; it was needed to alleviate crowding in the AM band.¹

In April 1997, the FCC did the same thing with the licenses for digital television broadcasting. Rather than awarding licenses to community groups and others that have been shut out of VHF and UHF television, the FCC gave the digital licenses to corporations that already had analog TV licenses. It rationalized this decision by saying that corporations such as RCA and Westinghouse have the money and experience to build and operate the new digital television stations.

To make the giveaway more publicly palatable, the FCC and their corporate cronies played up the benefits that the public will receive from digital television in the form of higher quality images. They played down the fact that viewers will have to spend enormous sums for new digital television receivers, which RCA and other electronics corporations are gearing up to manufacture.² ■

1. Sean Scully, "FCC Opens Up Expanded AM Band," *Broadcasting & Cablecasting*, April 19, 1993, p. 7.

2. For an example of the televised discussions about digital broadcasting, see Forrest Sawyer, "ABC Nightline," April 22, 1997; Joel Brinkley, "TV Sales Weaken on Fears New Sets Will Soon Be Obsolete," *New York Times*, June 23, 1997, p. D1.

Kantako invited listeners to call in and describe their experiences with police, many came forward to report abuse; some called police "pigs" and the "occupying army." Soon after these broadcasts, police began harassing people associated with the station.¹³ Even visitors and journalists were detained and questioned. "As soon as we left Kantako's apartment [and makeshift studio]," reported *Nation* writer Luis Rodriguez, "two police officers yelled at us to stop and then ordered us to spread our legs and place our hands on the wall. They had been standing near the apartment next to marked-car units, apparently listening to our on-the-air comments on police terror."¹⁴

Springfield police chief Mike Walton contacted the FCC, claiming that he had received complaints about the station. FCC agents obligingly visited the station on April 6, 1989, and ordered Kantako to stop broadcasting, and slapped him with a \$750 fine. A week and a half later, Kantako defiantly began broadcasting 24 hours-a-day, 7 days-a-week.¹⁵ A year later a federal court ordered Kantako to shut down his transmitter. Instead, he contacted the San Francisco-based National Lawyers Guild Committee

on Democratic Communications, formed in 1987 to explore "the applicability of traditional First Amendment concepts in the face of the world-wide monopolization of communication resources by commercial interests."¹⁶ The Committee drafted a brief arguing that the FCC's complete ban on micro-radio stations was unconstitutional.

"Deferred bribery" is endemic as retiring FCC commissioners are routinely rewarded with communications industry jobs.

The brief was never filed on Kantako's behalf because the FCC backed away from the confrontation. But the ban on micro-radios continued. It had been adopted in 1978 at the urging of National Public Radio, to force low-power FM stations off the air so that NPR could form a national network of a few, high-powered stations. This new professionalized system, which relied on federal, corporate, and community funding for support, was the antithesis of community radio.¹⁷

Public input and community involvement were kept to a minimum while corporations and beltway power brokers exerted influence over programming by earmarking grants for coverage of specific issues. For example, Waste Management, Inc., which NPR describes as "providing comprehensive waste services worldwide" but which Greenpeace calls "one of the worst corporate criminals in the country," has given NPR money specifically for environmental coverage.¹⁸ Beltway power brokers exert influence by supporting or opposing federal funding for NPR and by appearing regularly on NPR news programs.

The influence extends not only to what is said, but to who says it. A study by the media watchdog group Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) found that NPR news reports frequently quote government officials, members of Congress, and analysts from Washington, DC-based think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute. However, less than one percent of the sources quoted by NPR are from labor unions, women's groups, or the environmental movement, and only 1.5 percent are from racial and ethnic minority groups.¹⁹

13. Michael Townsend, "Black Liberation Radio Escalates Battle with the Thought Police," Sangamon State University Press Release, Winter 1992, p. 4.

14. Luis Rodriguez, "Rappin' in the Hood," *The Nation*, Aug. 12, 1991, p. 192.

15. Steven O. Shields and Robert Ogles, "Black Liberation Radio: A Case Study of Free Radio Micro-Broadcasting," *Howard Journal of Communications*, Spring 1995, p. 176.

16. "The National Lawyers Guild's Committee on Democratic Communications," <http://www.surf.com/~graham>.

17. "Changes in Rules Relating to Noncommercial Educational Broadcast Stations," 69 *FCC 2nd* 240 (June 7, 1978), 68 *FCC 2nd* 985 (June 7, 1978); Peter Lewis and Jerry Booth, *The Invisible Medium* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1990).

18. For an in-depth discussion of NPR, see Sam Hussein, "The Broken Promises of Public Radio," *The Humanist*, Sept. 1994, pp. 26-30.

19. Charlotte Ryan, "A Study of National Public Radio," *Extra!*, April/May 1993, pp. 18-21, 26.

Muzzling Black Radio

The micro-radio revolution that Kantako sparked was in large part a response to the exclusion of diverse voices from either "public" or commercial radio. From his living room studio, Kantako became the Tom Paine of the micro-radio revolution, producing and distributing videotapes showing how easy it is to start a radio station. "The biggest lie that has ever been told is that it costs a lot of money to run a radio station," he said about the FCC's requirement that broadcast licensees be "financially qualified." Napoleon Williams and Mildred Jones of Decatur, Illinois, took his message to heart and started Black Liberation Radio on August 20, 1990, using a less-than-one watt transmitter. In their view, radio should operate like public access channels on cable television, where interested groups and individuals can produce programs. "We want total community involvement, so anybody can be on the air," says Williams.²⁰

Like Kantako's station, Decatur's Black Liberation Radio was overtly political. It exposed how African-Americans in Macon County were being herded through the judicial system like slaves through a plantation-era auction. The broadcasts quickly grabbed the attention of Macon County prosecutor Lawrence Fichter and the police, who targeted Williams and Jones for arrest.

Just two weeks after Black Liberation Radio signed on, Williams was charged with fondling a young relative. A few weeks later, the police raided the couple's house, searching for a videotape allegedly showing a gang contract being issued for the killing of two narcotics officers. Next, police arrested Williams during a domestic dispute, even though Jones had not called the police and said she didn't need them. Fichter decided to indict Williams anyway and convened a grand jury. When she refused to testify, Jones was sentenced to jail for contempt of court. Citing these arrests, authorities claimed that Williams and Jones were unfit parents and seized their daughters.²¹

Most recently, police, armed with a search warrant and drawn guns, invaded the couple's home to seize electronics equipment used for "eavesdropping," alleging that Williams taped and broadcast his conversations with public officials without their consent — a practice which, while legal in many states, is a felony in Illinois. When the police confiscated every bit of broadcasting equipment *except* the tapes and tape recorders, it fueled suspicions that


the goal of the raid had been to force Black Liberation Radio off the air.²²

The Case of "Free Radio Berkeley"

As the micro-radio phenomenon spread, the FCC pursued individual prosecutions but managed to avoid litigation that would raise constitutional issues. Then in April 1993, in "an absolute attempt to challenge directly the FCC's regulatory structure and policies," Stephen Dunifer started broadcasting Free Radio Berkeley from a home-made transmitter on Sunday nights from

backpacks along with other portable studio equipment and were all hiked into the hills of Berkeley," Dunifer explains. The strategy was designed to keep the FCC from locating the source of the broadcast, getting a search warrant, entering his residence, and seizing all of his electronic equipment.

The plan worked, but it angered the FCC, which ordered Dunifer to stop broadcasting and fined him a whopping \$20,000. In the Committee on Democratic Communications' response, attorney Luke Hiken raised constitutional issues and pointed out that the fine was "grossly disproportionate



HARVEY FINKLE/IMPACT VISUALS

For many with no input into media, graffiti and pirate radio are all they have.

his workshop-home. Two years after it was first drawn to defend Kantako, the National Lawyers Guild brief found new relevance. Armed with a revised version of the brief, Dunifer, "felt sure we had a solid legal basis to proceed on if we could find a proper venue."²³

San Francisco-based FCC agents seemed happy to oblige. On April 23 and April 30 they monitored broadcasts of "Free Radio Berkeley" and used direction-finding equipment to determine the source. Dunifer, however, was one step ahead. "The first broadcasts were made from a fixed location to get the attention of the FCC," Dunifer says, but as soon as the feds pinpointed the source, "the station went mobile. The transmitters were put into

to the alleged violations ...and exceeds the [\$1,000] maximum set by statute."

A petulant FCC countered that the high fine was warranted because Dunifer was "a recalcitrant individual who decide[d] to willfully operate a radio transmitter without the required authorization, as a protest against the regulatory power of the Commission." The FCC was going to make an example of Dunifer.

But besides getting the National Lawyers Guild to represent him, Dunifer did several things that the FCC did not expect: He remained on the air and he began manufacturing inexpensive transmitters, which he made available to other political dissidents. A month later, San Francisco Liberation Radio (SFLR) signed on. It was followed by "Radio Libre" in San Francisco's Mission District which broadcasting with a Dunifer-built transmitter, "Arizona

20. Interview, July 1996.

21. Richard Muhammad, "Black Couple Fights for Their Child," *The Final Call*, Nov. 24, 1993, p. 5.

22. Dave Moore and Billy Tyus, "The Voice of 'Liberation,'" *Decatur Herald & Review*, Jan. 12, 1997, p. A1.

23. Interview, March 1997.



Studio for pirate radio 102.1FM in Tampa, Florida.

Free Radio" in Phoenix, "Black Liberation 2" in Richmond, Virginia, and "Free Radio Santa Cruz." Commenting on the growth of free radio stations, Luke Hiken said, "I think this is going to get beyond the ability of the FCC to control, judging from the snowballing of people interested in setting up stations."²⁴

He was right. Micro-radio stations soon appeared in New York, Tampa, Miami, Indianapolis and numerous other cities, sporting names like "Temple Terrace Community Radio," "Steal This Radio," and "Free Radio Pittsburgh" — far too many stations for the FCC to easily eliminate.

FCC Inaction

Sensing it was being outmaneuvered and drawn into a constitutional fight it might not win, the FCC drew back. Rather than quickly denying Dunifer's appeal — which would have allowed Hiken to

move the case to federal court — the FCC filed in U.S. District Court in California for an injunction ordering Dunifer to stop broadcasting. The FCC reasoned that if it could charge Dunifer with violating this court injunction rather than FCC rules, an in-court discussion of the constitutionality of the rules could be avoided.

The strategy backfired. The FCC's biggest mistake was requesting an immediate preliminary injunction, claiming that Free Radio Berkeley broadcasts caused "immediate and irreparable harm" by interfering with licensed signals. Hiken responded

24. Quoted in Susan Ferriss, "Pirates Roil the Airwaves," *San Francisco Examiner*, Jan. 15, 1995, p. B1.

that the FCC had monitored the station for 18 months without finding significant interference. If there were imminent danger, "Why did they wait for over 18 months to bring this to the court's attention," he asked.²⁵ Hiken pointed out that Black Liberation Radio and other low-power stations were also on the air, but that the FCC had not sought injunctions to shut them down. "If there is an emergency, why is it they haven't done anything

about that?" he asked.²⁶

Federal District Court Judge Claudia Wilken accepted Hiken's arguments, and refused to issue a temporary injunction against Dunifer. The FCC hadn't even acted on Dunifer's appeal, she said, so coming to court for an injunction was premature. As a result of the decision, Free Radio Berkeley emerged from the underground, broadcasting 24

hours-a-day from a house in North Oakland.

Nine months later, though, the FCC formally rejected Dunifer's appeal. Its reasoning was as predictable as it was ironically accurate. Dunifer's broadcasting "directly challenge[d] the 60-plus-year statutory approach to licensing broadcast transmissions" — an approach which had ceded the publicly owned airwaves to commercial interests.²⁷ The FCC was not above twisting facts to maintain its current policies. For example, by claiming that Dunifer should have "asked for a license,

25. "Defendant's Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction," *United States of America vs. Stephen Paul Dunifer*, United States District Court, No. C94-3542 CW (Dec. 2, 1994).

26. The Black Hat, "Some Comments and Excerpts from the United States vs. Stephen Dunifer," *Reclaiming the Airwaves*, April/May 1995, p. 3.

27. "Memorandum Opinion and Order," in the Matter of Application for Review of Stephen Paul Dunifer, NAL/ACct. No. 315SF0050 (Aug. 2, 1995).

along with a request for a waiver of the relevant rules limiting low power FM service," the FCC suggested that it might have issued Dunifer a license had he applied. Not so, says John Reed of the FCC's engineering and technology department in Washington, DC. "I've never heard of [the FCC] giving permission like that," he said. "There's never been a case of our approving this."²⁸

After issuing its decision, and still hoping to avoid a court discussion of the constitutionality of its rules, the FCC filed in federal district court for a "summary judgment" and permanent injunction against Dunifer and Free Radio Berkeley. To win a summary judgment, all the FCC needed to show was that the facts were undisputed (i.e., Free Radio Berkeley was on the air) and that the law was on its side (i.e., Free Radio Berkeley didn't have a license to broadcast).²⁹

The FCC also filed a brief asking the court for permanent injunctions against Free Radio

Santa Cruz and other stations, falsely claiming they were operated by Dunifer. The commission requested the broad injunction so that it could avoid having to take individual micro-radio stations to court, where the constitutionality of its rules could be challenged.

Although the FCC was hoping to throw the switch on micro-radio with a quick injunction, as of this summer, none had been issued. And even if the court decides against community radio, Hiken and the Committee on Democratic Communications expect to challenge the FCC's rules in a different venue, where the FCC will be forced to justify its policy of licensing corporate, but not neighborhood, stations.

Global Radio Rebellion

The battle for broadcast access is being fought not only in the courts and living room studios in the US, but in jungles, community centers, and war rooms around the world. For liberation struggles and community activists, for intelligence agencies and petty warlords, the power of radio

28. Interview, June 1997.

29. "Free Radio Berkeley vs. United States of America," *Slingshot*, Spring 1996, p. 1.

to cheaply and effectively put out the word makes the airways a prize worth claiming. Unlicensed stations have been operated on and off for many years by well-organized political movements such as the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front during its struggle against the US-backed regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The Sandinistas' powerful shortwave station "La Voz la Liberación de Nicaragua" — later called "Radio Sandino" — was hidden first in Costa Rica and then moved to guerrilla-controlled zones of Nicaragua, as the Sandinistas began holding their own, and then beating back Somoza's National Guard. It took a well-trained guerrilla force to obtain, operate and protect the transmitter from the enemy.³⁰

For its part, the CIA has for decades sponsored clandestine radio stations for information and disinformation including "Radio Quince de Septiembre" and "Radio Liberación" which broadcast against the Sandinista government from Honduras during the Nicaraguan Contra war of the 1980s. The Contra broadcasts needed expensive, high-power transmitters to transmit a clear signal from Honduras to Nicaragua. Secret radio transmissions were a key element in the CIA-backed coups against Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, and broadcasts of the clandestine Radio Swan were part of the massive US propaganda campaign directed against Fidel Castro in the 1960s. As part of US involvement in Southeast Asia, the CIA also sponsored a host of clandestine stations directed to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, including Khmer Serei, Radio Destiny of the Motherland, and Radio Liberation of the Southern Part.³¹

What is new about the micro-radio revolution is that transmitters are now available to almost everyone — from hip-hop youth in Harlem to disenfranchised peasants in Guatemala — not just to well-organized guerrilla groups or intelligence agencies. The movement is fueled in part by the low cost of the equipment. E. D. Brewer, founder of Temple Terrace Community Radio in Florida, Stephen Dunifer, and Ernest Wilson, who op-



RICK DROZ/IMPACT VISUALS

El Salvador's FMLN is one of many revolutionary groups that used unlicensed radio transmitters.

erates Pan-Com International, produce and sell micro-radio transmitters for under \$150. The three operate Internet sites describing the equipment that can be accessed from anywhere in the world.

Dunifer's Internet site (www.frb.org) has received over 600 inquiries, many from

Dunifer's transmitters are used in Chiapas where the Zapatistas have spearheaded opposition to government corruption and brutality.

outside the US, and has shipped transmitters to Guatemala, Mexico, and Haiti. One of the Dunifer-built transmitters was used to start "Radio TeleVerdad," which defied the Mexican government's control of the airwaves by broadcasting pro-democracy commentaries in Mexico City. The station was raided by soldiers, but after protests by listeners and opposition politicians, was allowed to resume broadcasting. Dunifer has also built transmitters for activists in Chiapas, Mexico, where the Zapatistas have spearheaded widespread opposition to government corruption and brutality.³²

In contrast to Mexico, the populist governments of Jean Bertrand Aristide and his successor have supported the establishment of micro-radio stations, which are seen as tools for empowering Haiti's poor.

Brewer (www.ldbrewer.com) has built and sent transmitters to Israel, Chile and the Philippines, where dozens of stations have gone on the air in the past few years. Wilson (www.panaxis.com) has also shipped transmitters abroad, including to Argentina, where hundreds of micro-radio stations are now on the air.³³ The several thousand Argentine stations broadcast from shantytowns and poor rural areas — to populations neglected by that country's commercial media — and, unlike those in the US, are tolerated because there are too many free stations for the FCC to silence.³⁴

Around the world, these stations are providing broadcast voices to people who were previously voiceless. It is going to be difficult for governments which previously controlled access to the airwaves, including Washington, to put these transmitters back in their boxes. ■

30. Soley and Nichols, *Clandestine Radio* ..., *op. cit.*, pp. 231. 31. *Ibid.*, pp. 268-77.

32. Kenneth Noble, "Rebel Radio Operator Exports His

Know-how," *New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1996, p. A10.


33. Interviews, July 1997.

34. Jesse Walker, "Don't Touch That Dial," *Reason*, Oct. 1995, p. 34; and Ellen Torres, "Latin TV Industry Meets in Buenos Aires," *Video Age International*, Oct. 1995, p. 38.

Mad Cow Disease: Industrial Farming Comes Home to Roost

by Sheldon Rampton
and John Stauber

Illustrations by Sue Coe



The USDA had just recalled 25 million pounds of contaminated hamburger and Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman was doing his best to sound upbeat. "All evidence at this point indicates that we have contained the outbreak," he told reporters in August. The reassurance did not generate much optimism. Not only had researchers failed to pinpoint the source of the contamination, but everyone involved — including the meat industry — admitted that future outbreaks are inevitable.¹

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1. Mitchell Satchell and Stephen J. Hedges, "The Next Bad Beef Scandal?" *US News and World Report*, Sept. 1, 1997.

The deadly strain of *E. coli* bacteria found in hamburgers from Hudson Foods Inc. is only one of several life-threatening diseases that have found their way into the human food supply. The problem is an inevitable consequence of modern factory farming systems, whose very success at mass production of food has created the potential for massive spread of disease. A disease introduced anywhere into the system has the potential to spread widely and often cannot be detected until it is already on the consumer's plate. Yet factory farming has become so entrenched in modern society that no one is seriously proposing any alternatives. Instead, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) is waging rearguard battles — "containing outbreaks" rather than averting them, because effective preventive actions would be far more radical than anyone in power is prepared to countenance.

What should you do to protect yourself from unsafe food? According to USDA and the food industry, you should wash your hands and kitchen surfaces more often and cook everything longer. In other words, think of your kitchen as a decontamination center. Inside the food factories, they plan to introduce other reforms — jerry-rigged food safety protocols aimed at "hazardous and critical control points" — HACCP for short. Finally, they'd like to nuke your food before they sell it to you, bombarding it with radiation to kill bacteria.

But "hazardous and critical control point" procedures can be effective only if they anticipate all potential avenues through which disease can enter and spread. And even irradiating your food — the solution currently being pushed by the food and nuclear waste industries — won't knock out everything in it that could kill

you. It is simply the latest high-tech "fix" for problems created by mass production, problems which demonstrate that the hazards created by technological innovation tend to be difficult to predict and hard to control once they have emerged. The problem is global in scope and growing.

Take, for example, the case of mad cow disease.

First identified in England in 1985, mad cow disease — technically, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE — produces profound physical deterioration and dementia before it kills. It belongs to a class of fatal brain diseases known as transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, or TSEs, because they riddle their victims' brains with microscopic sponge-like holes.

Neither irradiation nor cooking, nor any other routine sterilization, is any good at killing the infectious agent that causes TSEs. According to the current leading scientific theory, the infectious agent can't in fact be killed at all, because it isn't a living organism to begin with.² It's simply a protein, called a "prion" (PREE-on), that occurs naturally in all mammals and has the ability to refold itself into a deadly configuration that multiplies by recruiting other prion proteins to change their folding patterns.

A Steak through the Heart

If the prion is just a protein, it follows that the only way to "disinfect" contaminated meat would be to treat it with something that destroys proteins — which would pretty much negate the whole point to eating meat in the first place. In addition to radiation, prions can withstand antibiotics, boiling water, bleach, formaldehyde, and a variety of solvents, detergents, and enzymes known to destroy most known bacteria and viruses. In one experiment, the infectious agent remained transmissible even after an hour-long exposure to 360 degrees centigrade (680 degrees Fahrenheit) — enough heat to melt lead and to reduce a good-sized slab of meat to fine ash. This resilience forced researchers to raise "the disturbing question of whether even incineration can be guaranteed to inactivate the agent."³

Worse yet, if infectious prions are simply refolded versions of a protein that the body produces naturally, testing for their presence

2. Gordon B. Hunter, *Scrapie and Mad Cow Disease: the Smallest, Deadliest Living Thing* (New York: Vantage Press, 1993).

3. Paul Brown, Pawel P. Liberski, Axel Wolff and D. Carleton Gajdusek, "Resistance of Scrapie Infectivity to Steam Autoclaving after Formaldehyde Fixation and Limited Survival after Ashing at 360°C: Practical and Theoretical Implications," *Journal of Infectious Diseases*, n. 161, Mar. 1989, p. 470.



Drs. Carleton Gajdusek (l.) and Vincent Zigas examine a victim of kuru, a TSE contracted from eating infected human brains.

D. CARLETON GAJDUSEK, ARCHIVE #57-368B.

is much harder than testing for a bacteria, virus, or other foreign invader. Indeed, TSEs produce no signs of inflammation or fever, and no detectable antibody response. The disease usually goes undetected, therefore, until visible symptoms appear, by which time death is inevitable.

Unlike other infectious diseases, TSEs

mit, especially from one species to another. With the exception of a disease in sheep called "scrapie," TSEs have spread widely only in populations engaged in unnatural feeding practices. In humans, the most notable example occurred among the Fore society of Papua New Guinea. After incorporating ritual cannibalism into their fun-

eral ceremonies in the early 20th century, the Fore fell victim in large numbers to a devastating epidemic of a TSE called kuru.

You Eat What You Are

These days, however, in the high-tech world of factory farms, cannibalism and other unnatural feeding patterns are not only practiced

but preached as the latest miracles of modern efficiency and progress.

Although these practices are in fact more widespread in the US than in any other country, it was in England that the first cases of TSEs spreading from mammal to human were documented. Like kuru, England's epidemic of mad cow disease has been traced to cannibalism — in this case, the feeding of "rendered" cattle protein to other cattle. Following the first human deaths in England, the USDA and the cattle industry have reluctantly accepted a limited ban on this practice. In order to minimize the blow to industry, however, loopholes were written into the legislation. It remains legal to feed rendered cattle protein to pigs or chickens, whose remains can

In the high-tech world of factory farms, cannibalism is not only practiced, but is preached as the latest miracle of modern efficiency and progress.

can arise through chance mutations even in populations that have never been exposed. These "spontaneous" occurrences affect about one in a million humans per year and kill a variety of other mammals at the same rate.

Finally, TSEs are characterized by an even longer incubation period than the AIDS virus. Cases have been documented in which more than 40 years have elapsed between the time of exposure and the onset of symptoms.

Taken together, these factors make it impossible to prevent an outbreak through quarantines, or even to detect an outbreak before it has reached epidemic proportions.

Fortunately, the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies have an Achilles heel: They are usually "difficult" to trans-

in turn be rendered and fed back to cattle. In addition, pigs are still eating pigs, and chickens are routinely fed with protein supplements derived from the feathers, blood, and even the feces of other chickens.

According to *Consumers Research* food editor Beatrice Trum Hunter, the food industry's quest for cheaper animal feed

has taken us from grass and hay feeding to such non-traditional ingredients in animal feed as sewage sludge and treated manure. The search for alternative substances in animal feed suited the new conditions that arose from agricultural changes. ... A plethora of substances found their way into animal feed. They included agricultural [and] ... food wastes. ... Slaughterhouses and tanneries provided blood, entrails, hoofs, bristles, and feathers for use in animal feed. [Industry provided] wastes such as sawdust, wood chips, twigs, and even ground-up newspapers and cardboard boxes [as well as] cement dust from kilns, sludge from municipal composting plants, water from electric generating plants that used fluidized bed combustion of coal, and waste water from nuclear power stations. ... [Agriculture provided] 'the Four Ds' — dead, dying, disabled, and diseased animals ... moisture-damaged or maggot-infested grains; foods contaminated by rodents, roaches, or bird excreta.⁴


These innovations exist because they are a cheap source of nutrients and a convenient way for large-scale farming operations to dispose of wastes. Most have occurred in the past two decades, aided and abetted by the USDA and by university research scientists, whose pilot projects and experimental samplings have "demonstrated" that "alternative feed substances" can be used safely.⁵

Dying for Dinner

Pilot projects, however, cannot anticipate the possibility of rare and unusual "Andromeda strains" such as the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, and they are not much good either at predicting the likelihood of other infectious disease outbreaks. Government and industry have been aware of these dangers for years, but have kept a tight lid on public discussions for fear of consumer reactions. A 1990 report on cattle inspection by the Food and Nutrition Board of the National Academy of Sciences found that in the United States, food-borne diseases "appear to be steadily increasing."

4. Beatrice Trum Hunter, "What Is Fed to Our Food Animals?" *Consumers' Research*, Dec. 1996, pp. 13-14.

5. The use of bovine growth hormones has also contributed to increases in supplements. In order to support the higher milk production induced by the drugs, cows on BGH need levels of protein not available in their natural diet.



Pigs are still eating pigs, and chickens are routinely fed with protein supplements derived from the feathers, blood, and even feces of other chickens.

An estimated 5 million cases of food borne disease and approximately 5,000 related deaths occur annually. This apparent increase is variously attributed to automated food processing, increased reliance on fast foods, greater use of pre-packaged foods and microwave ovens, urbanization, public naiveté about food production and slaughter methods, and lack of knowledge about the hygienic precautions required at all stages of food handling.⁶

6. Committee on Evaluation of USDA Streamlined Inspection System for Cattle, *Cattle Inspection* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1990), p. 14.

Even the National Cattlemen's Beef Association admitted that this estimate of the human toll is conservative. According to the NCBA's James Reagan. "Today, [1994] food borne illness is a major problem for the industry, and it's a major cost for our country. If you look at some estimates, there are about 12.6 million cases of food borne illness a year. The cost is estimated to be about \$8.4 billion, including lost time at work, health care cost, etc."⁷ The

7. J.O. Reagan, "E. coli O157:H7: Issues and Answers: Food borne Pathogens," *Reciprocal Meat Conference Proceedings*, v. 46, 1993, p. 119.



US government's General Accounting Office puts the danger even higher, estimating the true incidence of food borne illness at as many as 81 million cases a year.⁸ By 1997, the accepted figure for US deaths was 9,000 a year.

Salmonella and listeria are at the top of the list of common infections, but *Escherichia coli* 0157:H7 — the cause of the Hudson hamburger recall — has become a growing problem. *E. coli* is a common bacteria and usually benign, but the 0157:H7 strain can be deadly.⁹

"It's a critical problem for us and it's a major problem, since it occurs most of the time in children between one and eight years of age," Reagan said. First identified in 1982, *E. coli* 0157:H7 can induce abdomi-

8. US General Accounting Office, "Food Safety: Reducing the Threat of Food borne Illnesses," report number T-RCED-96-185, May 23, 1996.

9. Listeria is a food-borne pathogen implicated in several outbreaks of illness.

nal cramping so severe that it can rival labor pains or appendicitis, followed within 24 hours by watery diarrhea which later becomes grossly bloody, described in some cases as "all blood and no stool." In one in 20 patients, especially children, these symptoms progress to a more severe condition known as hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS), marked by clotting of the red blood cells which in turn can cause kidney and heart failure, disorders of the central nervous system, seizures, coma, and death.

Researchers are discovering that the problem is even more extensive and complicated than previously thought. When a group of Belgian microbiologists tried to track down the cause of life threatening kidney failures from contaminated food, they found no *E. coli* 0157 in the stricken patients. After conducting genetic or toxicology tests, the researchers found that the gravely ill patients had other *E. coli* variants including 026, 091, 0103, 0111, and 0172. Without the specialized and time-consuming tests they ran, these strains would have gone undetected and the source of the contamination impossible to find.¹⁰

Undercooked ground beef is the most common vehicle of *E. coli* infection, which has been popping up increasingly in day-care centers, nursing homes, restaurants, and other institutional settings. The

most notorious single outbreak was a highly publicized 1992 case involving contaminated hamburgers at Jack-in-the-Box restaurants, which sickened more than 700 people, causing 55 cases of HUS and four deaths. The media reaction from that case prompted James Reagan to ponder "how today's headlines compare with those at the turn of the century when Upton Sinclair wrote [*The Jungle*.] We know how revolutionary that [book] was and how devastating it was for the meat industry," he said. "I think back over the number of discussions I've had during the last six months with regulatory agencies, meat packers and others. I left some of those conversations thinking that this outbreak in January may be as revolutionary as what happened around the turn of the century."¹¹

10. "Food bug detectives look beyond the usual suspects," *New Scientist* (England), June 7, 1997, p. 5.

11. Reagan, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

Fillet of Soul

The situation may be revolutionary, but industry reaction has been mostly of the counterrevolutionary variety. Rather than offering solutions to prevent future outbreaks, industry focuses on "containing" current outbreaks — including outbreaks of public concern.

This attitude toward health risks is epitomized by the words of Jack Mongoven, president of the Mongoven, Biscoe & Duchin PR firm which advises the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA). In 1994, Mongoven helped broker an industry response to evidence compiled by the Environmental Protection Agency showing that consumption of beef and milk products accounts for more than three-fourths of human exposure to dioxin-like compounds. Exposure to even small amounts of dioxin has been linked to cancer and to endocrine disruption which can cause sexual deformities, lowered intelligence and other hormonal problems.

"The National Cattlemen's [Beef] Association is coordinating a group of affected industries to respond," Mongoven wrote in a confidential memo. "At this time, the dioxin source industry groups are concentrating on questioning the toxicology data the report relies on. ... NCA and its allies in the working group have a history of strong relations with the Agriculture department, and it's certain they will use these solid ties to put pressure on EPA through Agriculture."¹²

Thanks to a corporate whistleblower, several of Mongoven's internal memos were leaked to Greenpeace. The documents revealed a cynical attitude toward human safety that shocked even jaded political activists. According to Mongoven, the industry should wage an aggressive campaign against environmentalists and other activists who "play on the emotions of the public and its concern for future generations." Such concerns, he argues, are simply part of an environmentalist effort to attack corporate power by imposing a new and nefarious legal standard that Mongoven calls "the precautionary principle."

"The precautionary principle holds that a manufacturer must prove that its product does no harm, before it can be marketed," Mongoven complained in the March 1995 issue of "Eco-logic," an anti-environmentalist newsletter. "Activists want to use this weapon to control the behavior of other Americans ... [to] revolutionize American thinking about regulation, constitutional

12. MBD Update and Analysis, Confidential for Chlorine Chemistry Council; Activist Update: Chlorine, May 18, 1994.

law, and government's role in society."¹³ To win its war against activists, industry needs "to mobilize science against the precautionary principle. ... The industry must identify the implications posed by the 'precautionary principle' and assist the public in understanding the damage it inflicts on the role of science in modern development and production."¹⁴

Apocalypse Cow?

Mad cow disease puts the two sides of the debate on the precautionary principle in stark relief. As in many situations affecting public health — from the dangers of global warming to low-level radiation, to pesticide contamination — the science is convincing but not definitive. Industry contends that if a clear danger cannot be proven beyond a shadow of a doubt, then the marketplace should rule and trade should not be restricted. Activists and environmentalists take the view that it is up to industry to establish the safety of a product or process *before* it is marketed and that consumers should never be used as guinea pigs. In the case of mad cow disease, no one knows if the problem will remain small or become epidemic, and a credible case can be made for either scenario. With potential stakes this high — the health of a major industry versus the lives of mil-

lions — government regulatory agencies are squirming.

On March 20, 1996, after much public pressure, London reversed a decade of denial and admitted that consumption of beef from mad cows was the "most likely" explanation for the appearance of a bizarre, previously unseen dementia in humans known as "new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease" (nvCJD). Like conventional

It is impossible to predict the size of the epidemic — it may only involve hundreds, but it could ...become a disaster of biblical proportions. — John Collinge, microbiologist

strains of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), the new variant belongs to the class of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. Like all TSEs, nvCJD is incurable and inevitably fatal. Conventional CJD, unlike nvCJD, almost always attacks people over 50 years old. The new variant came to light when young people — some of them still in their teens — started dying.

To date, 22 cases of the new disease have been documented in humans, with several more suspected cases still alive and therefore unconfirmed. The number so far is small, and it is possible that it will stay

small, but that is by no means certain. Like AIDS, the spongiform encephalopathies are diseases that can take years, even decades, to incubate, thereby making it impossible to predict the size of an outbreak during its early stages.

This parallel has been noted by Luc Montagnier, the French scientist who in 1983 first discovered the infectious agent that causes AIDS. At that time, France had only 200 AIDS cases. "I did not realize the epidemic could spread so fast and so widely in the world," he said, warning that the handful of early human victims from mad cow disease could be the harbinger of a much larger epidemic. "It is very difficult to predict, as it was for HIV in 1983," he said.

No TSE had ever been documented in cows until the mid-1980s, and the total number of bovine cases did not top 1,000 until 1988. Since then, however, more than 160,000 cows have been diagnosed and scientists concur that most were infected during the period when the British government was confidently claiming that "the number of confirmed cases ... is very small."¹⁵ "In those days, it really was hard; in fact, nobody honestly could foresee what was going to happen," British researcher Richard Kimberlin said in 1996. "Now it is all painfully clear, the sheer scale of the epidemic."¹⁶

Upton Sinclair Meets Soylent Green

While the fate of Britain's cows may be clear, that of its beef-eating human population remains clouded. Recent news has not been good. This August, doctors disclosed that Clare Louise Tomkins had become the 22nd known victim of mad cow disease. Twenty-four years old at the time of her death, Tomkins had been a strict vegetarian for 12 years. Earlier in the epidemic, the beef industry would probably have interpreted this fact as "proof" that something other than eating beef was the true cause of nvCJD. Today, however, mounting evidence has led to a near-total scientific consensus in favor of the link to beef.

15. "Disease Update: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy," *Veterinary Record* (UK), v. 122, n. 20, May 14, 1988, pp. 477-78.

16. Richard Kimberlin, "Current Science on Transmission of TSE," presentation during a two-day symposium on Tissue Distribution, Inactivation and Transmission of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs) of Animals, Riverdale, MD, May 13-14, 1996.



DAVID JACKSON

In one experiment, the infectious agent remained transmissible even after an hour-long exposure to enough heat to melt lead and to reduce a good-sized slab of meat to fine ash. This raised "the disturbing question of whether even incineration can be guaranteed to inactivate the agent?"

That the disease occurred in a woman who had not eaten meat for 12 years raises ominous possibilities: While Tomkins might have eaten a small quantity of meat without being aware of it, it is also possible that her illness had been incubating for more than a decade and that she became infected by eating beef before mad cow disease was even detected in cows. In that case, the 22 nvCJD cases to date might mark the beginning of a huge epidemic bell curve. There is also a chance that Tomkins was infected by non-meat products. Like most vegetarians, she drank milk and ate cheese, and was probably exposed to bovine products such as gelatin, which is used in a wide variety of processed foods, as well as in medicines and cosmetics. Laboratory tests, however, have failed to detect infectivity in milk or gelatin. If they were the route through which she contracted the disease, it would imply that existing tests are not sensitive enough and that undetectable yet deadly levels of infection have entered the human food chain.

Whatever that cause, scientists are growing increasingly concerned. In 1996, British microbiologist John Collinge was one of the researchers whose work was frequently cited as evidence that mad cow disease posed little or no risk to humans. This August, however, he said, "I am now coming round to the view that doctors working in this field have to say what they think, even though this may give rise to anxieties which later turn out to be groundless. We have a heavy weight of responsibility to warn, but we have to be aware that what we say may be scary and may do irremediable economic damage. But it can no longer be denied that it is

is certain is that we cannot afford to wait and see. We have to do something, right now. We have to find the answers, not only to the questions of the nature of the disease, but to find a way to develop an effective treatment."¹⁷

Can It Happen Here?

No cases of the British strain of bovine spongiform encephalopathy have been documented yet in the US, but there is evidence that a different TSE has already occurred in US cattle. Outbreaks of transmissible mink encephalopathy have wiped out a few mink farms, and epidemiological data show clearly that this rare disease is spread through contaminated feed. In every documented case to date, cattle proteins have been part of the minks' diet. In 1985, Professor Richard Marsh of the University of Wisconsin investigated a

case in which a mink rancher's primary food source came from "downer cows" — animals designated unfit for human consumption. Their symptoms, e.g., inability to stand, matched those for mad cow disease. Further research showed that when brain matter from the diseased mink was transmitted back to healthy cattle, it produced a TSE with symptoms identical to those commonly found in downer cows.

Another unexpected avenue of CJD risk hit the headlines in the US in August 1997, when researchers studied five unrelated patients who had been seen with CJD at a clinic in western Kentucky and found that all five had a history of eating squirrel brains. Although squirrel brains are eaten by some people in rural areas, it was hardly a popular food

17. "Human 'Mad Cow' Case Number 21 in Britain," Reuters, London, Aug. 4, 1997.



SUE COE

item. No cases of TSE had ever been documented in a squirrel, but the link was suggestive enough that researchers urged "caution ... in the ingestion of this arboreal rodent."¹⁸

So far, the US appears to have avoided an epidemic like the one that has devastated Britain's cattle industry — but thanks more to blind luck than to sound policies. Even after England prohibited feeding rendered cows back to cows, USDA officials continued to tell farmers that the practice was safe. In 1993, the USDA rebuffed a formal petition by activist Jeremy Rifkin to ban the practice. Gary Wilson of the National Cattlemen's Association responded by ridiculing Rifkin's warning that BSE could pose a risk to humans, calling it a "very creative stretch of scientific research and evidence."¹⁹ Wilson admitted that his

18. Joseph Berger, et al., "Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Eating Squirrel Brains," *Lancet*, v. 350, no. 9078, Aug. 30, 1997.
19. "Citing 'Mad-Cow' Fears, Rifkin Group Petitions FDA to Halt 'Cow Cannibalism,'" *Nutrition Week*, Community Nutrition Institute, v. 23, n. 24, June 25, 1993, p. 2.

While industry wants to market any product not yet proven dangerous, environmentalists insist that consumers never be used as guinea pigs.

possible, even likely, that we may have to face an epidemic. It is impossible to predict the size of the epidemic — it may only involve hundreds, but it could be Europe-wide and become a disaster of biblical proportions. We have to face the possibility of a disaster with tens of thousands of cases. We just don't know if this will happen, but what

"industry could find economically feasible alternatives to ... [rendered] animal protein. ... However, the association does not want to set a precedent of being ruled by 'activists.'"20

Internally, some USDA staff members within the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) have come down on the side of employing the precautionary principle. A 1992 internal report recommended a mandatory ban on same-species feeding. "They argue that because there is evidence that pigs, cats, mink, deer, and a wide variety of experimental animals may be susceptible to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, the only prudent policy is to not feed products that may contain these agents to any species of animal," the report admitted. "The advantage of this option is that it minimizes the risk of BSE. The disadvantage is that the cost to the livestock and rendering industries would be substantial."²¹

No action was taken, however, until June 4, 1997 — more than a year after the British government reluctantly admitted that human beings were dying from eating BSE-infected beef. The regulation now in place officially bans the practice of feeding cattle and other ruminant (cud-chewing) animals with proteins derived from other ruminants. Cannibalistic feeding practices

20. *Food Chemical News*, July 5, 1993.

21. USDA/APHIS, "Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Rendering Policy," 1991, pp. 6-10.

are continuing, however, with pigs, chickens, and other non-ruminant species.

So far, then, faced with the choice between possible damage to public health and injury to private industry, the government has thrown the precautionary principle to the wind.

Shut Up and Eat: Food Censorship in the USA

Meanwhile, corporations are trying to chill critics. On June 19, a British judge ruled that two environmental activists had com-

Media coverage of the food disparagement laws has trivialized the issues with cutesy wordplay about "veggie hate crimes."

mitted "McLibel" when they criticized the McDonald's restaurant chain for serving fatty, unhealthy foods, damaging the environment, paying low wages, and mistreating animals. Although Justice Rodger Bell acknowledged that there was a factual basis for all of these criticisms, he ruled under Britain's reactionary libel law that activists Helen Steel and Dave Morris were guilty *anyway* and ordered them to pay \$96,000 in damages.

In the US, the food industry is working overtime to enact British-style libel laws that make it easier to silence activists and journalists. Agribusiness has spent the past half decade introducing "food disparagement" laws into dozens of states and has gotten laws passed in 13: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. Nicknamed "banana laws" or "broccoli bills" by media, agricultural product disparagement laws were designed specifically and expressly to chill critics and protect industry profits by preventing people from expressing opinions that might discourage consumers from buying particular foods.

The scant media coverage of new laws has tended to trivialize the issues with cutesy wordplay

and light-hearted commentary about "veggie hate crimes." "Mind how you disparage asparagus or berate broccoli," advised the headline in the *Los Angeles Times*. "Don't bad-mouth that Brussels sprout. It could cost you," quipped *USA Today*. But while the media chuckle smugly, the potential chilling effect and the constitutional

implications of the laws are largely ignored. Although the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," the new "agricultural product disparagement laws," are doing just that. They give the food industries the power to sue people who criticize their products, using standards of evidence which dramatically shift the "burden of proof" in favor of the industry. "In them, American agribusiness has its mightiest tool yet against food-safety activists and environmentalists, whose campaigns can cost industry millions if they affect consumers' buying habits," observes *Village Voice* reporter Thomas Goetz.²²

The first target of a lawsuit under the new legislation is Howard Lyman of the Humane Society of the US, who is being sued along with Oprah Winfrey for warning on the Oprah Show about the human dangers associated with Britain's epidemic of mad cow disease. The lawsuit against him, filed in 1996 by cattleman Paul Engler, states that Lyman's warning about mad cow disease "goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community."²³

The Oprah lawsuit will be the first test case for a new legal standard. "All agricultural eyes will be watching this one," ob-

22. Thomas Goetz, "After the Oprah Crash," *Village Voice*, Apr. 29, 1997, p. 39.

23. Petition by Paul F. Engler and Cactus Feeders, Inc. against Oprah Winfrey, Harpo Productions, Howard Lyman and Cannon Communications, US District Court, Texas Northern District, May 28, 1996.

An experiment is being carried out to see if humans can catch BSE.



These are the guinea pigs.

THE VEGETARIAN SOCIETY

Ad placed in Britain by vegetarian activists.



COURTESY OF F.A.R.M.

"Finishing" feedlot for fattening up to 10,000 cattle before slaughter.

served one food industry lobbyist. Engler's attorney described the suit as "a historic case; it serves as a real bellwether. It should make reporters and journalists and entertainers — and whatever Oprah considers herself — more careful."²⁴

Shifting the Burden

Under previous laws, the food industry bore the burden of proof. To win a libel case, it had to prove that its critics were deliberately and knowingly circulating false information. Under the new standard, however, it doesn't matter that Lyman believes in his statements, or even that he can produce distinguished scientists to support his conclusions. According to Tom Holt, right-wing policy wonk with longstanding ties to right-wing institutions and causes, the new laws place "the onus on the disparaging activist, rather than under liability law, which would place the onus on the grower or manufacturer of the disparaged product."²⁵ That means that instead of cor-

porations being forced to prove their critics are wrong, food critics can be judged guilty unless they can prove that what they have said is right. The industry could convict Lyman of spreading "false information" if it convinced a jury that his statements on the Oprah show deviated from "reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry, facts, or data" — a legal standard which gives a clear advantage to the multi-billion-dollar beef industry, particularly in Texas cattle country — and particularly with respect to mad cow disease, an exotic illness whose characteristics continue to baffle researchers. And the penalties are stiff. In Idaho, defendants can be required to pay a fine equal to the plaintiff's claimed financial damages. In Texas, the penalty is three times the damages. In Colorado, the legislation included provisions for up to a year of actual jail time.

"Agricultural disparagement statutes represent a legislative attempt to insulate an economic sector from criticism, and, in

this respect, they may be strikingly successful in chilling the speech of anyone concerned about the food we eat," observes David Bederman, Associate Professor of Law at Emory University Law School. "The freedom of speech, always precious, becomes ever more so as the agricultural industries use previously untried methods as varied as exotic pesticides, growth hormones, radiation, and genetic engineering on our food supply. Scientists and consumer advocates must be able to express their legitimate concerns. The agricultural disparagement statutes quell just that type of speech. At bottom, any restriction on speech about the quality and safety of our food is dangerous, undemocratic, and unconstitutional."²⁶

Kansas cattle rancher Jim Sartwelle disagrees. "That type of speech, I don't feel needs to be protected," he argues. "It's important to have some sort of backstop

24. Goetz, *op. cit.*

25. Tom Holt, "Could Lawsuits Be the Cure for Junk Science?" *Priorities*, v. 7, n. 2 (1995).

26. David J. Bederman, interview by John Stauber, Feb. 15, 1997.



COURTESY OF F.A.R.M.

Thousands of chickens in a battery egg-laying system are kept in small cages throughout their productive lives.

in place to penalize people for making unsubstantiated comments.²⁷

That the Oprah case has emerged as the test may prove fortunate. Amid the scientific debate and many mysteries surrounding the disease, one fact has emerged undisputed. The disease in cows became an epidemic because of modern farming practices, in particular the practice of feeding protein derived from rendered cattle back to other cows. Howard Lyman's appearance on the Oprah Winfrey show focused precisely on this "cow cannibalism." He is being sued because he accurately and correctly told a national audience that the US meat industry is continuing to practice animal cannibalism on a massive scale.

SLAPP Happy

No matter what the verdict in the Lyman case, though, the food industry expects to emerge a winner. Lyman is a victim of a corporate technique that has become so popular that it even carries its own cute nickname in legal circles. "SLAPP suits," an acronym for "strategic lawsuits against public participation" are designed to sue people into silence and submission. "Thousands of SLAPPs have been filed in the last two decades, tens of thousands of Americans have been SLAPPED, and still more have been muted or silenced by the threat," write law professors George Pring and Penelope Canan in their 1996 book, *SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out*.

27. Anthony Collings, "Food Producers Push for Laws Protecting Their Crops from Rumors," CNN, May 13, 1996.

"[F]ilers of SLAPPs rarely win in court yet often 'win' in the real world, achieving their political agendas. We found that SLAPP targets who fight back seldom lose in court yet are frequently devastated and depoliticized and discourage others from speaking out — 'chilled' in the parlance of First Amendment commentary."²⁸

If we let industry set the rules of the debate, there will literally be no limit to what we'll have to swallow.

They are also often broke since these suits not only divert critics' time and energy, but force them to spend huge amounts of money defending themselves in court. "The longer the litigation can be stretched out . . . the closer the SLAPP filer moves to success," observes New York Supreme Court Judge J. Nicholas Colabella. "Those who lack the financial resources and emotional stamina to play out the 'game' face the difficult choice of defaulting despite meritorious defenses or being brought to their knees to settle. . . . Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined."²⁹

28. George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, *SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out* (Philadelphia, Temple University Press: 1996), p. xi.

29. *Gordon vs. Marrone*, NY Supreme Court decision, 1992.

"Initially we saw such suits as attacks on traditional 'free speech' and regarded them as just 'intimidation lawsuits,'" Pring and Canan state. "As we studied them further, an even more significant linkage emerged: the defendants had been speaking out in government hearings, to government officials, or about government actions. . . . This was not just free speech under attack. It was that other and older and even more central part of our Constitution: the right to petition government for a redress of grievances, the 'Petition Clause' of the First Amendment."

SLAPP suits threaten the very foundation of citizen involvement and public participation in democracy. "Americans by the thousands are being sued, simply for exercising one of our most cherished rights: the right to communicate our views to our government officials, to 'speak out' on public issues," state Pring and Canan. "Today, you and your friends, neighbors, co-workers, community leaders, and clients can be sued for millions of dollars just for telling the government what you think, want, or believe in. Both individuals and groups are now being routinely sued in multimillion-dollar damage actions for such 'all-American' political activities as circulating a petition, writing a letter to the editor, testifying at a public hearing, reporting violations of law, lobbying for legislation, peaceful demonstrating, or otherwise attempting to influence government action."³⁰

Power to the Plaintiffs/Sue As I Do, Not As I Say

Corporate libel lawsuits bring the formidable powers of government and industry together

for the purpose of suppressing the views of people with complaints against the system. Ironically, the PR industry is eagerly hyping these lawsuits as populist solutions to the problem of too much government. According to Tom Holt, associated with Capital Research Center, reforms are necessary to make it harder to sue corporations because "the consumer movement has imposed significant costs on industry — costs ultimately passed on to consumers — and has violated individual freedoms in a futile effort to protect us from our own actions and judgment."³¹ In order to restore those freedoms, Holt is now calling for new laws so that corporations can more effectively sue, chastise and punish their enemies. "Could

30. Pring, pp. x, 2.

lawsuits be the cure for junk science?" he asked in a 1995 issue of *Priorities*, the monthly publication of Elizabeth Whelan's corporate-funded right-wing advocacy group, the American Council on Science and Health.³²


Holt complained that current libel law "has been a major stumbling block to the progress of a lawsuit brought by the Washington Apple Growers against the National Resources Defense Council, perpetrators of the Alar scare. The growers initially filed suit in Yakima County (Wash.) Superior Court; but . . . the growers lost their case." Fortunately, he added, "agribusiness is now fighting back, shepherding what are known as 'agricultural product disparagement laws' through state legislatures. . . . On the national level, the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture failed in its attempt to include similar provisions in the 1995 farm bill."³³

The Meat of the Matter

Not surprisingly, given its disastrous safety record and vulnerability to liability, the meat industry is spearheading the current drive to undercut consumer protections. Leading the charge is the nonprofit, tax-exempt Animal Industry Foundation (AIF), which calls itself "animal agriculture's collective voice on food animal production, its effect on diet and environment, and its contributions to our quality of life." AIF's corporate funders include the powerhouse Burson-Marsteller and Hill & Knowlton PR firms. Its trustees include a who's-who of meat industry lobby and trade associations: the American Farm Bureau Federation, American Feed Industry Association, American Sheep Industry Association, American Society of Animal Science, American Veal Association, National Broiler Council, National Cattleman's Beef Association, National Milk Producers Federation, National Pork Producers Council, National

Turkey Federation, Southeastern Poultry & Egg Association and United Egg Producers.

Rather than push for legislation at the national level, the food industry has worked quietly state-by-state while avoiding a controversial national debate. "The model for these statutes was developed by the American Feed Industry Association," boasts an AIF newsletter. "If you'd like a copy of the model state legislation, please contact in writing Steve Kopperud at AFIA."³⁴ AIF in fact shares the same address, phone and staff as AFIA — the American Feed Industry Association, a "national trade association representing the manufacturers of more than 70 percent of the primary formula livestock and poultry feed sold annually."



Contrary to the old adage, you should watch both policy and sausage being made — if you value your stomach.

A letter Kopperud wrote to *Consumer Reports* is a model of Orwellian double-speak. In it he defended the industry's rationale behind food disparagement laws, claiming that they "do not repress free speech, but rather compel a speaker to think twice about opportunistic or false statements and the damage such rhetoric can do. . . . Food disparagement laws, as tools to make more honest our national discussion of food safety, are the ultimate consumer protection."

The AIF speaks more bluntly in literature aimed at farmers: "Animal rights activists . . . threaten the survival of today's farmers and ranchers. . . . It's time to fight back! . . . through advertising, elementary school programs,

publications and videos, news media outreach and public opinion research."

Terms of the Debate

With this arsenal at their disposal, the food industry certainly has enough power to make its voice heard in debates over food safety, but it never seems to feel that it has enough power. It would be convenient, from the industry's perspective, to shield itself from "hysteria, panic and instability" if it could limit the debate to "experts," through censorship measures such as "food disparagement laws."

Mad cow disease, however, is only one of multiple indications that the modern food industry is tampering with forces of

nature that it does not fully understand. "BSE is the Chernobyl of food safety," writes Nicols Fox in her important new book, *Spoiled: The Dangerous Truth About a Food Chain Gone Haywire*. "Just as the world's worst nuclear accident transformed public thinking about the wisdom of producing electricity by a means with the potential to be so damaging for so long a time, BSE is a warning shot across the bow of intensive farming practices, the worldwide distribution of agricultural products, and the demand for cheap food," she adds. "It underscores the dangers inherent in creating a division between animal and human

medical science and making the erroneous assumption that they are not directly related. It underlines the inherent flaw in entrusting the safety of food to a government agency that is at the same time mandated to protect the agricultural industry."³⁵

The debate over these practices needs to involve more than the voices of industry and its designated experts. If we let industry set the rules of the debate, there will literally be no limit to what we'll have to swallow, and the nightmare of mad cow disease — or something just as bad, or worse — not only *can* happen again, but almost certainly will. ■

31. Capital Research Center website advertisement for *The Rise of the Nanny State*.

32. Holt, *op. cit.*

33. *Ibid.* In 1990, apple growers filed an unsuccessful libel suit against CBS 60 Minutes, NRDC, and the Fenton PR firm for allegedly disparaging apples treated with Alar, a pesticide considered a "probable human carcinogen" by the EPA.

34. Animal Industry Foundation newsletter, v. 7, n. 3 (May/June 1994).

35. Nicols Fox, *Spoiled: The Dangerous Truth About a Food Chain Gone Haywire* (NY: Harper Collins, 1997), p. 331.

Off the Shelf:

CAQ'S BOOKS OF INTEREST

Secrets: The CIA's War at Home

by Angus Mackenzie

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, 1997,
ENDNOTES, INDEX, 254 PP., \$27.50 HB.

Prize-winning investigative journalist and First Amendment crusader Angus Mackenzie died in 1994, but continues to haunt the CIA. The agency celebrated its 50th anniversary in September, and the simultaneous posthumous publication of *Secrets* must have spoiled the festivities. For Mackenzie's final work, the product of 15 years of dedicated research, is an expose of the CIA's long-running — and clearly illegal — operations inside the US, as well as a history of the agency's efforts to hide its misdeeds behind a veil of imposed secrecy.

The book examines two tools in the government's arsenal of weapons to quash dissent — suppression and censorship — and shows how the CIA, among other agencies, used those tools to protect its interests; the rule of law be damned. Mackenzie's narrative of Vietnam-era CIA political spying on anti-war publications and its subsequent use of censorship to protect its crimes from discovery is as engaging as any spy novel. It also shows dramatically how the CIA's effort to cover up its domestic operations — an act of bureaucratic self-preservation — has had a far-reaching negative impact on First Amendment rights, especially those of government employees.

For Mackenzie, the root of the problem is the CIA's founding charter, the National Security Act of 1947, which enjoins the agency to "protect sources and methods." This injunction became the legal basis for prior censorship against former employees-turned-critics, such as Victor Marchetti and Philip Agee. Building on its success in those early cases, the government has expanded the use of secrecy contracts for all sorts of federal employees, subjecting them to prior review of their writings for life.

Apart from the government enforcers themselves, Mackenzie finds some surprising villains in the long struggle over censorship, most prominently the Washington ACLU office under Morton Halperin. Mackenzie argues convincingly that Halperin and his ACLU associates repeatedly caved in to the CIA in secrecy battles during the 1980s. Notably, Halperin agreed to sacrifice the First Amendment rights of government employees in order to preserve those of journalists under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Equally unconscionable in Mackenzie's view, the ACLU chose to negotiate with the CIA rather than mobilize its members and supporters to fight attempts at censorship.

Secrets covers episodes familiar to those who have followed the spy wars over the decades, such as the brouhaha around *Counterspy*, stepparent to CAQ, but Mackenzie adds information gleaned from his voluminous FOIA requests and hard-won interviews. He also situates the individual episodes in the long-running struggle over freedom of information in a fruitful, long-term perspective. *Secrets* is a fitting farewell from a journalist who will be missed.

Crack in America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice

Craig Reinerman & Harry G. Levine, (eds.)

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, 1997,
ENDNOTES, INDICES, 388 PP., \$17.95 PB.

Crime is Not the Problem: Lethal Violence in America

by Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1997, ENDNOTES,
BIBLIOGRAPHY, APPENDICES, 288 PP., \$35.00 HB.

What's behind the rot in the inner cities, the decline of moral values, and all of our other ills? According to law-and-order politicians, the media, and other purveyors of moral panic, the answer is *drugscrimewillence*, as if the three distinct phenomena were somehow one big, throbbing mass of social evil. In these two important works, social scientists put the lie to much of the demagoguery that passes for informed discourse on criminal justice issues.

Crack in America insists in no uncertain terms that nearly everything we "know" about crack is wrong, and it relies not on polemics but on hard numbers to do so. The crack epidemic? At the same time the media were hyping the plague, cocaine use was dropping. A black epidemic? The majority of crack users are white. Crack babies? It turns out that the syndromes asso-

ciated with "crack babies" are better described as being associated with *poverty*. Neither, it seems, do the horrendous consequences for these babies — life-long learning disorders, inability to bond with other humans — actually exist.

Editors Craig Reinerman and Harry G. Levine bring together a coterie of respected researchers to examine all facets of the "crack crisis," from the drug's psychopharmacology to the creation of "drug panics" to the unintended consequences of prohibition and the threats to basic freedoms deriving from what they describe as a misguided drug war. The editors contribute excellent chapters on the manufacture of drug hysteria and on how to achieve a sane response to drug abuse. All the contributors agree that a primary function of the crack scare was social and political: to deflect attention from the Reagan and Bush administrations' inner city-destroying economic policies. The editors and researchers involved have crafted the book on crack cocaine. *Crack in America* is rigorously reasoned, yet passionate in its prescriptions. It should be a required text for anyone interested in drug policy.

Crime Is Not the Problem isolates the act that gives US criminality its particularly frightening character: murder. The authors' trick is to distinguish *between* crime and violence, and the results are rewarding. Drawing on an exhaustive (and occasionally exhausting) review of existing research, the authors first place US crime in comparative and historical perspective, then examine the factors that may explain the differences.

In something of a surprise (at least to those who rely on the mass media), Zimring and Hawkins find that except for homicide, US crime rates are roughly similar to those of the other Western industrial countries. They then devote chapters to the question of whether guns, the mass media, and illegal drugs have a significant explanatory role, and in the authors' own words, the short answer is "yes, no, and maybe."

It seems commonsensical that the easy availability of guns increases the likelihood of murder. Zimring and Hawkins crunch the numbers, and the results confirm common sense, but with a few twists. Guns are used in only 4% of all crimes, but 70% of all killings. And most killings do *not* originate in criminal activity but in arguments that escalate. Where guns are not easily available, the result may be an assault; in the US, it is more often murder. Likewise, illegal drug markets in other countries do not produce the slaughter blamed on drugs in the US.

That many of the conclusions reached in these volumes seem counterintuitive at first glance speaks volumes about the sorry state of the national conversation about crime and justice. These works are a vigorous antidote to a muscle-bound "toughness" that is unable or unwilling to take the feeblest of analytical steps toward untying the Gordian knot of criminality in the US.

Grossed-Out Surgeon Vomits Inside Patient!: An Insider's Look at Supermarket Tabloids
by Jim Hogshire

FERAL HOUSE, 1997, BIBLIOGRAPHY, 147 PP., \$12.95 PB.

The Redneck Manifesto: America's Scapegoats — How We Got That Way and Why We're Not Going to Take It Anymore

by Jim Goad

SIMON & SCHUSTER, 1997, ENDNOTES, BIBLIOGRAPHY, 274 PP., \$22.00 HB.

These two books emerge from the far side of white America's class divide, that tawdry world of trailer parks, stretch pants, big hair, and Elvis worship. The world of the white poor and working class, or at least the popular image of it. For those whose understanding of "redneck" culture consists primarily of watching *Roseanne* reruns, Jim Goad and Jim Hogshire are must-reads, and they're fun, too. Goad is angry, articulate, and biting funny, if at times over the top. Hogshire's exposé of the multi-million selling tabloid newspaper industry is less aggressively outraged but equally eye-opening.

A journalist with years of experience in the tabloids, Hogshire uses insider knowledge and provocative analysis to open a window into both the business of tabloids and the larger role they play in the national psyche. (He is also author of *Opium for the Masses*, whose publication led to his arrest for the possession of dried poppies purchased legally from a neighborhood florist.)

His slender effort, named for a headline he once composed for a tabloid publisher, zeroes in on the tabs' consistently reactionary slant and their behind-the-scenes connections to national politics. The tabs usually fly beneath the radar of media critics, and Hogshire deserves credit for making the connections. He discusses how the tabs' black-and-white worldview both reflects and simplifies the government's and the mainstream media's line on the foe of the day.

Beginning with the story behind Ed Anger, the popular, hyper-reactionary *Weekly*

World News columnist who's always "pig-bitin' mad" about gays, feminists, criminals, or bureaucrats, Hogshire goes on to show how the tabs wholeheartedly beat the war drums during the Gulf War — and in their own inimitable style: "Jesus Appears to Our Boys in Saudi" and "I Was Raped By Saddam Hussein" are two of hundreds of lurid headlines for bogus articles churned out by the tabs. The Iraqi leader was also variously described as receiving battle plans from an undead Adolf Hitler, dying of brain cancer, being both gay and a swinish gigolo (in the same issue of the *Sun!*), and being a pet-torturer and dog-eater. Outrageous lies, of course, but then, as Hogshire dryly notes, so was the Kuwaiti baby incubator story.

Hogshire also exposes the tabs' historical links with the CIA, the Mafia, and other unsavory types. He demythologizes *Enquirer* publisher Generoso Pope, the man who "invented" the supermarket tabloid, worked for the CIA, and associated with mobster Frank Costello. Just why are those tabloid reporters making trips to global trouble spots yet coming away without published stories? Hogshire has some interesting answers.

Jim Goad probably reads the *Weekly World News*, and he's definitely got some of Ed Anger's vitriol, but thankfully not his Neanderthal cant. Goad rose to notoriety as the chief writer, editor, and publisher of the infamous 'zine *Answer Me!* and rode it all the way to a big cash advance from Simon & Schuster. With *The Redneck Manifesto*, he has earned his fee. (Whether or not S&S will recoup its investment is another question.)

Goad's contention is fairly simple: Poor and working-class whites have gotten a bum rap, and all that endless talk about racism misses the point. And that point is class, class, class! Goad works all the angles: He discusses the history of poor white Americans (in a defensively well-researched chapter), the savaging of "redneck culture," the seething resentment of workers toward idiotic, born-to-privilege managers, as well as white trash culture, religion, and play time. His enemies list includes collegiate radicals, alternative press pundits, and Eastern progressives in general. He also aims more than a few choice words at professional militia-watchers: "I'll bet you didn't know that anyone who criticizes the bankers is a closet anti-Semite with schizophrenic delusions and anyone who questions the federal government's claims to historical innocence is actually hiding his sexual inadequacy and fear of blacks." Whew.

The Redneck Manifesto is not for delicate souls. The easily offended will be offended. Goad's rhetoric is inflammatory (racist terms abound) and his style is an in-your-face rant. Still, it is precisely those holier-than-thou progressives with tender sensibilities who most need to read him. It's easy to quote *Redneck* about "white skin privilege" when you are comfortably situated in the middle class — much more comfortable than talking about class privilege! But try explaining the concept to a low-paid, high school-educated truck driver or factory worker. Goad will help you understand why you might try a different tack. ■

— Phillip Smith

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
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
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